scholarly journals Ungulates rely less on visual cues, but more on adapting movement behaviour, when searching for forage

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan A Venter ◽  
Herbert H. T. Prins ◽  
Alla Mashanova ◽  
Rob Slotow
Keyword(s):  
Visual Cues ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Step Length ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Habitat Patch ◽  
Movement Behaviour ◽  
Large Herbivores ◽  
Scale Step ◽  
Patch Scale ◽  
Priori Knowledge

Finding suitable forage patches in a heterogeneous landscape, where patches change dynamically both spatially and temporally could be challenging to large herbivores, especially if they have no a priori knowledge of the location of the patches. We tested whether three large grazing herbivores with a variety of different traits, improve their efficiency when foraging at a heterogeneous habitat patch scale, by using visual cues to gain a priori knowledge about potential higher value foraging patches. For each species (zebra (Equus burchelli ), red hartebeest (Alcelaphus buselaphus subspecies camaa ) and eland ( Tragelaphus oryx )), we used step lengths and directionality of movement to infer whether they were using visual cues to find suitable forage patches at a habitat patch scale. Step lengths were significantly longer for all species when moving to non-visible patches than to visible patches, but all movements showed little directionality. Of the three species, zebra movements were the most directional. Red hartebeest had the shortest step lengths and zebra the longest. We conclude that these large grazing herbivores may not exclusively use visual cues when foraging at a habitat patch scale, but would rather adapt their movement behaviour, mainly step length, to the heterogeneity of the specific landscape.

scholarly journals Ungulates rely less on visual cues, but more on adapting movement behaviour, when searching for forage

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan A Venter ◽  
Herbert H. T. Prins ◽  
Alla Mashanova ◽  
Rob Slotow
Keyword(s):  
Visual Cues ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Step Length ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Habitat Patch ◽  
Movement Behaviour ◽  
Large Herbivores ◽  
Scale Step ◽  
Patch Scale ◽  
Priori Knowledge

Finding suitable forage patches in a heterogeneous landscape, where patches change dynamically both spatially and temporally could be challenging to large herbivores, especially if they have no a priori knowledge of the location of the patches. We tested whether three large grazing herbivores with a variety of different traits, improve their efficiency when foraging at a heterogeneous habitat patch scale, by using visual cues to gain a priori knowledge about potential higher value foraging patches. For each species (zebra (Equus burchelli ), red hartebeest (Alcelaphus buselaphus subspecies camaa ) and eland ( Tragelaphus oryx )), we used step lengths and directionality of movement to infer whether they were using visual cues to find suitable forage patches at a habitat patch scale. Step lengths were significantly longer for all species when moving to non-visible patches than to visible patches, but all movements showed little directionality. Of the three species, zebra movements were the most directional. Red hartebeest had the shortest step lengths and zebra the longest. We conclude that these large grazing herbivores may not exclusively use visual cues when foraging at a habitat patch scale, but would rather adapt their movement behaviour, mainly step length, to the heterogeneity of the specific landscape.

scholarly journals Ungulates rely less on visual cues, but more on adapting movement behaviour, when searching for forage

PeerJ ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. e3178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan A. Venter ◽  
Herbert H.T. Prins ◽  
Alla Mashanova ◽  
Rob Slotow
Keyword(s):  
Visual Cues ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Step Length ◽  
Habitat Patch ◽  
Movement Behaviour ◽  
Large Herbivores ◽  
Heterogeneous Landscape ◽  
Equus Burchelli ◽  
Scale Step ◽  
Patch Scale

Finding suitable forage patches in a heterogeneous landscape, where patches change dynamically both spatially and temporally could be challenging to large herbivores, especially if they have noa prioriknowledge of the location of the patches. We tested whether three large grazing herbivores with a variety of different traits improve their efficiency when foraging at a heterogeneous habitat patch scale by using visual cues to gaina prioriknowledge about potential higher value foraging patches. For each species (zebra (Equus burchelli), red hartebeest (Alcelaphus buselaphussubspeciescamaa) and eland (Tragelaphus oryx)), we used step lengths and directionality of movement to infer whether they were using visual cues to find suitable forage patches at a habitat patch scale. Step lengths were significantly longer for all species when moving to non-visible patches than to visible patches, but all movements showed little directionality. Of the three species, zebra movements were the most directional. Red hartebeest had the shortest step lengths and zebra the longest. We conclude that these large grazing herbivores may not exclusively use visual cues when foraging at a habitat patch scale, but would rather adapt their movement behaviour, mainly step length, to the heterogeneity of the specific landscape.

