Security design and firm dynamics under long-term moral hazard

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 852-869
Author(s):  
Alexandre Messa
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Firm Dynamics ◽  
Security Design

scholarly journals Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 110-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Autor ◽  
Mark Duggan ◽  
Jonathan Gruber
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Time Variation ◽  
Rate Increase ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Severe Disabilities ◽  
Replacement Rate ◽  
Waiting Period ◽  
Over Time

Exploiting within-firm, over-time variation in plan parameters for nearly 10,000 Long Term Disability (LTD) policies held by US employers, we present the first empirical analysis of the determinants of private LTD spells. We find that a shorter waiting period and a higher replacement rate increase the incidence of LTD spells. Sixty percent of the latter effect is due to the mechanical censoring of shorter spells, with the remainder due to the deterrence of spells that would have continued beyond the waiting period. Deterrence is driven primarily by a reduction in the incidence of shorter duration spells and less severe disabilities. (JEL D82, G22, J28, J32)

scholarly journals Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (10) ◽  
pp. 3030-3060 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Kaas ◽  
Philipp Kircher
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Heterogeneous Firms ◽  
Firm Dynamics ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Job Flows ◽  
Bargaining Models ◽  
The Business Cycle ◽  
Market Variables ◽  
Aggregate Dynamics

We develop and analyze a labor market model in which heterogeneous firms operate under decreasing returns and compete for labor by posting long-term contracts. Firms achieve faster growth by offering higher lifetime wages, which allows them to fill vacancies with higher probability, consistent with recent empirical findings. The model also captures several other regularities about firm size, job flows, and pay, and generates sluggish aggregate dynamics of labor market variables. In contrast to existing bargaining models with large firms, efficiency obtains and the model allows a tractable characterization over the business cycle. (JEL E24, J64, L11)

BAILOUTS, FRANCHISE VALUE AND MORAL HAZARD IN BANKING

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (03) ◽  
pp. 691-699
Author(s):  
KARLO KAUKO
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Safety Nets ◽  
Risk Monitoring ◽  
Franchise Value ◽  
Value Effect ◽  
Bank Bailouts ◽  
Theoretical Results

Policy discussions are dominated by the view that governmental safety nets offered to banks cause moral hazard and encourage risk-taking. However, [Cordella, T and E Levy Yeyati (2003). Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12, 300–330.] proposed that government support offered during crises may increase bank franchise value, resulting in less risk-taking. This paper presents additional theoretical results on the franchise value effect. The franchise value effect can dominate over the moral hazard effect even when there are no specific crisis periods. The franchise value effect dominates if bank shareholders have a weak time preference and if the decision on the intensity of risk monitoring is a long-term choice.

scholarly journals Demand-side strategies to deal with moral hazard in public insurance for long-term care

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 170-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter Bakx ◽  
Dov Chernichovsky ◽  
Francesco Paolucci ◽  
Erik Schokkaert ◽  
Maria Trottmann ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Long Term Care ◽  
Demand Side ◽  
Public Insurance ◽  
Term Care

Moral hazard and long-term care insurance

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Tamara Konetzka ◽  
Daifeng He ◽  
Jing Dong ◽  
John A. Nyman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Long Term Care ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Long Term Care Insurance
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document