scholarly journals Open-mindedness, Critical Thinking, and Indoctrination: Homage to William Hare

Paideusis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Important Work ◽  
Educational Ideal

William Hare has made fundamental contributions to philosophy of education. Among the most important of these contributions is his hugely important work on open-mindedness. In this paper I explore the several relationships that exist between Hare’s favored educational ideal (open-mindedness) and my own (critical thinking). I argue that while both are of central importance, it is the latter that is the more fundamental of the two.

Open-Mindedness, Critical Thinking, and Indoctrination

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Educational Theory ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Important Work ◽  
Educational Aims ◽  
To Come ◽  
Educational Ideal

William Hare has made fundamental contributions to philosophy of education. His work on various matters of educational theory and practice is of the first importance and will influence the field for decades to come. Among the most important of these contributions is his hugely important work on open-mindedness, an ideal that Hare has clarified and defended powerfully and tellingly. In this paper I explore the several relationships that exist between Hare’s favored educational ideal (open-mindedness) and my own (critical thinking). Both are important educational aims, but I argue here that while both are of central importance, it is the latter that is the more fundamental of the two.

scholarly journals De-idealising the educational ideal of critical thinking

2020 ◽  
pp. 147787852098130
Author(s):  
Henri Pettersson
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Educational Objectives ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Normative Standards ◽  
Educational Ideal

It is widely recognised among educational theorists, educators and policy makers alike, that critical thinking should claim a superordinate place in our system of educational objectives. In the philosophical literature on this topic, critical thinking is often conceptualised as the educational cognate of rationality, which in turn is analysed as being comprised of the relevant skills and abilities to assess reasons and evidence, together with the intellectual dispositions to actively use these proficiencies in practice. The resulting picture is in many respects normative and idealised, following the style of philosophical theorising commonplace in the tradition of analytic philosophy of education. In contrast, certain recent empirical findings related to the rational performance of actual human beings seem to cast doubts on the extent to which we can expect people to fulfil these idealised normative standards of rationality. After introducing the relevant philosophical theories and psychological results, I ruminate on the implications these ideas have on our pedagogical views pertaining to critical thinking education.

How Should We Educate Students Whose Cultures Frown upon Rational Disputation?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Public Education ◽  
Cultural Diversity ◽  
Cultural Differences ◽  
Democratic Participation ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Full Participation ◽  
Rational Argumentation

`How should public education in democratic states deal with the cultural diversity brought about by contemporary globalization? My suggestion is that key to democratic public education is the obligation to foster in students the skills and abilities, and attitudes and dispositions, needed to participate fully in democratic decision-making. Of central importance are the abilities and dispositions required for critical thinking and rational argumentation: evaluating arguments of others, constructing arguments of one’s own that might rationally persuade one’s fellow citizens, etc. Without these abilities and dispositions, full participation in democratic decision-making is impossible. But fostering them is problematic when students are members of cultures in which argumentation is frowned upon. In this paper I address this tension, and argue that while respecting cultural differences is of the first importance, in democracies it cannot override the requirements of democracy itself. When these two clash, the requirements of democratic participation must take precedence.

Neither Humean nor (Fully) Kantian Be

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Educational Ideal

This chapter offers a reply to Stefaan Cuypers’ explication and critique of the views of rationality and critical thinking laid out in the previous chapters and in earlier work (see his “Critical Thinking, Autonomy and Practical Reason,” 2004). While Cuypers’ discussion is praiseworthy in several respects, it (1) mistakenly attributes to those views a Humean conception of (practical) reason, and (2) unsuccessfully argues that the positions articulated and defended in those earlier chapters lack the resources required to defend the basic claim that critical thinking is a fundamental educational ideal. Cuypers’ analysis also raises deep issues about the motivational character of reasons; I briefly address this matter as well.

Cultivating Reason

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Epistemic Dependence ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Western Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Educational Ideal

The Western philosophical tradition has historically valorized the cultivation of reason as a fundamental intellectual ideal. This ideal continues to be defended by many as educationally basic. However, recent philosophical work has challenged it on several fronts, including worries stemming from relativistic tendencies in the philosophy of science, the apparent ubiquity of epistemic dependence in social epistemology, and broad critiques of objectionable hegemony launched from feminist and postmodernist perspectives. This chapter briefly reviews the historical record, connects the cultivation of reason to the educational ideal of critical thinking, spells out the latter ideal, and evaluates these challenges. It ends by sketching a general, “transcendental” reply to all such critiques of reason.

scholarly journals Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Kotzee ◽  
J. Adam Carter ◽  
Harvey Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Primary Role ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Effective Pedagogy ◽  
Further Development ◽  
Action Guidance ◽  
Pedagogical Challenge

Abstract Virtue epistemology is among the dominant influences in mainstream epistemology today. An important commitment of one strand of virtue epistemology – responsibilist virtue epistemology – is that it must provide regulative normative guidance for good thinking. Recently, a number of virtue epistemologists (most notably Baehr) have held that virtue epistemology not only can provide regulative normative guidance, but moreover that we should reconceive the primary epistemic aim of all education as the inculcation of the intellectual virtues. Baehr's picture contrasts with another well-known position – that the primary aim of education is the promotion of critical thinking. In this paper – that we hold makes a contribution to both philosophy of education and epistemology and, a fortiori, epistemology of education – we challenge this picture. We outline three criteria that any putative aim of education must meet and hold that it is the aim of critical thinking, rather than the aim of instilling intellectual virtue, that best meets these criteria. On this basis, we propose a new challenge for intellectual virtue epistemology, next to the well-known empirically driven ‘situationist challenge’. What we call the ‘pedagogical challenge’ maintains that the intellectual virtues approach does not have available a suitably effective pedagogy to qualify the acquisition of intellectual virtue as the primary aim of education. This is because the pedagogic model of the intellectual virtues approach (borrowed largely from exemplarist thinking) is not properly action-guiding. Instead, we hold that, without much further development in virtue-based theory, logic and critical thinking must still play the primary role in the epistemology of education.

scholarly journals "Critical thinking" in the context of John Dewey's philosophy of education

2019 ◽  
pp. 222-225
Author(s):  
Aleksandr V. Zaytsev
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Critical Thinking ◽  
John Dewey ◽  
Positive Feedback ◽  
Critical Reflection ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Educational Practice ◽  
Innovative Method ◽  
American Schools

The article discusses the innovative method of critical thinking or, more precisely, critical reflection in the field of education, formulated by the American philosopher and twentieth-century educator John Dewey. The author shows that the development of John Dewey of this method has passed practical approbation in a number of American schools, has received positive feedback and has been introduced into the pedagogic and educational practice. The "critical thinking" theory of has not lost its topicality in modern conditions.

scholarly journals Educating Reason: Critical Thinking, Informal logic, and the Philosophy of Education

1985 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Informal Logic

Educating Reason: Critical Thinking, Informal logic, and the Philosophy of Education

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