Care and Moral Motivation (Debra Shogan)

People engage in pure moral inquiry whenever they inquire into the moral features of some act, agent, or state of affairs without inquiring into the non-moral features of that act, agent, or state of affairs. The first section of this chapter argues that ordinary people act rationally when they engage in pure moral inquiry, and so any adequate view in metaethics ought to be able to explain this fact. The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation is to provide such an explanation. The remaining sections of the chapter argue that each of the standard views in metaethics has trouble providing such an explanation. A metaethical view can provide such an explanation only if it meets two constraints: it allows ordinary moral inquirers to know the essences of moral properties, and the essence of each moral property makes it rational to care for its own sake whether that property is instantiated.

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Reason and Moral Motivation in Mòzǐ

Dao ◽

10.1007/s11712-021-09772-1 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Myeong-seok Kim

Keyword(s):

Moral Motivation

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Akrasia and moral motivation

European Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1111/ejop.12657 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Sam Shpall

Keyword(s):

Moral Motivation

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Accountability and the Fear of the Lord

Studies in Christian Ethics ◽

10.1177/09539468211009756 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 095394682110097

Author(s):

C. Stephen Evans

Keyword(s):

Personal Autonomy ◽

Moral Motivation ◽

Human Flourishing ◽

Primary Motivation ◽

Fear Of The Lord

Why did the Biblical writers see the fear of the Lord as a virtue that is conducive to human flourishing? It is difficult for contemporary readers to understand how fear of anything can be virtuous. I propose that the fear of the Lord should be understood as accountability to God. I defend the claim that someone who displays excellence in an accountability relationship does display a virtue, and that this virtue is particularly valuable when exercised in relation to God. If we reject an individualistic view of moral motivation inspired by Kant, we can see that being held accountable does not necessarily diminish personal autonomy. The primary motivation for the person who has the virtue of accountability is not fear of punishment, but a desire to do what is right because it is right, rooted in an appreciation of the standing of one to whom one is accountable.

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