scholarly journals Vingt-cinq ans d’études stratégiques – Essai critique et survol de la documentation

2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 727-749
Author(s):  
Albert Legault
Keyword(s):  
Outer Space ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Ecological Consequences ◽  
The Past ◽  
Potential Increase ◽  
The Future ◽  
Ballistic Missile Defense

This article attempts to identify the great issues which have formed the mainstay of the strategic literature over the past twenty-five years. Its is essentially designee to acquaint the student with the major works and debates which have been published or discussed over the same period of time. The only new debates seem to bear on the ecological consequences of a nuclear war, and on the resurgence of the pacifist movements. The last section deals with the major issues of the future, such as outer space, ballistic missile defense, and the potential increase of the risks of a conventional war due to the progress of technology.

The Phantom Defense: America's Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion. By Craig Eisendrath, Melvin A. Goodman, and Gerald E. Marsh. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. 216p. $24.95. Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of American Security: Agendas, Perceptions, Technology, and Policy. By Roger Handberg. Praeger, 2001. 264p. $62.00. Rockets' Red Glare: Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics. Edited by James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001. 368p. $28.50.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 879-880
Author(s):  
David Goldfischer
Keyword(s):  
World Politics ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Star Wars ◽  
Technological Context ◽  
The Future ◽  
Ballistic Missile Defense ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Strategic Defense ◽  
The Subject

As Michael O'Hanlon concludes in his excellent contribution to Rockets' Red Glare: “We should…get used to the debate over ballistic missile defenses. It has been around a long time, and no final resolution is imminent” (p. 132). In one sense, a review of these three recent books makes clear that many analysts had grown a bit too used to positioning themselves in terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Preoccupied with arguments over whether the treaty should be preserved, modified, or rewritten in light of a changing strategic and technological context, no one seemed to have anticipated that President George W. Bush would simply withdraw from it, invoking Article XV's provision that either party could withdraw if “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.” Even many strategic defense supporters who deemed the treaty obsolete (as Robert Joseph persuasively maintains in his contribution to Rockets' Red Glare) generally believed that it should only—and would only—be scrapped if negotiations over U.S.-proposed changes broke down. (“The Bush Administration,” surmises O'Hanlon, “will surely try very hard to amend it before going to such an extreme”) (p. 112). In the event, the president's team disavowed even the word “negotiation,” saying they were willing only to “consult” the Russians regarding the treaty's impending demise.

The Nuclear Obsession: V. The “Stately Minuet” of the A.B.M. Debate

Worldview ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 4-5
Author(s):  
Jack Walker
Keyword(s):  
Air Force ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Defense System ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
National Elections ◽  
The Past ◽  
Ballistic Missile Defense ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The U.S

The currently emerging debate on the desirability of the U.S. undertaking to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system (A.B.M.) threatens to become the next national defense issue to have an impact on national elections. In the past we have all become familiar with real or alleged “bomber gaps,” “missile gaps,” and “conventional gaps.” The basis for all these “gaps” was a deep fear that potential enemies would subject ns to nuclear blackmail, or that our own failure to develop other kinds of military forces would require us to respond to any emergency with an all-out nuclear attack.In an earlier essay, I pointed out how our obsession with nuclear war had encouraged us to discount the significance of conventional war. I want now to turn to an examination of how specific groups in the U.S. have changed their positions in recent years on the subject of defensive weapons. In doing so I have borrowed the term used in 1960 by Henry Kissinger to describe the shifting arguments of the Air Force and Navy.

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