scholarly journals Redetermination of a Claim to Be a Convention Refugee; A Review of the Jurisprudence

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 609-643
Author(s):  
Roger Cantin
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Advisory Committee ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Judicial Interpretation ◽  
Refugee Status ◽  
Determination Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Definition Of

The refugee determination process under the Immigration Act, 1976 comprises many steps which have been the subject of judicial interpretation. An individual claiming to be a “Convention refugee” in Canada will first be examined under oath with regard to his claim. The Refugee Status Advisory Committee will study the transcript of this examination. After obtaining the advice of the Committee, the Minister of Employment and Immigration will determine whether or not the claimant is a “Convention refugee”. Should this determination be negative, the person concerned will have the choice to apply to the Immigration Appeal Board for a redetermination of his claim. At this stage, the Board will grant an oral hearing to the applicant and render a decision thereafter if it is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he could prove that he is a “Convention refugee”. If no oral hearing is granted, the Board will determine that the applicant is not a “Convention refugee”. The Federal Court and the Supreme Court of Canada have had a considerable input in the interpretation of the provisions relating to this refugee determination process, including the wording of the definition of “Convention refugee”. This paper limits itself to a review of the decisions rendered by these courts.

scholarly journals The Evolution of the Duty to Consult

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Gonzalez
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Regulatory Agency ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Current Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The duty to consult has been the subject of many trials and headlines, yet many still feel as though the consultation process is faulty. Relying on recent caselaw from the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal, I trace the evolution of the duty to consult from its inception to the latest major cases. I suggest that the current process can be improved to better engage all parties, (i.e. Crown, regulatory agency, industry proponent, Indigenous peoples), with a stronger emphasis on efficiency and reconciliation. I rely on the work of Matthew Hodgson to further solidify my consultation framework by advancing the idea of a specialized tribunal charged with reviewing the adequacy of consultations.

scholarly journals After Labaye: The Harm Test of Obscenity, the New Judicial Vacuum, and the Relevance of Familiar Voices

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 741 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Jochelson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Tolerance Test ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Obscenity Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Tolerance Approach ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Community Standards

In R. v. Labaye, the Supreme Court of Canada finally retired the community standards of tolerance test of obscenity. The test had been the subject of much academic critique, a matter that reached its zenith in the period following Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), in which a gay and lesbian bookshop contested the procedures and legislative regime of customs officials in detaining its imports. The engagement in the literature on the efficacy of the community standards test that followed was often heated, always interesting, and ultimately unresolved. To date, we have not seen any clarifying applications of the newly proposed harm test by the Supreme Court, nor have we seen a profound articulation in any lower courts. Subsequently, the academic discussion has slowed to a crawl. In this article, the author reviews four accounts of the community standards test that were prominent following Little Sisters, and asks if the newly proposed Labaye standard meets their concerns. The Labaye case provides much fodder for the previous critics and supporters of a community standards of tolerance approach to analyze. After a critical analysis of the new Labaye test, the author concludes that the concerns have not been muted by the retirement of the community standards test, even if the voices have been. The engaged voices heard in the aftermath of Little Sisters should not hold back and they should not abandon the work to be done in obscenity law and freedom of expression discourse generally.

scholarly journals Feu la D.C.D. L'arrêt Miller et la peine de mort

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.

scholarly journals Settling the Fisheries: Pre-Confederation Crown Policy in Upper Canada and the Supreme Court's decisions in R. v. NIKAL and LEWIS

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-172
Author(s):  
Peggy J. Blair
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Upper Canada ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Fishing Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject

Although a casual reading of the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in R. v. Nikal and R. v. Lewis might suggest otherwise, this article will argue that Court's decisions in two recent British Columbia aboriginal fishing cases do not apply in Ontario. In doing so, it will be shown that the Supreme Court of Canada relied on evidence of historic Crown policies towards aboriginal fishing rights in Upper Canada in the absence of appropriate context as to when, how and why those policies evolved. As a result, the Court wrongly concluded that fisheries could not be the subject of exclusive aboriginal rights.

scholarly journals Odpowiedzialność zakładu ubezpieczeń za szkody wyrządzone przez agenta ubezpieczeniowego

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 13-30
Author(s):  
Amanda Adamska ◽  
Anna Maria Barańska
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Insurance Company ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Insurance Agent ◽  
Insurance Intermediation ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Injured Party ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Definition Of

The responsibility of an insurance company for damages caused by an insurance agent The subject of this article is the responsibility of an insurance company for damages caused by an insurance agent in connection with the performance of agency activities. The Act on Insurance Intermediation of 22 May 2003 lays down a liability regime based on the principle of risk. It also contains the definition of an insurance agent and performed agency activities. In the next part of the article there is analysed the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court concerning the interpretation of article 11 1 of the abovementioned Act. It discusses an attempt at defining the difference between activities performed “in connection with” and “at the occasion of” other activities. Finally there is analysed an issue of the contribution of the injured party to the occurrence of the damage in this type of cases article 362 of the Civil Code.

scholarly journals Children in Pornography after Sharpe

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janine Benedet
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Child Pornography ◽  
Criminal Code ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
Constitutional Protection ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Definition Of

