scholarly journals Le contrôle des prix et des revenus au Canada

2009 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-310
Author(s):  
Richard G. Lipsey
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Traditional Methods ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The U.S

Abstract This paper is a summary of the Legal Factum submitted by the Canadian Labor Congress to the Supreme Court of Canada. It intends to demonstrate the irrelevance of the Anti-Inflationnary Act of October 1975. Three main questions are dealt with. First, was there an economic crisis in October 1975? Analysing various sets of data, the paper concludes that, by no stretch of imagination, could October 1975 be called an economic crisis. Second, was there a policy crisis in the sense that traditional methods had been tried and failed? It establishes here that no serious attempt had been made to contain inflation by traditional fiscal and monetary tools by October 1975. Third, what results can be expected from income policies? This part gives a summary of the voluminous evidence for the U.K. and the U.S., and concludes that the evidence of other incomes policies is that their effects on slowing the rate of inflation are small and often transitory.

Democracy and the Freedom of Speech: Rethinking the Conflict between Liberty and Equality

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasmin Dawood
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Competing Values ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Normative Claim ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The U.S

This article re-examines the distinction between the libertarian approach and the egalitarian approach to the regulation of campaign finance. The conventional approach (as exemplified by the work of Owen Fiss and Ronald Dworkin) is to reconcile the competing values of liberty and equality. By contrast, this article advances the normative claim that democracies should seek to incorporate both the libertarian and the egalitarian approaches within constitutional law. I argue that instead of emphasizing one value over the other, the ideal position is one that simultaneously recognizes the values of liberty and equality despite the irreconcilable tension between them. Rather than choosing one value over the other, or reconciling these values by redefining them, I claim that it is vital to maintain the tension between liberty and equality by instantiating the conflict in law. Democracy is better served when the law contains an explicit tension between these foundational values.After setting forth this normative framework, I then apply it to the campaign finance decisions of the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada, respectively. I make two main claims. First, I argue that although the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is usually presented as a binary choice, the laws of a given jurisdiction often simultaneously display both libertarian and egalitarian characteristics. For this reason, I claim that the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is better conceived of as a “libertarian-egalitarian spectrum.” Second, I argue that in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, respectively, have privileged one value—liberty or equality—at the expense of the other. The U.S. Supreme Court has over-emphasized the value of liberty (most notably in its Citizens United decision), with the result that political equality is markedly undermined. By the same token, the Supreme Court of Canada’s commitment to equality has become too one-sided in recent cases (Harper and Bryan), with the result that there are significant impairments to free speech liberties. I argue that both of these approaches are detrimental to democratic participation and governance. Finally, this article offers a preliminary proposal for how courts and legislatures can allow for the conflict between liberty and equality to be instantiated in law.

scholarly journals GAARs and the Nexus between Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Drafting: Lessons for the U.S. from Canada

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah ◽  
Amir Pichhadze
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Discretionary Power ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The U.S

Abstract Rules targeting specific known schemes are not the only tools available in the battle against tax avoidance. Legal systems also use measures that apply generally. The U.S. for example has tended to rely heavily on general doctrines. One such doctrine which is discussed in part 2 of this chapter is the “economic substance” doctrine. Yet as Xiong and Evans recently pointed out “although such judicial doctrines can be used to deal with various aspects of complicated tax abuse judges tended sometimes to limit and sometimes to enlarge the scope of jurisprudential interpretation leading to substantial uncertainty and risk.” One way to limit the discretionary power of judges and overcome the uncertainty apparent in their judgments is by formalizing the doctrines as the US has done by codifying the “economic substance” doctrine in 2010. As explained in part 2 of this chapter a limitation of the “economic substance” doctrine whether it is established judicially or codified by statute may be its focus on the taxpayer’s intentions as the basis for attacking tax avoidance. Part 3 of this chapter goes on to explain that the U.S. could overcome this limitation by adopting a statutory General Anti-Abuse Rule (“GAAR”). GAARs also impose generally applicable limits on what constitutes acceptable (reasonable) tax arrangements. But they do so based on whether the arrangements are consistent with the legislature’s intentions as they were conveyed in the tax provision which the taxpayer is relying on for achieving the tax advantage in question. As Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) explained “by confining legitimate tax avoidance to schemes that are not inconsistent with the policy underlying the statutory provision invoked by the taxpayer GAAR effectively limits the scope of the principle in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster… that ‘[e]very man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it would otherwise be’.” Based on Canada’s experience with the GAAR parts 4 and 5 identify and explain the nexus between statutory interpretation and legislative drafting and the implications of this nexus on the application of a GAAR in the U.S. should Congress choose to take this route. Part 4 identifies that while the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) has recognized the need to apply a purposive interpretation of Canada’s GAAR in order to ascertain parliament’s intentions in the relevant tax provision the court has also held that it will only give effect to those intentions which were clearly conveyed by the relevant provision and will not invent a legislative intention which parliament has failed to convey. Part 5 notes that such judicial restraint has also been taken by the U.S. Supreme Court and therefore a similar approach could be expected by the U.S. courts should Congress adopt a GAAR. Therefore it would be up to Congress as it is similarly up to Canada’s Parliament to carefully and clearly draft its legislative intentions otherwise the effectiveness of a GAAR would be undermined.

High Court Recruitment of Female Clerks: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada

2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin B. Kaheny ◽  
John J. Szmer ◽  
Michael A. Hansen ◽  
Katherine Felix Scheurer
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The U.S

scholarly journals Une doctrine d'abus de procédure revigorée en droit pénal canadien

2005 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 673-698
Author(s):  
Rachel Grondin
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Legal Process ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
American Experience ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Abuse Of Law ◽  
The U.S

This article examines the doctrine of abuse of process in Canadian criminal law in the light of two recent events, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Amato c. R. and the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The consideration of Amato v. R. in the firts part of the article shows that the majority of judges of the Supreme Court support the existence of the doctrine of abuse of law, and their reasons for this are examined. The effects of the Charter upon such a doctrine is demonstrated in the second part. The American experience is cited, showing the interrelationship of the U.S. Constitution and the doctrine of abuse of process. This is followed by a comparative table of Canadian cases in which the procedure was halted either because of the doctrine or by virtue of the Charter, particularly s. 24(1) which permits judges to stay proceedings for reasons of infringement or denial of guaranteed rights or freedoms. The article concludes that the doctrine has not been superceded by the Charter, but rather that it plays an important role par ailed to it : the former protects the integrity of the legal process while the latter safeguards the rights of the individual.

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