scholarly journals On the Scope of Egalitarian Justice

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Heath
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Central Component ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
The Social ◽  
David Gauthier ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Egalitarian Justice ◽  
A Current

It is not clear whether the social contract is supposed to merely supplement the unequal gains that individuals are able to make through the exercise of their natural endowments with a set of equal gains secured through social cooperation, or whether the social contract must also compensate individuals for the effects of these natural inequalities, so that they literally become all equal. The issue concerns, in effect, whether natural inequality falls within the scope of egalitarian justice. I think it is fair to say that the majority of egalitarians assume that the principle of equality imposes an obligation to redress natural inequality. Yet there is no consensus on this issue. David Gauthier has made the rejection of the principle of redress a central component of his project. It has often escaped notice that John Rawls also rejects the principle of redress. Thus it is not just anti-egalitarians who reject the principle of redress. There is a current of egalitarian thought – which we might call, for lack of a better term, narrow-scope egalitarianism – which also rejects this principle. In this paper, I would like to show that there is considerable wisdom in the narrow-scope egalitarian position. Many of the problems that lead theorists to reject egalitarianism in its entirety are a consequence, not of the principle of equality per se, but rather of the commitment to redress natural inequality. The narrow-scope view avoids all of these difficulties.

International Ethics within the International Social Contract

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy E. Eckert
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
International System ◽  
Choice Situation ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
International Ethics ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Initial Choice ◽  
International Social

The social contract tradition derives its ethical force from the hypothetical agreement that parties would reach in an initial choice situation. This initial choice situation brings together a description of the circumstances of justice, various extra-contractarian moral assumptions, and an instrumental theory of rational choice. The circumstances of justice refer to the conditions that require principles of justice. These conditions include the existence of social cooperation along with moderate scarcity. In the absence of such conditions, principles of justice are either unnecessary or impossible to sustain. Social cooperation generates both benefits and burdens, and it is the allocation of those components of social cooperation that requires principles of justice. The application of the social contract to the domestic context dates back to the ancient Greeks, though their version of the contract was somewhat crude and rather one-sided in favor of state authority. Later versions of the social contract would oblige the state to provide much more to citizens in return for their allegiance. John Rawls is widely credited with resurrecting the social contract tradition in the twentieth century. His thought holds special significance for the international social contract, as he extends the contractual approach ethics into the international system where his predecessors declined to do so.

The Social Contract as an Analytic, Justificatory, and Polemic Device

1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Keyt
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Analytic Method ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Comparative Study

John Rawls, in his distinguished revival and animation of the theory of the social contract, maintains that “the procedure of contract theories provides … a general analytic method for the comparative study of conceptions of justice ” (p. 121). As a corollary, he holds, secondly, that “if one interpretation [of the contractual situation] is philosophically most favoured, and if its principles characterize our considered judgments, we have a procedure for justification as well ” (p. 122). Finally, Rawls uses the social contract as a critical or polemic device; he is prepared to reject a conception of justice if the contractual situation associated with it contains objectionable features.

Justice in a Market Economy

2006 ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.

John Rawls

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines the impact of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice on the liberal audience that took it up. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls offers a defense of civil disobedience that would make politically motivated disobedience a much more acceptable part of our political life than either the U.S. Supreme Court or the English judiciary seems likely to contemplate. Furthermore, his views about the subservience of economic institutions to “social justice” place him firmly on one side of what is currently the most fiercely contested dividing line in politics in Britain today. The chapter also considers Rawls's use of the theory of the social contract to support his arguments; his principle of “the priority of liberty”; and his “difference principle.” It asserts that Rawls is safe from those critics who maintain that what purports to be a defense of liberalism actually collapses into a wholesale collectivism.

A Theory of Fairness in Trade

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron James
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Social ◽  
Basic Level

AbstractA theory of fairness in international trade should answer at least three questions. What, at the basic level, are we to assess as fair or unfair in the trade context? What sort of fairness issue does this basic subject of assessment raise? And, what moral principles must be fulfilled if trade is to be fair in the relevant sense? This discussion presents answers to these questions that derive from a “constructivist” methodology inspired by John Rawls and the social contract tradition.

scholarly journals Social Justice and Lesbian Feminism: Two Theories Applied to Homophobia

10.18060/210 ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-327
Author(s):  
Denise L. Levy
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Feminist Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Problem ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Lesbian Feminism ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
The Social ◽  
Theory Base ◽  
A Current

Trends in contemporary social work include the use of an eclectic theory base. In an effort to incorporate multiple theories, this article will examine the social problem of homophobia using two different theoretical perspectives: John Rawls’ theory of social justice and lesbian feminist theory.Homophobia, a current social problem, can be defined as “dislike or hatred toward homosexuals, including both cultural and personal biases against homosexuals” (Sullivan, 2003, p. 2). Rawls’ theory of justice and lesbian feminist theory are especially relevant to the issue of homophobia and provide a useful lens to understanding this social problem. In this article, these two theories will be summarized, applied to the issue of homophobia, and compared and contrasted based on their utility.

