scholarly journals On the cognitive bases of illusionism

PeerJ ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. e9712
Author(s):  
Jordi Camí ◽  
Alex Gomez-Marin ◽  
Luis M. Martínez

Cognitive scientists have paid very little attention to magic as a distinctly human activity capable of creating situations that are considered impossible because they violate expectations and conclude with the apparent transgression of well-established cognitive and natural laws. This illusory experience of the “impossible” entails a very particular cognitive dissonance that is followed by a subjective and complex “magical experience”. Here, from a perspective inspired by visual neuroscience and ecological cognition, we propose a set of seven fundamental cognitive phenomena (from attention and perception to memory and decision-making) plus a previous pre-sensory stage that magicians interfere with during the presentation of their effects. By doing so, and using as an example the deconstruction of a classic trick, we show how magic offers novel and powerful insights to study human cognition. Furthermore, live magic performances afford to do so in tasks that are more ecological and context-dependent than those usually exploited in artificial laboratory settings. We thus believe that some of the mysteries of how the brain works may be trapped in the split realities present in every magic effect.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Orlandi ◽  
Mohammad Adbolrahmani ◽  
Ryo Aoki ◽  
Dmitry Lyamzin ◽  
Andrea Benucci

Abstract Choice information appears in the brain as distributed signals with top-down and bottom-up components that together support decision-making computations. In sensory and associative cortical regions, the presence of choice signals, their strength, and area specificity are known to be elusive and changeable, limiting a cohesive understanding of their computational significance. In this study, examining the mesoscale activity in mouse posterior cortex during a complex visual discrimination task, we found that broadly distributed choice signals defined a decision variable in a low-dimensional embedding space of multi-area activations, particularly along the ventral visual stream. The subspace they defined was near-orthogonal to concurrently represented sensory and motor-related activations, and it was modulated by task difficulty and contextually by the animals’ attention state. To mechanistically relate choice representations to decision-making computations, we trained recurrent neural networks with the animals’ choices and found an equivalent decision variable whose context-dependent dynamics agreed with that of the neural data. In conclusion, our results demonstrated an independent decision variable broadly represented in the posterior cortex, controlled by task features and cognitive demands. Its dynamics reflected decision computations, possibly linked to context-dependent feedback signals used for probabilistic-inference computations in variable animal-environment interactions.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier G. Orlandi ◽  
Mohammad Abdolrahmani ◽  
Ryo Aoki ◽  
Dmitry R. Lyamzin ◽  
Andrea Benucci

Choice information appears in the brain as distributed signals with top-down and bottom-up components that together support decision-making computations. In sensory and associative cortical regions, the presence of choice signals, their strength, and area specificity are known to be elusive and changeable, limiting a cohesive understanding of their computational significance. In this study, examining the mesoscale activity in mouse posterior cortex during a complex visual discrimination task, we found that broadly distributed choice signals defined a decision variable in a low-dimensional embedding space of multi-area activations, particularly along the ventral visual stream. The subspace they defined was near-orthogonal to concurrently represented sensory and motor-related activations, and it was modulated by task difficulty and contextually by the animals’ attention state. To mechanistically relate choice representations to decision-making computations, we trained recurrent neural networks with the animals’ choices and found an equivalent decision variable whose context-dependent dynamics agreed with that of the neural data. In conclusion, our results demonstrated an independent decision variable broadly represented in the posterior cortex, controlled by task features and cognitive demands. Its dynamics reflected decision computations, possibly linked to context-dependent feedback signals used for probabilistic-inference computations in variable animal-environment interactions.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Payam Piray ◽  
Nathaniel D. Daw

AbstractIt is thought that the brain’s judicious allocation and reuse of computation underlies our ability to plan flexibly, but also failures to do so as in habits and compulsion. Yet we lack a complete, realistic account of either. Building on control engineering, we introduce a new model for decision making in the brain that reuses a temporally abstracted map of future events to enable biologically-realistic, flexible choice at the expense of specific, quantifiable biases. It replaces the classic nonlinear, model-based optimization with a linear approximation that softly maximizes around (and is weakly biased toward) a learned default policy. This solution exposes connections between seemingly disparate phenomena across behavioral neuroscience, notably flexible replanning with biases and cognitive control. It also gives new insight into how the brain can represent maps of long-distance contingencies stably and componentially, as in entorhinal response fields, and exploit them to guide choice even under changing goals.


2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 121-123
Author(s):  
Jeri A. Logemann

Evidence-based practice requires astute clinicians to blend our best clinical judgment with the best available external evidence and the patient's own values and expectations. Sometimes, we value one more than another during clinical decision-making, though it is never wise to do so, and sometimes other factors that we are unaware of produce unanticipated clinical outcomes. Sometimes, we feel very strongly about one clinical method or another, and hopefully that belief is founded in evidence. Some beliefs, however, are not founded in evidence. The sound use of evidence is the best way to navigate the debates within our field of practice.


