Standards improve board governance, boost fund development

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (S7) ◽  
pp. 1-1
Keyword(s):  
Board Governance ◽  
Fund Development

scholarly journals Nonprofit Arts Organizations’ Pursuit of Public Interests: The Role of Board Diversity

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Young-Joo Lee
Keyword(s):  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Racial Diversity ◽  
Arts Organizations ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Public Interests ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
The Public ◽  
Nonprofit Boards ◽  
Nonprofit Arts

Abstract Although nonprofit organizations are expected to contribute to public interests, their tax exemption does not necessarily entail serving the broader public. What, then, makes nonprofit organizations orient their work externally, serving the broader public, instead of internally, pursuing private goals? This paper examines this question by studying the link between nonprofits’ board governance, with a specific focus on boards’ racial diversity, and their contribution to public interests. The analysis of the 2015 US Local Arts Agency Census reveals that boards’ racial diversity is closely related with nonprofit arts organizations’ participation in serving the broader public through civic engagement and community development activities. The findings offer insights on how nonprofit boards, which are neither publicly elected nor publicly accountable, can be trusted to attend to broader issues of the public interest.

Mitigating Legal Risks in Nigeria's Project Finance Market

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 442-455
Author(s):  
Olufemi Soyeju
Keyword(s):  
Debt Financing ◽  
Project Finance ◽  
Infrastructure Development ◽  
Public Infrastructure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Fund Development ◽  
Legal Risks ◽  
Project Risks ◽  
Infrastructure Project

Project finance is a subset of financial techniques used traditionally in raising long-term debt financing for projects particularly in the energy and mining sectors of the economy. However, over the years, it has proved helpful in raising the required funds to drive public infrastructure projects through the public private partnership framework. By its nature, project finance is either non-recourse, or of limited recourse, to the project sponsors and hence identifying the various risks and determining who should bear these risks is the overarching essence of project finance technique. These uncertainty and risks may have significant impact on outturn costs or benefits of a particular infrastructure project. Generally, typical project finance transaction is fraught with many project risks which sometimes overlap. However, among these inherent risks there are some that are legal in nature and hence they are referred to as legal risks. So, this article seeks to interrogate the related legal risks in project finance as a financing technique to fund development of infrastructure and in particular, the procurement of critical public infrastructure assets in Nigeria and the various ways by which these risks can be mitigated to drive infrastructure development in the country.

Board governance and diversity will be more important than ever in 2019

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (160) ◽  
pp. 4-5
Author(s):  
Carlos Castelán
Keyword(s):  
Board Governance

scholarly journals CEO Monitoring and Board Effectiveness: Resolving the CEO Compensation Issue

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-134
Author(s):  
Chiraz Ben Ali ◽  
Frédéric Teulon
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Board Effectiveness ◽  
Past Performance ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact

This study examines the impact of board governance mechanisms on the pay of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) using a sample of major French listed companies for the 2009–2011 period. The results show that CEO pay is negatively associated with the presence of a family CEO and positively associated with board size, busy directors, board meetings, and compensation committee independence. We provide further evidence that CEO compensation increases with firm size, and both present and past performance. Our study casts doubt on the effectiveness of formal board attributes in constraining CEO compensation.

scholarly journals Votes at work in Britain: shareholder monopolisation and the ‘single channel’

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewan McGaughey
Keyword(s):  
Trade Unions ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Policy Document ◽  
Participation Rights ◽  
History Of ◽  
Private Corporations ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Enterprise Governance

Why do shareholders monopolise voting rights in UK companies, and are trade unions the only way to get meaningful workplace representation? In 1967 a Labour Party policy document first coined the phrase that a ‘single channel’ for representation should ‘in the normal’ case mean trade unions. Since then, it has been said the labour movement embraced an ‘adversarial’ rather than a ‘constitutional’ conception of corporations, neglecting legal rights to worker voice in enterprise governance. This article shows that matters were not so simple. It explains the substantial history of legal rights to vote in British workplaces, and competition from the rival constitutional conception: employee share schemes. The UK has the oldest corporations – namely universities – which have consistently embedded worker participation rights in law. Britain has among the world’s most sophisticated ‘second channel’ participation rights in pension board governance. Developing with collective bargaining, it had the world’s first private corporations with legal participation rights. Although major plans in the 1920s for codetermination in rail and coal fell through, it maintained a ‘third channel’ of worker representatives on boards during the 20th century in numerous sectors, including ports, gas, post, steel, and buses. At different points every major political party had general proposals for votes at work. The narrative of the ‘single channel’ of workplace representation, and an ‘adversarial’ conception of the company contains some truth, but there has never been one size of regulation for all forms of enterprise. (2018) 47(1) Industrial Law Journal 76.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document