Board governance and diversity will be more important than ever in 2019

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (160) ◽  
pp. 4-5
Author(s):  
Carlos Castelán
Keyword(s):  
Board Governance

scholarly journals Nonprofit Arts Organizations’ Pursuit of Public Interests: The Role of Board Diversity

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Young-Joo Lee
Keyword(s):  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Racial Diversity ◽  
Arts Organizations ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Public Interests ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
The Public ◽  
Nonprofit Boards ◽  
Nonprofit Arts

Abstract Although nonprofit organizations are expected to contribute to public interests, their tax exemption does not necessarily entail serving the broader public. What, then, makes nonprofit organizations orient their work externally, serving the broader public, instead of internally, pursuing private goals? This paper examines this question by studying the link between nonprofits’ board governance, with a specific focus on boards’ racial diversity, and their contribution to public interests. The analysis of the 2015 US Local Arts Agency Census reveals that boards’ racial diversity is closely related with nonprofit arts organizations’ participation in serving the broader public through civic engagement and community development activities. The findings offer insights on how nonprofit boards, which are neither publicly elected nor publicly accountable, can be trusted to attend to broader issues of the public interest.

scholarly journals CEO Monitoring and Board Effectiveness: Resolving the CEO Compensation Issue

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-134
Author(s):  
Chiraz Ben Ali ◽  
Frédéric Teulon
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Board Effectiveness ◽  
Past Performance ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact

This study examines the impact of board governance mechanisms on the pay of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) using a sample of major French listed companies for the 2009–2011 period. The results show that CEO pay is negatively associated with the presence of a family CEO and positively associated with board size, busy directors, board meetings, and compensation committee independence. We provide further evidence that CEO compensation increases with firm size, and both present and past performance. Our study casts doubt on the effectiveness of formal board attributes in constraining CEO compensation.

scholarly journals Votes at work in Britain: shareholder monopolisation and the ‘single channel’

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewan McGaughey
Keyword(s):  
Trade Unions ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Policy Document ◽  
Participation Rights ◽  
History Of ◽  
Private Corporations ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Enterprise Governance

Why do shareholders monopolise voting rights in UK companies, and are trade unions the only way to get meaningful workplace representation? In 1967 a Labour Party policy document first coined the phrase that a ‘single channel’ for representation should ‘in the normal’ case mean trade unions. Since then, it has been said the labour movement embraced an ‘adversarial’ rather than a ‘constitutional’ conception of corporations, neglecting legal rights to worker voice in enterprise governance. This article shows that matters were not so simple. It explains the substantial history of legal rights to vote in British workplaces, and competition from the rival constitutional conception: employee share schemes. The UK has the oldest corporations – namely universities – which have consistently embedded worker participation rights in law. Britain has among the world’s most sophisticated ‘second channel’ participation rights in pension board governance. Developing with collective bargaining, it had the world’s first private corporations with legal participation rights. Although major plans in the 1920s for codetermination in rail and coal fell through, it maintained a ‘third channel’ of worker representatives on boards during the 20th century in numerous sectors, including ports, gas, post, steel, and buses. At different points every major political party had general proposals for votes at work. The narrative of the ‘single channel’ of workplace representation, and an ‘adversarial’ conception of the company contains some truth, but there has never been one size of regulation for all forms of enterprise. (2018) 47(1) Industrial Law Journal 76.

Intellectual capital in Ugandan service firms as mediator of board governance and firm performance

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 300-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Korutaro Nkundabanyanga ◽  
Joseph M. Ntayi ◽  
Augustine Ahiauzu ◽  
Samuel K. Sejjaaka
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Intellectual Capital ◽  
Predictor Variable ◽  
Mediating Effect ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Firm Financial Performance ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the mediating effect of intellectual capital on the relationship between board governance and perceived firm financial performance. Design/methodology/approach – This study was cross-sectional. Analyses were by SPSS and Analysis of Moment Structure on a sample of 128 firms. Findings – The mediated model provides support for the hypothesis that intellectual capital mediates the relationship between board governance and perceived firm performance. while the direct relationship between board governance and firm financial performance without the mediation effect of intellectual capital was found to be significant, this relationship becomes insignificant when mediation of intellectual capital is allowed. Thus, the entire effect does not only go through the main hypothesised predictor variable (board governance) but majorly also, through intellectual capital. Accordingly, the connection between board governance and firm financial performance is very much weakened by the presence of intellectual capital in the model – confirming that the presence of intellectual capital significantly acts as a conduit in the association between board governance and firm financial performance. Overall, 36 per cent of the variance in perceived firm performance is explained. the error variance being 64 per cent of perceived firm performance itself. Research limitations/implications – The authors surveyed directors or managers of firms and although the influence of common methods variance was minimal, the non-existence of common methods bias could not be guaranteed. Although the constructs have been defined as precisely as possible by drawing upon relevant literature and theory, the measurements used may not perfectly represent all the dimensions. For example board governance concept (used here as a behavioural concept) is very much in its infancy just as intellectual capital is. Similarly the authors have employed perceived firm financial performance as proxy for firm financial performance. The implication is that the constructs used/developed can realistically only be proxies for an underlying latent phenomenon that itself is not fully measureable. Practical implications – In considering the behavioural constructs of the board, a new integrative framework for board effectiveness is much needed as a starting point, followed by examining intellectual capital in firms whose mediating effect should formally be accounted for in the board governance – financial performance equation. Originality/value – Results add to the conceptual improvement in board governance studies and lend considerable support for the behavioural perspective in the study of boards and their firm performance improvement potential. Using qualitative factors for intellectual capital to predict the perceived firm financial performance, this study offers a unique dimension in understanding the causes of poor financial performance. It is always a sign of a maturing discipline (like corporate governance) to examine the role of a third variable in the relationship so as to make meaningful conclusions.

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