scholarly journals JUSTIFICATIONS PHILOSOPHIQUES DU CRITERE DE FAIR INNINGS ET CONTROVERSES

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 67
Author(s):  
Clémence Thébaut ◽  
Paul-Loup Weil-Dubuc ◽  
Jérôme Wittwer
Keyword(s):  
Fair Innings

scholarly journals Fair Innings: Equality and Children’s Healthcare

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Long ◽  
Randi Zlotnik Shaul
Keyword(s):  
Canadian Charter ◽  
Ethical Implications ◽  
Fair Innings

This commentary assesses the ethical implications of a fair innings inspired approach to healthcare through the lens of the equality guarantee contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

A “fair innings” between the sexes: are men being treated inequitably?

2005 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aki Tsuchiya ◽  
Alan Williams
Keyword(s):  
Fair Innings

Against proportional shortfall as a priority-setting principle

2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 305-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Altmann
Keyword(s):  
Priority Setting ◽  
Direct Impact ◽  
Double Jeopardy ◽  
Future Health ◽  
Healthy Life ◽  
Healthy Life Years ◽  
Life Years ◽  
A Priority ◽  
Fair Innings

As the demand for healthcare rises, so does the need for priority setting in healthcare. In this paper, I consider a prominent priority-setting principle: proportional shortfall. My purpose is to argue that proportional shortfall, as a principle, should not be adopted. My key criticism is that proportional shortfall fails to consider past health.Proportional shortfall is justified as it supposedly balances concern for prospective health while still accounting for lifetime health, even though past health is deemed irrelevant. Accounting for this lifetime perspective means that the principle may indirectly consider past health by accounting for how far an individual is from achieving a complete, healthy life. I argue that proportional shortfall does not account for this lifetime perspective as it fails to incorporate the fair innings argument as originally claimed, undermining its purported justification.I go on to demonstrate that the case for ignoring past health is weak, and argue that past health is at least sometimes relevant for priority-setting decisions. Specifically, when an individual’s past health has a direct impact on current or future health, and when one individual has enjoyed significantly more healthy life years than another.Finally, I demonstrate that by ignoring past illnesses, even those entirely unrelated to their current illness, proportional shortfall can lead to instances of double jeopardy, a highly problematic implication. These arguments give us reason to reject proportional shortfall.

scholarly journals Explaining rule of rescue obligations in healthcare allocation: allowing the patient to tell the right kind of story about their life

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Life Stories ◽  
Life Story ◽  
Treatment Decision ◽  
Early Death ◽  
Great Cost ◽  
Imminent Death ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Right ◽  
Fair Innings ◽  
Short Life Expectancy

AbstractI consider various principles which might explain our intuitive obligation to rescue people from imminent death at great cost, even when the same resources could produce more benefit elsewhere. Our obligation to rescue is commonly explained in terms of the identifiability of the rescuee, but I reject this account. Instead, I offer two considerations which may come into play. Firstly, I explain the seeming importance of identifiability in terms of an intuitive obligation to prioritise life-extending interventions for people who face a high risk of an early death, and I explain this in turn with a fair innings-style principle which prioritises life-extending interventions for people expected to die young. However, this account is incomplete. It does not explain why we would devote the same resources to rescuing miners stuck down a mine even if they are elderly. We are averse to letting people die suddenly, or separated from friends and family. And so, secondly, I give a new account that explains this in terms of narrative considerations. We value life stories that follow certain patterns, classic patterns which are reflected in many popular myths and stories. We are particularly averse to depriving people of the opportunity to follow some such pattern as they approach death. This means allowing them to sort out their affairs, say goodbyes to family and friends, review their life, or come to terms with death itself. Such activities carry a lot of meaning as ways of closing our life story in the right way. So, for someone who has not been given much notice of their death, an extra month is worth much more than for other patients. Finally, I review the UK National Health Service's end of life premium, which gives priority to patients with short life expectancy. I suggest it falls short in terms of such considerations. For example, the NHS defines its timings in terms of how long the patient can expect to live as at the time of the treatment decision, whereas the timings should be specified in terms of time from diagnosis.

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