PROPORTIONATE TAXATION AS A FAIR DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SURPLUS: THE STRANGE CAREER OF AN IDEA

2003 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara H. Fried
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Surplus Value ◽  
The Social ◽  
David Gauthier ◽  
Social Surplus

The article considers a surprisingly resilient argument, going back to Adam Smith, for the fairness of proportionate taxation: that proportionate taxation represents the fair way to divide the surplus value produced by social cooperation among all of society's members. The article considers two recent variants on that argument, one by Richard Epstein in Takings and one by David Gauthier in Morals by Agreement. It concludes that the normative and empirical assumptions that underlie these, and all other variants, of the argument are so implausible as to suggest the argument cannot be taken seriously as a defense of proportionate taxation. The article concludes by considering other possible explanations for the enduring attraction of proportionate taxation for political philosophers, particularly those with libertarian and quasi-libertarian leanings.

Evolution’s republic: Groundwork for a biosocial contract

2014 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 518-541
Author(s):  
Alex Schulman
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Arms Races ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Public Sphere

Are the concepts of the state of nature and the social contract still relevant for contemporary political theory? I argue that these ideas from early modern and Enlightenment political theory can be fruitfully reapplied via the data and methods of evolutionary biology. Alignment of evolutionary theory with social contract theory can answer the charge that Darwinism, however accurate its picture of the natural world or natural history, provides no defensible grounding for ethics or politics. The implications of the biosocial contract for political economy are far-reaching, with Rousseau’s insistence that ‘all have something and none has too much of anything’ gaining biological and evolutionary confirmation. Republicanism refracted through Darwinism telescopes freedom as non-domination back to the very biological origins of human politics. Such naturalization suggests translating the Rawlsian imperative to reconcile self-interest and social cooperation into the related Darwinian imperative to use the public sphere to end irrational and destructive arms races.

Contractarianism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Common Good ◽  
John Locke ◽  
General Will ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
Social Compact ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principles Of Justice

The idea that political relations originate in contract or agreement has been applied in several ways. In Plato’s Republic Glaucon suggests that justice is but a pact among rational egoists. Thomas Hobbes developed this idea to analyse the nature of political power.Given the predominantly self-centred nature of humankind, government is necessary for society. Government’s role is to stabilize social cooperation. By exercising enforcement powers, government provides each with the assurance that everyone else will abide by cooperative rules, thereby making it rational for all to cooperate. To fulfil this stabilizing role, Hobbes argued that it is rational for each individual to agree to authorize one person to exercise absolute political power. Neo-Hobbesians eschew absolutism and apply the theory of rational choice to argue that rules of justice, perhaps even all morality, can be construed in terms of a rational bargain among self-interested individuals. John Locke, working from different premises than Hobbes, appealed to a social compact to argue for a constitutional government with limited powers. All men are born with a natural right to equal freedom, and a natural duty to God to preserve themselves and the rest of mankind. No government is just unless it could be commonly agreed to form a position of equal freedom, where agreement is subject to the moral constraints of natural law. Absolutism is unjust according to this criterion. Rousseau developed egalitarian features of Locke’s view to contend for a democratic constitution.The Social Contract embodies the General Will of society, not the unconstrained private wills of its members. The General Will wills the common good, the good of society and all of its members. Only by bringing our individual wills into accord with the General Will can we achieve civic and moral freedom. In this century, John Rawls has recast natural rights theories of the social contract to argue for a liberal egalitarian conception of justice. From a position of equality, where each person abstracts from knowledge of their historical situations, it is rational for all to agree on principles of justice that guarantee equal basic freedoms and resources adequate for each person’s independence. T.M. Scanlon, meanwhile, has outlined a right-based contractualist account of morality. An act is right if it accords with principles that could not be reasonably rejected by persons who are motivated by a desire to justify their actions according to principles that no one else can reasonably reject.

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