scholarly journals Contra la normalización de la ilegalidad: la protección judicial de los extranjeros frente a las expulsiones colectivas y las devoluciones “en caliente” | Against the Normalization of Illegality: the Judicial Protection of Foreigners Facing Collective Expulsions and Police “Push-Backs”

Author(s):  
Ángeles Solanes Corella

Resumen: Las expulsiones colectivas de extranjeros, aun estando prohibidas por el derecho internacional, son una práctica que sistemáticamente se ha aplicado en el ámbito del control de los flujos migratorios. En el caso de España, en su frontera sur terrestre, se han generalizado las denominadas “devoluciones en caliente”. Las vulneraciones de derechos que conllevan estas medidas son incompatibles con el Convenio Europeo para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales, del que derivan obligaciones concretas para los Estados parte. Este trabajo, propone un análisis crítico de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos para delimitar cuándo se produce una expulsión colectiva. Con ello se pretende evitar la aparente normalización de una medida que es ilegal e insistir en los mecanismos garantistas de los derechos de los extranjeros. Abstract: The collective expulsion of foreigners, although prohibited by International Law, is a practice that has been systematically applied in the field of control of migration flows. In the case of Spain, on its southern land border, the so-called police "push-backs" have become widespread. The violations of rights entailed by these measures are incompatible with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, from which obligations derive for the States Parties. This paper proposes a critical analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to delimit when a collective expulsion occurs. This is intended to avoid the apparent normalization of a measure that is illegal and to insist on mechanisms that guarantee the rights of foreigners.

Author(s):  
Maite Carretero Sanjuan

El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH), como máxima autoridad para la garantía de los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales en Europa, tiene como finalidad específica la de garantizar el cumplimiento del Convenio Europeo de Protección de los Derechos Humanos y Libertades Fundamentales (CEDH), firmado en Roma, el 4 de noviembre de 1950. Si bien este texto, en sí, no contiene una regulación de específica protección para los casos de violencia de género y otros tipos de violencia contra la mujer, la casuística es perfectamente encuadrable en su contenido y, por ende, enjuiciable por este Tribunal. Y ello, precisamente, por el encaje de este tipo de violencia en el artículo 3 del CEDH, a cuyo tenor: “Nadie podrá ser sometido a tortura ni a penas o tratos inhumanos o degradantes”. En este sentido se pronuncia la Sentencia Opuz vs. Turquía, de 9 de junio de 2009, que conlleva la condena, por primera vez en la historia del TEDH, de un Estado parte por violencia doméstica y malos tratos. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as the highest authority for the guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe, has the specific purpose of ensuring compliance with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), signed in Rome on 4 November 1950. Although this text, in itself, does not contain a regulation of specific protection for cases of gender violence and other types of violence against women, the casuistry can be perfectly framed in its content and, therefore, prosecuted by this Court. This is precisely because this type of violence is covered by Article 3 of the ECHR, which states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". In this sense, the Opuz v. Turkey Judgment of 9 June 2009 is pronounced, which entails the condemnation, for the first time in the history of the ECtHR, of a state party for domestic violence and ill-treatment.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-385
Author(s):  
Yana Litins’ka ◽  
Oleksandra Karpenko

Abstract COVID-19 became a stress-test for many legal systems because it required that a balance be found between rapid action to prevent the spread of the disease, and continued respect for human rights. Many states in Europe, including Ukraine, chose to enforce an obligation to self-isolate. In this article we review what the obligation to self-isolate entails in the case of Ukraine. We also analyse whether such an obligation should be viewed as a deprivation or a mere restriction of liberty, and if it is permissible under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.


2013 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurence A. Groen

This note analyzes the functioning of the Russian judiciary on the basis of the European Court of Human Rights’ judgments in the cases of OAO Neftianaia Kompaniia Iukos and three of the company’s former leading executives, Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovskii, Platon Leonidovich Lebedev and the late Vasilii Aleksanian. The analysis turns to the breaches by the Russian state of Articles 5 (right to liberty and security), 6 (right to a fair trial) and 18 (permissible restrictions to the rights guaranteed) of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as established by the Court in the aforementioned cases, and the role of the Russian judiciary therein. In light of the fundamental flaws and structural nature characterizing the violations found, the conclusion is reached that the Russian judiciary (still) appears not to be entirely free from undue influence by the other branches of government.


2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Gilles Cuniberti

In Sabeh el Leil v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (‘‘ECtHR’’ or ‘‘the Court’’) ruled for the second time that a contracting state had violated the right to a fair trial afforded by Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘‘Convention’’) by denying access to its courts to an embassy employee suing for wrongful dismissal on the grounds that the employer enjoyed sovereign immunity. The ECtHR had first ruled so a year earlier in Cudak v. Lithuania, where the plaintiff was also an embassy employee.


Author(s):  
Sandra Joksta

Ability to perform advocate’s duty is irrevocably linked to advocate’s immunity concept. The article provides an insight about the scope of advocate’s immunity concept in the age of money laundering. The purpose of it is to analyse the modern tendency to overstep the red lines guarding this concept, when applying legal enactments for money laundering evasion purposes. In the article, the judgment of 19 November 2020 in case “Klaus Mueller vs Germany” made by European Court of Human Rights, is analysed, where the issue of advocate’s immunity was considered in joint connection with the Clause 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The sometimes-exaggerated need for transparency at all costs conflicts with privacy protection aspects of individuals. Legislative enactments of money laundering and terrorism financing and proliferation evasion systemically contradicts Law of Advocacy and causes collision with other norms of higher legal rank such as fundamental rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights to fair trial and justice and rights to choose an occupation and engage in work. Keywords: advocate’s immunity concept, advocate’s rights to professional secret and confidentiality, legal certainty, money laundering and terrorism financing and proliferation evasion, principle of sound legislation, uncertain privilege.


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