In its recent decision in R. v. Sharpe, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Criminal Code provisions prohibiting the possession and making of child pornography, subject to two exceptions. Despite a narrow construction of the definition of child pornography and a broad reading of the statutory defences, the majority found that prohibiting individuals from making and possessing some kinds of child pornography was an unjustifiable limit on the freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The dissent would have upheld the legislation in its entirety. This article argues that the majority of the Court erred in considering the value of freedom of expression in a detached and abstract manner. Operating in this abstract plane led the Court to approve two significant exceptions on the basis of hypothetical examples of overbreadth, without considering the reality of the exceptions as they relate to documented child pornography cases. As a result, the Court extended constitutional protection to some categories of material that are clearly harmful to children. This result should make us sceptical of the use in Charter cases of broad reading in remedies that create complex judicial amendments with unexamined consequences.

scholarly journals GAARs and the Nexus between Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Drafting: Lessons for the U.S. from Canada

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah ◽  
Amir Pichhadze
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Discretionary Power ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The U.S

Abstract Rules targeting specific known schemes are not the only tools available in the battle against tax avoidance. Legal systems also use measures that apply generally. The U.S. for example has tended to rely heavily on general doctrines. One such doctrine which is discussed in part 2 of this chapter is the “economic substance” doctrine. Yet as Xiong and Evans recently pointed out “although such judicial doctrines can be used to deal with various aspects of complicated tax abuse judges tended sometimes to limit and sometimes to enlarge the scope of jurisprudential interpretation leading to substantial uncertainty and risk.” One way to limit the discretionary power of judges and overcome the uncertainty apparent in their judgments is by formalizing the doctrines as the US has done by codifying the “economic substance” doctrine in 2010. As explained in part 2 of this chapter a limitation of the “economic substance” doctrine whether it is established judicially or codified by statute may be its focus on the taxpayer’s intentions as the basis for attacking tax avoidance. Part 3 of this chapter goes on to explain that the U.S. could overcome this limitation by adopting a statutory General Anti-Abuse Rule (“GAAR”). GAARs also impose generally applicable limits on what constitutes acceptable (reasonable) tax arrangements. But they do so based on whether the arrangements are consistent with the legislature’s intentions as they were conveyed in the tax provision which the taxpayer is relying on for achieving the tax advantage in question. As Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) explained “by confining legitimate tax avoidance to schemes that are not inconsistent with the policy underlying the statutory provision invoked by the taxpayer GAAR effectively limits the scope of the principle in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster… that ‘[e]very man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it would otherwise be’.” Based on Canada’s experience with the GAAR parts 4 and 5 identify and explain the nexus between statutory interpretation and legislative drafting and the implications of this nexus on the application of a GAAR in the U.S. should Congress choose to take this route. Part 4 identifies that while the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) has recognized the need to apply a purposive interpretation of Canada’s GAAR in order to ascertain parliament’s intentions in the relevant tax provision the court has also held that it will only give effect to those intentions which were clearly conveyed by the relevant provision and will not invent a legislative intention which parliament has failed to convey. Part 5 notes that such judicial restraint has also been taken by the U.S. Supreme Court and therefore a similar approach could be expected by the U.S. courts should Congress adopt a GAAR. Therefore it would be up to Congress as it is similarly up to Canada’s Parliament to carefully and clearly draft its legislative intentions otherwise the effectiveness of a GAAR would be undermined.

scholarly journals The Principle of Good Faith in Contractual Performance: A Scottish-Canadian Comparison

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-331
Author(s):  
Hector MacQueen ◽  
Shannon O'Byrne
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Common

In 2014 the Supreme Court of Canada in Bhasin v Hrynew formally but cautiously acknowledged good faith as a general organising principle of contractual performance at common law and that the principle largely manifests by way of implied terms and through the new duty of honesty. Rejecting English recalcitrance on the subject, the SCC concluded that recognising a good faith principle makes the common law less unsettled and piecemeal, more coherent and just. The article suggests that the limitations placed on the good faith principle by the SCC make its potential adoption in Scotland offer more opportunity than risk, especially in relation to the exercise of contractual discretions and contractual remedies.

scholarly journals Un aspect crucial mais délicat des libertés de conscience et de religion des articles 2 et 3 des Chartes canadienne et québécoise: l'objection de conscience

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Freedom Of Conscience ◽  
Current Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right

The Supreme Court of Canada, obiter, in the Big M Drug Mart Case, has spoken of the "Constitutional Exemption". It is the possibility not to be bound to obey the neutral laws that conflict with one's conscience or religion. It is what we call in French l'objection de conscience. The institution exists in Canadian and Québec Law as a part of the right to freedom of conscience or religion expressed in 2a) and 3 of the Canadian and Québec Charters of Rights. And it goes well beyond the right not to fight within the armed forces. The Supreme Court of Canada has actually delivered six judgments touching on the subject in 1985 and 1986. The conditions under which l'objection de conscience come into play are not so well known however. Does it cover matters of worship or only rules of morals ? Secular or only religious principles ? Personal or only group beliefs ? Do the existence of the rule, the sincerity of the objector and the reasonableness of the exemption have to be proved? Above all, what is the difference between a creed and an opinion ? The following article tries to formulate answers to these questions, with the help of current case-law.

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