Public Employee Retention Responses to Alternative Retirement Plan Design: South Carolina Teachers and State Public Employees

2021 ◽  
ILR Review ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 519-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cory Koedel ◽  
P. Brett Xiang

The authors use data from workers in the largest public-sector occupation in the United States—teaching—to examine the effect of pension enhancements on employee retention. Specifically, they study a 1999 enhancement to the benefit formula for public school teachers in St. Louis, Missouri, that resulted in an immediate and dramatic increase in their incentives to remain in covered employment. To identify the effect of the enhancement on teacher retention, the analysis leverages the fact that the strength of the incentive increase varied across the workforce depending on how far teachers were from retirement eligibility when it was enacted. The results indicate that the St. Louis enhancement—which was structurally similar to enhancements that were enacted in other public pension plans across the United States in the late 1990s and early 2000s—was not a cost-effective way to increase employee retention.


2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 2227-2246 ◽  
Author(s):  
John G. Matsusaka

In the public sector, employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage, and wages may be inefficiently high because of public employee interest groups. This paper explores whether the initiative process, a direct democracy institution of growing importance, ameliorates these political economy problems. In a sample of 650+ cities, I find that when public employees cannot bargain collectively and patronage could be a problem, initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages. When public employees bargain collectively, driving up wages, the initiative appears to cut wages but not employment. The employment-cutting result is robust; the wage-cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests. (JEL D72, J31, J45, J52)


2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 328-345
Author(s):  
Abdulwahhab Gumaah Al-Kubissi ◽  
Shatha Ahmed Al-Assaf

This research focuses on the reasons for withdrawing the public employees hand from his position in the Iraqi and Jordanian Laws and judicial oversight over the decision to withdraw. He public employees. The research tries to answer a very important problem which is the extent of the legal regulation for the reasons for withdrawing the employees hand from the work of this job and the judicial: The first topic focuses on the reasons for withdrawing the public employees hand from his position. The second topic deals topic deals with judicial oversight of decisions to withdraw the employees hand from his position. A number: 1- that the administrative courts look into the penalties directed at the employee from the administrant to the employee who has withdrawn the hand from his public office. especially in the penalties of dismissal and dismissal, provided that the appeal is mandatory either by the employee or by investigative committee to raise all the investigative papers and the penalty directed to the employee to the administrative court consider whether the punishment is correct or not, the two penalties mentioned above are among the most serious penalties that are applied to the employee. 2- He suggested to the civil service system, setting time to suspend the year from work and not to be dismissed because in this it generates the state treasury and harms the public employee who is suspended from work to receive half of his salaries and does not provide any community service.


Author(s):  
Gordon Lafer

This chapter examines the legislative attacks on the public sector aimed at eliminating employee union rights and slashing public services. Corporate lobbies and their legislative allies saw the 2010 elections as an opportunity to restructure labor relations, political power, and the size of government. With no guarantee that their dominance would last into the future, the 2011–2012 legislatures were driven by an urgency to pursue ambitious reforms while it was politically feasible. The chapter analyzes the extent of this legislative offensive as well as its underlying motives and ultimate objectives. It also asks why large, private corporations would spend significant time, money, and energy fighting public employee unions in Wisconsin or Ohio, and whether public employees are to blame for state budget deficits. Finally, it discusses the political and economic impacts of antiunionism and who benefited from cutting public employee compensation and pensions.


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