scholarly journals 2. The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong?

2009 ◽  
pp. 26-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dionysia Katelouzou ◽  
Peer Zumbansen

This chapter explores corporate governance as a transnational regulatory field. Mirroring the rise in importance of the idea of shareholder wealth maximization as a firm’s definitive performance measure, corporate governance became a hotly contested field of competing visions of firms’ institutional and normative infrastructure in search of creating the most advantageous conditions to attract capital in volatile markets. This shift occurred at the same time that regulatory transformations in Western postindustrial societies since the early 1980s had begun to significantly shift public service provision and state-organized frameworks for old-age security guarantees and access to health services. Today’s corporate governance laboratory is a transnational force field, fought over by a host of different state and nonstate actors and also by private actors such as institutional investors. Meanwhile, following the financial crises in 2001, 2008 and 2020 and the simultaneously growing pressure on corporations from human rights, gender equality, and environmental groups, the corporate governance debate again is shifting. This time, a diversity of issues are being discussed under the corporate governance rubric, indicating a more comprehensive engagement with the firm’s purpose and functions and its societal obligations and responsibilities. Given the crucial role of firms as the residual claimants of a wide-ranging retreat of the state from its role in guaranteeing and providing a wide range of social functions, corporate governance is a mirror for the transformation of public and private power, and it has to address the twenty-first-century challenges, including global value chains and the proliferation of institutional investors, unfolding on a planetary scale.


2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 387-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Mortimer

This article considers the traditional approach to the ’state’ Models of corporate governance, namely shareholder Model and stakeholder Model. It then considers the extent to which developments in a recent accession EU country, Poland, reflects either of these Models or adopts a hybrid approach. It then offers proposals for the future development of corporate governance within Poland.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Leandro Massaki Yonemura ◽  
Davi Rogério De Moura Costa

Agricultural cooperatives are economic organizations that arise due to market failures and that adopt relevant roles in the organization of producers in different countries around the world. Research on the corporate governance of these organizations is abundant due the peculiarities of their structure and property rights. In Brazil, studies in this area are infrequent and in need of furtherexplanation. The aims of the present study were to identify and characterize the incentive mechanisms (remuneration) used by agricultural cooperatives and, in addition, to determine if they have an effect on the president’s longevity in office in agricultural cooperatives. The study was conducted by considering the different models of corporate governance and analyzing a sample of cooperatives from the State of São Paulo. The methodology asked for access to the bylaws, Minutes of general assembly s (MoGA) and registration forms, available for download on the website of the CommercialCouncil of the State of Sao Paulo (JUCESP). The sample consisted of data from 49 agricultural cooperatives. The results indicate that larger cooperatives tend to develop governance structures that separate ownership and control. Moreover, these organizations have the best-paid presidents.In general, apparently there is a positive relationship between entrenchment and remuneration and company size. These exploratory results identify interesting elements for further researchon cooperative governance. However, the methodological challenges for determining causalitymust be overcome by research designed to demonstrate the effect of remuneration on entrenchmentof the president and its effect on the performance of the cooperative.


Author(s):  
Alberto J. Arroyo ◽  
José D. Carrillo Verdún

Corporate governance is a key element today in organizations and companies. IT Governance, as a part of corporate governance, plays its role in aligning IT with the business and obtaining the maximum value, minimizing the risks. Several frameworks and guidelines have been published in order to set the basis for this discipline. The recent release of the ISO 38500 (ISO 2008) ads an effort to standardize the different elements of IT governance. Despite these efforts, none of the different frameworks or guidelines is focused on the specific characteristics of small and medium companies (SMOs), although the authors consider that their conclusions are universal. Furthermore, there is no research so far that analyzed the status of IT governance in Spanish organizations. The aim of this work is to do a research to identify the state of the art of IT governance in the Spanish small and medium organizations.


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucian Bebchuk ◽  
Michael Weisbach

2000 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 501 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Cioffi ◽  
Klaus J. Hopt ◽  
Hideki Kanda ◽  
Mark J. Roe ◽  
Eddy Wymeersch ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agyenim Boateng ◽  
Huifen Cai ◽  
Daniel Borgia ◽  
Xiao Gang Bi ◽  
Franklin Nnaemeka Ngwu

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of internal corporate governance mechanisms on the capital structure decisions of Chinese-listed firms. Design/methodology/approach Using a large and more recent data set consisting of 2,386 Chinese-listed firms over the period from 1998 to 2012, the authors use different statistical methods (OLS, fixed effects and system GMM) to analyse the effects of firm-specific and corporate governance influences on capital structure. Findings The authors find that the proportion of independent directors and ownership concentration exert significant influence on the level of Chinese long-term debt ratios after controlling for firm-specific determinants and split share reforms. Further analysis separating the sample of this paper into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises (POEs) suggests that ownership concentration in the hands of the state leads to decrease in debt ratios. Research limitations/implications The finding implies that concentrated ownership in the hands of the state appears more efficient compared to their private counterparts in their monitoring role. Originality/value This paper extends prior literature, which has concentrated disproportionately on firm-specific influences on capital structure, to the effects of within-firm governance mechanisms on capital structure decisions. The paper contributes to the agency theory–capital structure discourse in an emerging country context where corporate governance system appears weak.


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