Seeing, Knowing, and Doing

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Human Action ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Rational Action ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Discriminative Response ◽  
Rich Information ◽  
Priori Knowledge

This book provides an overall theory of perception and an account of knowledge and justification concerning the physical, the abstract, and the normative. It has the rigor appropriate for professionals but explains its main points using concrete examples. It accounts for two important aspects of perception on which philosophers have said too little: its relevance to a priori knowledge—traditionally conceived as independent of perception—and its role in human action. Overall, the book provides a full-scale account of perception, presents a theory of the a priori, and explains how perception guides action. It also clarifies the relation between action and practical reasoning; the notion of rational action; and the relation between propositional and practical knowledge. Part One develops a theory of perception as experiential, representational, and causally connected with its objects: as a discriminative response to those objects, embodying phenomenally distinctive elements; and as yielding rich information that underlies human knowledge. Part Two presents a theory of self-evidence and the a priori. The theory is perceptualist in explicating the apprehension of a priori truths by articulating its parallels to perception. The theory unifies empirical and a priori knowledge by clarifying their reliable connections with their objects—connections many have thought impossible for a priori knowledge as about the abstract. Part Three explores how perception guides action; the relation between knowing how and knowing that; the nature of reasons for action; the role of inference in determining action; and the overall conditions for rational action.

How Reality is Reasonable

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald C. Williams
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Dimensional Manifold ◽  
The World ◽  
Being There ◽  
Ways Of Being ◽  
Fundamental Entity ◽  
Spatiotemporal Relations ◽  
Priori Knowledge

This chapter begins with a systematic presentation of the doctrine of actualism. According to actualism, all that exists is actual, determinate, and of one way of being. There are no possible objects, nor is there any indeterminacy in the world. In addition, there are no ways of being. It is proposed that actual entities stand in three fundamental relations: mereological, spatiotemporal, and resemblance relations. These relations govern the fundamental entities. Each fundamental entity stands in parthood relations, spatiotemporal relations, and resemblance relations to other entities. The resulting picture is one that represents the world as a four-dimensional manifold of actual ‘qualitied contents’—upon which all else supervenes. It is then explained how actualism accounts for classes, quantity, number, causation, laws, a priori knowledge, necessity, and induction.

How Do We Know that We’re Not Brains in Vats?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith DeRose
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Conservative Approach ◽  
Contingent Fact ◽  
Brains In Vats ◽  
Priori Knowledge

In this chapter the contextualist Moorean account of how we know by ordinary standards that we are not brains in vats (BIVs) utilized in Chapter 1 is developed and defended, and the picture of knowledge and justification that emerges is explained. The account (a) is based on a double-safety picture of knowledge; (b) has it that our knowledge that we’re not BIVs is in an important way a priori; and (c) is knowledge that is easily obtained, without any need for fancy philosophical arguments to the effect that we’re not BIVs; and the account is one that (d) utilizes a conservative approach to epistemic justification. Special attention is devoted to defending the claim that we have a priori knowledge of the deeply contingent fact that we’re not BIVs, and to distinguishing this a prioritist account of this knowledge from the kind of “dogmatist” account prominently championed by James Pryor.

Incorporating a priori knowledge into neural networks

1995 ◽  
Vol 31 (22) ◽  
pp. 1930-1931 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Anguita ◽  
S. Rovetta ◽  
S. Ridella ◽  
R. Zunino
Keyword(s):  
Neural Networks ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Priori Knowledge

A priori knowledge based particle filter for estimating 3-D pose position of implanted knee

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusuke Nakajima ◽  
Syoji Kobashi ◽  
Yohei Tsumori ◽  
Nao Shibanuma ◽  
Fumiaki Imamura ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Particle Filter ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Priori Knowledge
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