Getting the most from MBA internships: Promoting intern learning and job acceptance

2010 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard Beenen ◽  
Denise M. Rousseau
Keyword(s):  
Job Acceptance

The Inconsistent Role of Comparison Others and Procedural Justice in Reactions to Hypothetical Job Descriptions: Implications for Job Acceptance Decisions

1994 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 326-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max H. Bazerman ◽  
Holly A. Schroth ◽  
Pri Pradhan Shah ◽  
Kristina A. Diekmann ◽  
Ann E. Tenbrunsel
Keyword(s):  
Procedural Justice ◽  
Job Descriptions ◽  
Job Acceptance

Job Acceptance Intention Measure

1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan M. Saks ◽  
Willi H. Wiesner ◽  
Russel J. Summers
Keyword(s):  
Job Acceptance

Gaining Precision in Prediction of Job Acceptance

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin D. Carlson ◽  
Rebecca Lau
Keyword(s):  
Job Acceptance

Factors Related to Job Acceptance Decisions of College Recruits

1995 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel B. Turban ◽  
James E. Campion ◽  
Alison R. Eyring
Keyword(s):  
Job Acceptance

Mechanisms for hiring discrimination of immigrant applicants in the United States

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-417
Author(s):  
Ekundayo Y. Akinlade ◽  
Jason R. Lambert ◽  
Peng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Power Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Immigrant Status ◽  
Job Seekers ◽  
Theoretical Understanding ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Hiring Discrimination ◽  
Hiring Process ◽  
Job Offers ◽  
Job Acceptance

PurposeFew studies examine how hiring discrimination can be an antecedent to the labor exploitation of immigrant workers. The main purpose of this paper is to advance the theoretical understanding of how the intersectionality of race and immigrant status affects differential hiring treatment, and how it affects job offers, job acceptance and hiring decision outcomes for immigrant job seekers.Design/methodology/approachThe paper draws from theories on status and intersectionality, and literature on immigration labor and racial hierarchy, addressing the unequal power relations that underlie race and immigration status affecting the hiring process, to advance critical understandings of why immigrant job seekers accept positions where they may be exploited.FindingsThis paper provides a conceptual model to critically synthesize the complexity between race and immigrant status, and their effect on the experience of immigrant job seekers differently. Exploitation opportunism is introduced to better understand the mechanisms of hiring discrimination among immigrant job seekers to include the role of race, immigrant status, economic motivations and unequal power relations on the hiring process.Practical implicationsThe framework for exploitation opportunism will help employers improve the quality and fairness of their hiring methods, and empower immigrant job seekers to not allow themselves to accept subpar job offers which can lead to exploitation.Originality/valueThe paper provides an original analysis of immigrant job seekers' experience of the hiring process that reveals the intragroup differences among immigrants based on race and status, and the decision-making mechanisms that hiring managers and immigrant job seekers use to evaluate job offers and job acceptance.

scholarly journals Directed Search, Rationing and Wage Dispersion

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenjiro Hori
Keyword(s):  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Directed Search ◽  
Matching Function ◽  
Wage Dispersion ◽  
Aggregate Level ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Matching Market ◽  
Matching Efficiency ◽  
Job Acceptance

This paper develops a microeconomic model of directed search, where firms are heterogeneous in the number of vacancies advertised, and wages affect workers' choices when both applying for jobs and accepting a job. An aggregate matching function is derived, which incorporates workers' preferences for firms. The aggregate level of matches is shown to be independent of the workers' preferences in the job acceptance stage. When firms' labor demands are heterogeneous, the matching market equilibrium outcome is suboptimal. Matching efficiency is, however, attained in equilibrium, when wages are employed as a rationing device. This results in wage dispersion, despite workers being homogeneous.

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