scholarly journals Struggling Towards Coherence in Canadian Administrative Law? Recent Cases on Standard of Review and Reasonableness

2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 527-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Daly

Although the Supreme Court of Canada’s seminal decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick has now been cited more than 10,000 times by Canadian courts and administrative tribunals, many of its key features remain obscure. In this article, the author analyzes recent cases decided under the Dunsmuir framework with a view to determining where Canadian courts might usefully go next. The author’s argument is that the two important principles said to underlie the Dunsmuir framework—the rule of law and democracy—can provide guidance to courts in simplifying and clarifying judicial review of administrative action. In Part I, the author explains how the relationship between Dunsmuir’s categorical approach and the contextual approach that it replaced is uncertain and causes significant confusion, and explores the potential utility of the two underlying principles in simplifying the law. The application of the reasonableness standard of review is the focus of Part II, in which the author criticizes the general approach to reasonableness review in Canada, but suggests that the rule of law and democracy may assist in clarifying the law, by setting the boundaries of the “range” of reasonable outcomes and structuring the analytical framework for identifying unreasonable administrative decisions. Finally, the author draws the strands of Parts I and II together by arguing for the adoption of a unified, context-sensitive reasonableness standard, underpinned by the rule of law and democracy, with the aim of providing clarity and simplicity to Canadian administrative law in a manner faithful to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Dunsmuir.

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Thomas Halper

Abstract Felix Frankfurter, renowned as a public intellectual fighting for justice, became as a member of the Supreme Court a figure proclaiming his devotion to the rule of law and its corollary, judicial self restraint, even when its results conflicted with his deepest beliefs. Yet an analysis of several of his leading opinions suggests that his famous balancing tests had little to do with law. In sacrificing his policy and ethical goals in the service of law, he often failed to serve the law, and in that sense, his well publicized sacrifices were for nothing.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-710
Author(s):  
Denis Bourque

Clause 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights specifies that every person has the right to equality before the law. The purpose of this article is to analyse, on the one hand, the meaning that the judges of the Supreme Court have given to this concept of equality before the law and, on the other hand, the way in which they have applied this aforementioned principle of Clause 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. Four judgements are the subject of Mr. Bourque's study. He concerns himself with the Drybones, Lavell, Burnshine and Canard judgements. In the course of analysing these cases, Mr. Bourque brings out the shilly-shallying of the judges in connection with their concept of equality before the law. In spite of this beating about the bush two concepts emerge at the level of the judges of the Supreme Court, namely an equalitarian concept of equality before the law, and a concept which makes equivalent equality before the law and the rule of law. According to Mr. Bourque, the analysis of these four judgements shows that it is the concept which makes equivalent equality before the law and the rule of law, which represents, the position of the Supreme Court, at the present time.


2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Patrice Garant ◽  
Sylvio Normand

Administrative Tribunals have jurisdiction to deal with questions of law. In the exercise of such jurisdiction they may sometimes make mistakes in the construction of the statutes, regulations or other instruments. Even in the presence of a privative clause, an inferior tribunal should not be the supreme interpret of the law. It is one of the requirements of the « rule of law » that the Superior Court should have a supervisory « droit de regard ». Traditionally, only errors of law going to jurisdiction were out of the shield of the privative clause ; the Superior Courts used to restrain their intervention only after charactarizing the alleged error as « jurisdictional error of law ». Two difficulties came to arise from the approach about whether there exists an error of jurisdiction or one « merely » of law. Firstly, who can tell whether there is a genuine error of law. Secondly, what criteria transmute in the minds of Superior Court Judges an error into one of jurisdiction. The recent case law convinces us of the necessity of a different approach in order to achieve some clarity in this field of Administrative law. Mr. Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada hints at it in the Nispawin and the New Brunswick Liquor Corporation cases. This approach would put an end to the confusion that still prevail in other Supreme Court cases like Blanco or Labrecque. The distinction between errors of law going to jurisdiction and « merely » errors of law is unrational and so unpracticable that it should be abandoned and replaced by what we suggest in the following lines... Mr. Justice Robert Reid of the Ontario Divisional Court has also expressed the same concern in a remarquable judgment.


1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 356-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itzhak Zamir

Professor David Kretzmer has reviewed the development of administrative law in Israel and reached the conclusion that a revolution has occurred. The revolution manifests itself in the substantial widening of the scope of judicial review over administrative acts. For example, the Supreme Court is now willing to review the legality of parliamentary proceedings. This revolution, in his opinion, reflects a change in the conception of the Court's function in this realm. In the past the Court saw itself as limited to the function of deciding controversies between two opposing parties. Today, it is as if another function has been added, and the Court perceives itself as the guardian of the rule of law. Therefore, it is likely to become actively engaged in protecting the rule of law and to invalidate a governmental decision even absent a controversy in the traditional sense. The Court acts in this manner without explaining the basis or the reason for the role that it has assumed. Thus, the question may well arise whether this revolution is legitimate. On the basis of Professor Kretzmer's comments one may ask if indeed the Court, in the struggle over the rule of law, has taken on a function not its own, and in doing so itself infringed upon the rule of law.


