When do informed traders acquire and trade on informational advantage? Evidence from Federal Reserve stress tests

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (10) ◽  
pp. 1459-1485
Author(s):  
Scott Fung ◽  
Robert Loveland
2017 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Flannery ◽  
Beverly Hirtle ◽  
Anna Kovner
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 1509-1546 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ohad Kadan ◽  
Roni Michaely ◽  
Pamela C. Moulton

We use a proprietary data set to test the implications of several asymmetric information models on how short-lived private information affects trading strategies and liquidity provision. Our identification rests on information acquisition before analyst recommendations are publicly announced. We provide the first empirical evidence supporting theoretical predictions that early-informed traders “sell the news” after “buying the rumor.” Further, we find distinct profit-taking patterns across different classes of institutions. Uninformed institutions, but not individuals, emerge as de facto liquidity providers to better-informed institutions. Placebo tests confirm that these trading patterns are unique to situations in which some investors have a short-lived informational advantage.


Author(s):  
Mark J. Flannery ◽  
Beverly Hirtle ◽  
Anna Kovner
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Yuliya Demyanyk

The Federal Reserve conducts stress tests of the largest bank holding companies to ensure that the banking system has sufficient capital to stay financially sound in the event of worsening economic conditions. Some groups have raised concerns that the stress tests will reduce lending to small businesses. This article describes recent research investigating the impact of the stress tests on small-business lending. It finds that the banks that are most affected by stress tests have reduced their small-business credit, but aggregate credit to small businesses has not fallen.


2004 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Kurov ◽  
Dennis J. Lasser

AbstractThis paper examines the price dynamics in the S&P 500 and Nasdaq-100 index futures contracts. By utilizing transactions data with attached trader type identification codes, we are able to analyze price dynamics for trades initiated by exchange locals and off-exchange customers. The empirical results show that price discovery appears to be initiated in the E-mini index futures contracts and that trades initiated by exchange locals seem to be more informative than those initiated by off-exchange traders. Furthermore, results show that exchange locals appear to make informed trades on the E-mini contracts around large trades that occur on the open outcry floor. We maintain that the exchange locals' ability to observe pit dynamics may contribute toward explaining the price leadership of the Emini contracts. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that exchange locals are informed traders who derive their informational advantage from the proximity to order flow.


2020 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 100789 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcia Millon Cornett ◽  
Kristina Minnick ◽  
Patrick J. Schorno ◽  
Hassan Tehranian

Risks ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 13
Author(s):  
Robert J. Powell ◽  
Duc H. Vo

Stability indicators are essential to banks in order to identify instability caused by adverse economic circumstances or increasing risks such as customer defaults. This paper develops a novel comprehensive stability indicator (CSI) that can readily be used by individual banks, or by regulators to benchmark financial health across banks. The CSI incorporates the three key risk factors of Creditworthiness, Conditions and Capital (3Cs), using a traffic light system (green, orange and red) to classify bank risk. The CSI achieves similar outcomes in ranking the risk of 20 US banks to the much more complex US Federal Reserve Dodd–Frank stress tests.


2003 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 817-839 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joe Peek ◽  
Eric S. Rosengren ◽  
Geoffrey M.B. Tootell

2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (13) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
SHERRY BOSCHERT
Keyword(s):  

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (7) ◽  
pp. 163-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prof. Piotr Masiukiewicz ◽  
◽  
Paweł Dec Paweł Dec
Keyword(s):  

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