This chapter starts by tracing trends in central bank transparency. It reports key policy changes by some of the world’s most important central banks: the FOMC, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan. The second section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on central bank design, paying close attention to the role of committee size, composition, and decision-making protocol, and classifies central banks around the world according to these features. The third section outlines the aim of central bank communications: to broadcast news and to reduce noise. The author argues that while previous literature has examined both committee design and central bank communications, it has done so in isolation. By putting these two topics together, the chapter argues that we can better understand, first, how different types of committees may be better at communicating and, second, how communication affects households’ inflation expectations and inflation.
The role of forward‐ and backward‐looking information for inflation expectations formation