Author(s):  
Yu. I. Matat

The article is devoted to the study of the legal nature of the interpretation of law, its features, as well as the role in overcoming gaps in the law. Attention is focused and substantiated that the interpretation of legal norms, being a necessary element of the legal regulation mechanism, plays the important role in the process of overcoming gaps in law. So, by means of various methods of interpretation, in particular, formal gaps are overcome, which, in turn, may arise as a result of an unsuccessful presentation of legal norms by the legislator. It is determined that when applying the rule of law by analogy, such a rule in the particular situation should be interpreted not as part of the institution from which it is borrowed, but as part of the institution, the gap in which it is designed to overcome. This is due to the fact that the rule applied by analogy is subject to double influence: on the one hand, it generally retains its original meaning, on the other - partially adapts to the characteristics of the institution in which the gap is overcome through it. The role of official interpretation in the process of application of the law in the conditions of gaps in the legislation is clarified, the role of recommendatory explanations provided by higher courts on the issues of application of the legislation is investigated. In Ukraine, these powers, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges" dated June 02, 2016, are assigned to the Plenum of the Supreme Court, in order to ensure the same application of the rules of law in solving certain categories of cases, generalizes the practice of applying substantive and procedural laws, systematizes and ensures the promulgation legal positions of the Supreme Court, as well as based on the results of the analysis of judicial statistics and generalization of judicial practice, it provides explanations of the recommendatory nature on the application of legislation in solving court cases. It is concluded that the importance of the interpretation of law is primarily to ensure full and accurate disclosure of the functions of legal acts as a source and form of existence of legal norms, other substantive elements of the legal system. The interpretation concretizes the law, which allows law enforcement agencies to ensure the resolution of legal cases in strict accordance with the constitutional principles of legal certainty, legality and the rule of law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-57
Author(s):  
Azwad Rachmat Hambali

Tujuan penelitian menganalisis kemerdekaan hakim dan kemandirian kehakiman dalam konsep negara hukum. Metode Penelitian menggunakan penelitian hukum normative, Hasil penelitian bahwa Kemerdekaan Hakim  dan kemandirian Kekuasaan Kehakiman sebagai  penjelmaan konsep Negara Hukum sebagaimana diatur dalam Pasal 1 ayat 3 Undang Undang Dasar Negara Republik indonesia Tahun 1945  (hasil amandemen) beserta beberapa peraturan perundang undangan yang terkait seperti Undang Undang Kekuasaan Kehakiman, Undang Undang Mahkamah Agung, Undang Undang Komisi Yudisial  serta ketetapan MPR yang merupakan rujukan dalam pelaksanan Kemerdekaan Hakim, dan kemandirian personal, kemandirian substantive ,kemandirian internal serta kemandirian institusi. Rekomendasi mewujudkan konsep Negara Hukum perlu ditata peraturan perundang undangan yang menjamin kemerdekaan Hakim dan Kemandirian Kekuasaan. The research objective is to analyze the independence of judges and the independence of the judiciary in the concept of a rule of law. The research method uses normative legal research. The results show that the independence of judges and the independence of the judicial power as the embodiment of the concept of the rule of law as regulated in Article 1 paragraph 3 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (amendments) along with several related laws and regulations such as the Law Judicial Power, the Law on the Supreme Court, the Judicial Commission Law and the MPR decrees which are references in the implementation of Judges' Independence, and personal independence, substantive independence, internal independence and institutional independence. Recommendations to embody the concept of a rule of law need to put in place laws and regulations that guarantee the independence of judges and independence of power.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Budi Suhariyanto

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.


1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.


Author(s):  
O. Kravchuk ◽  
I. Ostashchuk

The oath of a judge as an oath of office and as an element of judicial symbolism is considered in the article. The oath of a judge belongs to the categories of oaths of office, taken by an official upon taking office. At the same time, it belongs to the judicial oaths used in the justice process and is an element of judicial symbols. The oath of a judge as an oath of office symbolizes the endowment of a judge as an official by the state (judicial) power, the moment of his acquisition of powers (it is the inauguration ceremony), and the duty of a judge as an official to perform his duties properly. The oath of a judge as a judicial symbol represents a public and solemn obligation of the judge to exercise a fair trial in all its manifestations, including: independence and impartiality of the court, adversarial proceedings, equality of arms, and the rule of law. The judge takes the oath in a solemn atmosphere in the presence of senior officials (in Ukraine – in the presence of the President of Ukraine). It is an important ritual – a symbol of giving a person judicial power. The oath itself is a symbolic action of conscious choice of responsible and impartial observance of the law in the professional functions of realization of the rule of law for the good of all people. The coronavirus pandemic has shown that gathering a large number of people in one room can be problematic, so the oath ceremony was held even outdoors. It is stated that holding a ceremony in one of the judicial bodies, for example, in the premises of the Supreme Court or (subject to quarantine restrictions) in the territory of the Supreme Court may symbolize the independence of the judiciary and each judge from other branches of power. The peculiarity of the oath of a judge in Ukraine is its one-time nature. It should be taken only by a person first appointed to the position of a judge. In case of an appointment or transfer to another court, the judge shall not take the oath again. In this aspect, the oath of a judge is similar to the oath of a civil servant, which is taken only by persons recruited for the first time.


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