Chapter 7 Texas Air Power during the Second World War

2014 ◽  
pp. 122-146
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-92
Author(s):  
Caterina Albano

The Italo-Ethiopian war (1935–6) had a profoundly destabilising effect internationally and can be regarded as one of the events that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. Benito Mussolini's occupation of the country (then known as Abyssinia) was facilitated by the massive use of air power and chemical weapons – in ways that at the time were still unprecedented. Mussolini's chemical war, occurring in a country at the periphery of geopolitical spheres of interest, has remained marginal to established historical narratives, rendering it anachronistically topical to today's politics of memory. By examining two films based on archival film footage, respectively Lutz Becker's documentary The Lion of Judah, War in Ethiopia 1935–1936 (1975) and Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi's video work Barbaric Land ( Paese barbaro, 2013), this article considers the significance of the moving image as a trace of events that have mostly remained visually undocumented and questions its relevance vis à vis today's mediated warfare and the ethics of images.


Author(s):  
Frank Ledwidge

‘The Second World War: air operations in the West’ considers the air capabilities of the main actors of the Second World War including the Polish air force, the German Luftwaffe, the Soviet air force, Britain’s Royal Air Force, and the US Army Air Corps. It discusses the strategies employed by the different forces during the various stages of the war, including securing the control of the air during the Battle of Britain in 1940, which demonstrated that a defensive air campaign could have strategic and political effect. The improving technology throughout the war is discussed along with role of air power at sea, and the results and controversy of the bombing war in Europe.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (Summer 2020) ◽  
pp. 131-159
Author(s):  
Arda Mevlütoğlu

Rapid advances in technology enable incremental developments in the aerospace and defense sector, the most well-known example of which is the evolution of air power. Since the end of the Second World War, the aerospace industry has been constantly developing and providing more capabilities to air forces around the world. These developments can be grouped under ‘generations’ and today, the latest iteration is the fifth generation. Fifth-generation combat aircraft or, in more general terms, fifth-generation air power is the product of various technological elements and innovations. To fully exploit these developments, air forces need to have interdisciplinary vision and the capability to absorb, deploy and develop skills ranging from requirement definition to program management. This study aims to provide an understanding on the features of the next generation of air warfare, while presenting the status of the Turkish Air Force and offering suggestions on several challenges and opportunities.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 384-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Hammond

Historians have not yet attempted to integrate the global nature of Britain’s war with the process and outcome of military learning, and British approaches are generally presented as being compartmentalized within each theatre. This article demonstrates that in the crucial field of coastal air power, while intra-theatre learning processes were important, the British were indeed capable of inter-theatre learning. A symbiotic, mutually beneficial relationship evolved between the Home and Mediterranean theatres that contributed positively to its development. However, they failed to create a similar arrangement for the Indian Ocean, which could only act as a receptor for externally created knowledge.


Author(s):  
Frank Ledwidge

‘The Second World War: the air war in the Pacific’ describes the maritime and air operations in the Pacific that were truly epic in scale. It outlines the strategic bombing in the Far East as well as the two atomic raids carried out on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Prior to the atomic strikes on Japan, strategic bombing to coerce capitulation had failed in the combined operations against Germany. Even then, it seems likely now that the atomic raids contributed to rather than caused Japanese surrender. Command of the air was indispensable. However, air power alone could not deliver success. When used as a component of an integrated pragmatically founded strategy, it was nonetheless vital.


The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest campaign of the Second World War. This volume highlights the scale and complexity of this bitterly contested campaign, one that encompassed far more than just attacks by German U-boats on Allied shipping. The team of leading scholars assembled here situate the German assault on seaborne trade within the wider Allied war effort and provide a new understanding of its place within the Second World War. Individual chapters offer original perspectives on a range of neglected or previously-overlooked subjects: how Allied grand strategy shaped the war at sea; the choices and tensions facing Churchill and other Allied leaders over the allocation of scarce resources between theaters; how the battle spread beyond the Atlantic Ocean in both military and economic terms; the management of Britain's merchant shipping repair yards; the defense of British coastal waters against German surface raiders; the contribution of air power to trade defense; anti-submarine escort training; the role of special intelligence; and the war against the U-boats in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans.


2014 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 645-655
Author(s):  
ADAM PAGE

In the preface to the 1941 edition to his 1908 novel, The War in the Air, H. G. Wells wrote: ‘I told you so. You damned fools’. The books discussed here illustrate how, in the few intervening decades, air war moved from a fearful vision into reality, and detail the varied experiences and consequences of the aerial bombardment of cities and civilians. The histories of air power and the aerial bombardment of cities have centred on the Second World War, moving from the humanising endurance of Londoners during the Blitz to the entirely dehumanised horror of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The texts reviewed here extend the histories of air war and highlight the city and the home as a target for bombing while remaining the place where people carried on their daily lives.


2019 ◽  
pp. 096834451982978
Author(s):  
Matthew Powell

This article investigates the work conducted by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the development of tactical air power in the interwar period. It analyses the RAF’s theoretical doctrinal thinking during the period along with exercises conducted on a joint Service basis to further develop these ideas in practice. It will argue that, rather than neglecting tactical air power during this period as is the accepted view, much good theoretical work was done that formed a theoretical and intellectual basis for the further development of tactical air power in the light of operational experience during the Second World War.


Author(s):  
Tim Benbow

During the Second World War, there were intense disputes between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry over the provision of air support for the Battle of the Atlantic. This was not mere inter-service squabbling but the product of deep and long-standing differences about the nature and conduct of war. The Admiralty, fully appreciating the central role of air power in attacking and defending sea communications, repeatedly asked for reinforcement of the under-resourced Coastal Command. The Air Staff, however, consistently and strenuously resisted these requests due to the overwhelming priority it placed on the strategic air offensive against Germany. This chapter by Tim Benbow examines these disputes between 1940 and 1943, assessing the arguments presented by the Air Staff and by the Admiralty. It maintains that the Air Staff was dogmatically fixated on demonstrating that bombing could win the war on its own, despite ample evidence to the contrary, and failed to allocate aircraft appropriately. As a result, the war at sea did not receive the support that its strategic importance justified. It further asserts that Churchill and his government failed to adjudicate effectively on this vital issue as a result of their sloppy and inconsistent approach to setting priorities.


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