Interfaces for enterprise valuation from a real options lens

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-80
Author(s):  
Jackson J. Tan
2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 403-415
Author(s):  
ALAA EL-SHAZLY

This article studies competitive bidding by strategic investors to buy enterprises that are being privatized through sealed-bid auctions. The bidders use a real options approach to enterprise valuation that accounts for asset quality given their private information. It is shown that the optimal bidding strategy under first-price sealed-bid auctions defines a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each strategic investor bids only a fraction of its prior valuation and competition decreases the bidder's profit margin. The greater the transparency and information disclosure on asset quality, the higher the seller's expected receipts will be.


10.1596/27376 ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Odin K. Knudsen ◽  
Pasquale L. Scandizzo

CFA Digest ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-102
Author(s):  
Frank T. Magiera
Keyword(s):  

CFA Digest ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 40-43
Author(s):  
Frank T. Magiera

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 (3 (156)) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paulina Adamczyk ◽  
Waldemar Rogowski

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