Delivering health insurance through informal financial groups: Evidence on moral hazard and adverse selection

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ketki Sheth
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Financial Groups

Information, Risk Aversion, and Healthcare Economics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hendrik Schmitz ◽  
Svenja Winkler
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Consumer Choice ◽  
Insurance Coverage ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Healthcare Sector ◽  
Healthcare Economics ◽  
Information Asymmetries

The terms information and risk aversion play central roles in healthcare economics. While risk aversion is among the main reasons for the existence of health insurance, information asymmetries between insured individual and insurance company potentially lead to moral hazard or adverse selection. This has implications for the optimal design of health insurance contracts, but whether there is indeed moral hazard or adverse selection is ultimately an empirical question. Recently, there was even a debate whether the opposite of adverse selection—advantageous selection—prevails. Private information on risk aversion might weigh out information asymmetries regarding risk type and lead to more insurance coverage of healthy individuals (instead of less insurance coverage in adverse selection). Information and risk preferences are important not only in health insurance but more generally in health economics. For instance, they affect health behavior and, consequently, health outcomes. The degree of risk aversion, the ability to perceive risks, and the availability of information about risks partly explain why some individuals engage in unhealthy behavior while others refrain from smoking, drinking, or the like. Information has several dimensions. Apart from information on one’s personal health status, risk preferences, or health risks, consumer information on provider quality or health insurance supply is central in the economics of healthcare. Even though healthcare systems are necessarily highly regulated throughout the world, all systems at least allow for some market elements. These typically include the possibility of consumer choice, for instance, regarding health insurance coverage or choice of medical provider. An important question is whether consumer choice elements work in the healthcare sector—that is, whether consumers actually make rational or optimal decisions—and whether more information can improve decision quality.

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