Foreign Aid and Recipient Government Behavior in Nicaragua

2011 ◽  
pp. 462-468
Author(s):  
Mariola Gozalo-Delgado ◽  
Fernando Rueda-Junquera
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Aid ◽  
Government Behavior ◽  
Recipient Government

Israel's Military Aid to Africa, 1960–66

1971 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abel Jacob
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Aid ◽  
Donor Country ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Cultural Barriers ◽  
The Political ◽  
Military Assistance ◽  
Military Aid ◽  
The Social ◽  
Recipient Government ◽  
The Military

DURING the late 1950S and early 19605, Israel mounted an active campaign of aid to Africa, which took three main forms: technical help in agriculture, joint commercial ventures, and military assistance. Of the three, the military and quasi-military programmes made the most considerable mark in Africa;1 they were also an important part of Israel's overall foreign policy, in an attempt to gain political influence through military aid, and thus to help overcome her isolation in the Middle East. Israel's military assistance to Africa illustrates several important aspects of foreign aid. This article deals mainly with the political motives of the donor country, and the various ways in which it may be concerned to influence the actions of the recipient government. Later, there is some discussion of the social and cultural barriers to the transfer of military and para-military organisations from one culture to another.

Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy Tool

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clair Apodaca
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Foreign Aid ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Time Frame ◽  
Foreign Assistance ◽  
Development Assistance Committee ◽  
Human Welfare ◽  
Complete Control ◽  
Multilateral Aid ◽  
Recipient Government

The majority of countries around the world are engaged in the foreign aid process, as donors, recipients, or, oftentimes, both. States use foreign aid as a means of pursuing foreign policy objectives. Aid can be withdrawn to create economic hardship or to destabilize an unfriendly or ideologically antagonistic regime. Or, conversely, aid can be provided to bolster and reward a friendly or compliant regime. Although foreign aid serves several purposes, and not least among them the wish to increase human welfare, the primary reason for aid allocations or aid restrictions is to pursue foreign policy goals. Strategic and commercial interests of donor countries are the driving force behind many aid programs. Not only do target countries respond to the granting of bilateral and multilateral aid as an incentive, but also the threat of aid termination serves as an effective deterrent. Both the granting and the denial of foreign assistance can be a valuable mechanism designed to modify a recipient state’s behavior. Donors decide which countries will receive aid, the amount of aid provided, the time frame in which aid is given, and the channel of aid delivery. The donor’s intentions and the recipient’s level of governance determine the type or sector of foreign aid. States can choose between bilateral or multilateral methods of disbursing foreign assistance in order to pursue their interests. Although bilateral disbursements allow the donor state to have complete control over the aid donation, the use of multilateral forums has its advantages. Multilateral aid is cheaper, it disperses accountability, and it is often viewed as less politically biased. Foreign aid, once the exclusive foreign policy instrument of rich powerful states, is now being provided by middle-income countries, too. The motivation for foreign aid allocations by nontraditional donors parallels the motives of traditional Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors. A main difference between traditional and nontraditional aid donors is that nontraditional aid donors generally do not place conditionalities on their loans. The issue of fungibility can obstruct the donor government’s purpose behind the allocation of foreign aid. If the preferences of the recipient government are different from those of the donor, the recipient can often divert the aid and use it for other purposes. A recipient government may reallocate its budget after it determines how much aid it is slated to receive. The recipient government will redirect its resources to areas it deems a priority that cannot be funded externally, for example the military or prestige projects.

scholarly journals The Impact of Foreign Aid Conditionality on Poverty Alleviation in Bangladesh: A Recipient’s Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 151
Author(s):  
Mehadi Mamun
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Aid ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
Journal Articles ◽  
Aid Conditionality ◽  
Sub Saharan ◽  
Recipient Government ◽  
The Impact

Donors provide aid to the recipient government with conditions to implement some policies so that the recipient government can use aid effectively and able to improve its economic, social, and political situation as well as reduce its poverty. However, concerns have been raised that aid conditionality has promoted reforms that could not reduce the poverty situation in some countries such as sub-Saharan Africa, while some countries in East Asia were able to break out of poverty and find themselves better off than before the conditional aid was accepted. Hence, the purpose of this study is to examine the impact of foreign aid conditionality on poverty alleviation in Bangladesh. The paper is qualitative in nature and a case study on Bangladesh. The study has been conducted by using secondary data, like journal articles, research papers, and Bangladesh government and aid donors’ reports. The study finds that Bangladesh has started to show considerable improvement in reducing poverty, though it is still ranking low on the Human Development Index. The findings have important implications for policymakers and captured insights about the foreign aid conditionality in Bangladesh.

scholarly journals Incentives for Conditional Aid Effectiveness

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Candel-Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Foreign Aid ◽  
Donor Country ◽  
Aid Effectiveness ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Structural Reforms ◽  
Aid Programs ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Recipient Government ◽  
Privately Owned

AbstractCan sanctions against foreign aid donors enhance the credibility of conditional aid policies? If such policies suffer from time inconsistency, the answer is positive. This paper proposes a mechanism to overcome the lack of credibility of conditional aid donations to developing countries. A scheme of policy-dependent transfers to the donor country is shown to achieve an optimal commitment outcome by improving the credibility of conditional aid programs. The scheme is devised to cover situations in which the cost of structural reforms is information privately owned by the recipient government.

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