Author(s):  
Pierre Aubenque

Pierre Aubenque’s “Science Regained” (1962; translated by Clayton Shoppa) was originally published as the concluding chapter of Le Problème de l’Être chez Aristote, one of the most important and original books on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In this essay, Aubenque contends that the impasses which beset the project of first philosophy paradoxically become its greatest accomplishments. Although science stabilizes motion and thereby introduces necessity into human cognition, human thought always occurs amidst an inescapable movement of change and contingency. Aristotle’s ontology, as a discourse that strives to achieve being in its unity, succeeds by means of the failure of the structure of its own approach: the search of philosophy – dialectic – becomes the philosophy of the search. Aubenque traces this same structure of scission, mediation, and recovery across Aristotelian discussions of theology, motion, time, imitation, and human activity.


Author(s):  
Thomas Douglas

Interventions that modify a person’s motivations through chemically or physically influencing the brain seem morally objectionable, at least when they are performed nonconsensually. This chapter raises a puzzle for attempts to explain their objectionability. It first seeks to show that the objectionability of such interventions must be explained at least in part by reference to the sort of mental interference that they involve. It then argues that it is difficult to furnish an explanation of this sort. The difficulty is that these interventions seem no more objectionable, in terms of the kind of mental interference that they involve, than certain forms of environmental influence that many would regard as morally innocuous. The argument proceeds by comparing a particular neurointervention with a comparable environmental intervention. The author argues, first, that the two dominant explanations for the objectionability of the neurointervention apply equally to the environmental intervention, and second, that the descriptive difference between the environmental intervention and the neurointervention that most plausibly grounds the putative moral difference in fact fails to do so. The author concludes by presenting a trilemma that falls out of the argument.


2021 ◽  
pp. 232949652110288
Author(s):  
Meaghan Stiman

In theory, participatory democracies are thought to empower citizens in local decision-making processes. However, in practice, community voice is rarely representative, and even in cases of equal representation, citizens are often disempowered through bureaucratic processes. Drawing on the case of a firearm discharge debate from a rural county’s municipal meetings in Virginia, I extend research about how power operates in participatory settings. Partisan political ideology fueled the debate amongst constituents in expected ways, wherein citizens engaged collectivist and individualist frames to sway the county municipal board ( Celinska 2007 ). However, it was a third frame that ultimately explains the ordinance’s repeal: the bureaucratic frame, an ideological orientation to participatory processes that defers decision-making to disembodied abstract rules and procedures. This frame derives its power from its depoliticization potential, allowing bureaucrats to evade contentious political debates. Whoever is best able to wield this frame not only depoliticizes the debate to gain rationalized legitimacy but can do so in such a way to favor a partisan agenda. This study advances gun research and participatory democracy research by analyzing how the bureaucratic frame, which veils partisanship, offers an alternative political possibility for elected officials, community leaders, and citizens to adjudicate partisan debates.


Axioms ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 145
Author(s):  
Yun Jin ◽  
Zareena Kousar ◽  
Kifayat Ullah ◽  
Tahir Mahmood ◽  
Nimet Yapici Pehlivan ◽  
...  

Interval-valued T-spherical fuzzy set (IVTSFS) handles uncertain and vague information by discussing their membership degree (MD), abstinence degree (AD), non-membership degree (NMD), and refusal degree (RD). MD, AD, NMD, and RD are defined in terms of closed subintervals of that reduce information loss compared to the T-spherical fuzzy set (TSFS), which takes crisp values from intervals; hence, some information may be lost. The purpose of this manuscript is to develop some Hamacher aggregation operators (HAOs) in the environment of IVTSFSs. To do so, some Hamacher operational laws based on Hamacher t-norms (HTNs) and Hamacher t-conorms (HTCNs) are introduced. Using Hamacher operational laws, we develop some aggregation operators (AOs), including an interval-valued T-spherical fuzzy Hamacher (IVTSFH) weighted averaging (IVTSFHWA) operator, an IVTSFH-ordered weighted averaging (IVTSFHOWA) operator, an IVTSFH hybrid averaging (IVTSFHHA) operator, an IVTSFH-weighted geometric (IVTSFHWG) operator, an IVTSFH-ordered weighted geometric (IVTSFHOWG) operator, and an IVTSFH hybrid geometric (IVTSFHHG) operator. The validation of the newly developed HAOs is investigated, and their basic properties are examined. In view of some restrictions, the generalization and proposed HAOs are shown, and a multi-attribute decision-making (MADM) procedure is explored based on the HAOs, which are further exemplified. Finally, a comparative analysis of the proposed work is also discussed with previous literature to show the superiority of our work.


2021 ◽  
pp. 107385842110039
Author(s):  
Kristin F. Phillips ◽  
Harald Sontheimer

Once strictly the domain of medical and graduate education, neuroscience has made its way into the undergraduate curriculum with over 230 colleges and universities now offering a bachelor’s degree in neuroscience. The disciplinary focus on the brain teaches students to apply science to the understanding of human behavior, human interactions, sensation, emotions, and decision making. In this article, we encourage new and existing undergraduate neuroscience programs to envision neuroscience as a broad discipline with the potential to develop competencies suitable for a variety of careers that reach well beyond research and medicine. This article describes our philosophy and illustrates a broad-based undergraduate degree in neuroscience implemented at a major state university, Virginia Tech. We highlight the fact that the research-centered Experimental Neuroscience major is least popular of our four distinct majors, which underscores our philosophy that undergraduate neuroscience can cater to a different audience than traditionally thought.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document