scholarly journals Toward a Bijural Interpretation of the Principle of Respect in Aboriginal Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 939-977
Author(s):  
Kirsten Manley-Casimir

Aboriginal law disputes are disputes that arise in the spaces between Indigenous and non-Indigenous societies. To date, the Supreme Court of Canada has resolved Aboriginal law disputes under section 35 by relying heavily on the common law to the exclusion of Indigenous legal traditions and principles. In this article, the author argues that applying a bijural interpretation of the principle of respect provides a promising pathway forward in resolving Aboriginal law disputes in a way that supports the grand purpose of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982—reconciliation. The author discusses the principle of respect by considering both non-Indigenous and Indigenous theories to propose a robust conception of respect to guide Aboriginal law jurisprudence. She then suggests three ways to implement the principle of respect in the intercultural relationship: (1) making interdependence and relationships primary; (2) rejecting colonial attitudes and stereotypes of Indigenous peoples; and (3) creating political and legal space for the expression and flourishing of cultural difference.

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-350
Author(s):  
Patricia Ochman

AbstractThe author reviews the most recent judgments rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada and certain provincial courts, in order to provide an update in the sphere of Aboriginal law practice in Canada, destined mainly for foreign lawyers and academics. Throughout the review of those recent judgments, the author provides an overview of certain key principles and concepts of Canadian Aboriginal law. Besides providing an overview of recent judgments in the sphere of Aboriginal law, the author seeks to illustrate how meaningful the protection and recognition of Aboriginal rights and treaty rights are in practice, through the overview of key concepts and principles of Canadian Aboriginal law and how they were recently interpreted by Canadian courts. The author briefly addresses Canada's vote against the adoption of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.


Legal Studies ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Giliker

This article examines the treatment of pure economic loss claims in England and Canada. The two jurisdictions have much in common. Starting from the same case sources, the common law of each system has struggled to deal with claims for negligently-incurred pure economic loss. Yet, the systems diverged in the 1990s when the Canadian Supreme Court refused to follow the lead of Murphy v Brentwood DC and reiterated its adherence to the Anns two-stage test. It is submitted that, in view of recent developments which suggest the gradual convergence of the two systems, English law should carefully examine the categorisation approach adopted by the Canadian courts. The current English position is far from clear, and the Canadian model is capable of bringing transparency and greater clarity to this difficult area of law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-331
Author(s):  
Hector MacQueen ◽  
Shannon O'Byrne

In 2014 the Supreme Court of Canada in Bhasin v Hrynew formally but cautiously acknowledged good faith as a general organising principle of contractual performance at common law and that the principle largely manifests by way of implied terms and through the new duty of honesty. Rejecting English recalcitrance on the subject, the SCC concluded that recognising a good faith principle makes the common law less unsettled and piecemeal, more coherent and just. The article suggests that the limitations placed on the good faith principle by the SCC make its potential adoption in Scotland offer more opportunity than risk, especially in relation to the exercise of contractual discretions and contractual remedies.


1969 ◽  
pp. 299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julianne Parfett

The common law has historically defined self- incrimination narrowly. Using Packer's models of the criminal justice system as a framework, the article examines the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretations of s. 24(2) of the Charter. The Court has expanded the definitions of both self incrimination and remoteness. The author argues that s. 24(2) has ceased to be a remedy requiring the balancing of interests and has become a quasi- automatic rule of exclusion, which promotes individual rights at the cost of victim's rights. Further, in the Court's zeal to protect the integrity of the system, there is no allowance made for the seriousness of the breach, the consequences of the exclusion, or the causal connection between the breach and any evidence obtained. The author argues that this has resulted in a justice system more concerned with police behaviour than with the pursuit of truth. Instead, either the exclusionary rule must be used to foster a balance of individual and communitarian rights, or other more imaginative remedies should be crafted from s. 24(2) to protect the integrity of the legal system.


1969 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 95
Author(s):  
Jeff Berryman

The Supreme Court of Canada has purported to distinguish the approach to quantifying equitable compensation from that applied to the quantification of damages in common law for breach of contract or tort. In particular, the rules associated with causation and remoteness and the application of evidential presumptions has dominated this discourse. In this comment the author suggests that these distinctions are adding to conceptual muddling of the fiduciary relationship and that it would be better for the court to embrace totally the sophisticated analytical rules of the common law rather than recreate new rules in equity. Further, he argues that the distinctive features of the fiduciary relationship would be better recognized through the application of punitive damages rather than the distortion of compensation principles.


Author(s):  
Brittany Scott

Over the past number of years, the law surrounding the requirement to operate in good faith in conducting contractual obligations has been a developing principle in common law countries from Australia, to the United Kingdom to Canada. In Canada, this principle has developed separately within the civil and common law legal traditions respectively. While the Quebec Civil Code has historically provided for an expectation of parties to a contract to operate in good faith, the common law in Canada has not been as clear.  Prior to 2014, the Canadian common law duty to negotiate in good faith was an unsettled body of law, recognized in certain areas, but not across the discipline as a whole. It has only been since the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Bhasin v. Hrynew that this duty to negotiate in good faith has been outlined as a coherent set of guiding principles. Parties to a contract are now both bound by a general organizing principle of good faith in contracts and are expected to act honestly in the performance of their contractual obligations. While new to the Canadian common law, numerous cases have been quick to test the court’s interpretation of this change in scope to the law of good faith. As Canadian common law jurisprudence moves forward, this principle will continue to expand and develop.


Author(s):  
Jud Mathews

This chapter picks up the story where the previous chapter left off, showing how the Supreme Court of Canada initially made a show of rejecting the application of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to private law relationships in Dolphin Delivery. But at the same time, the Court left itself room to interpret the common law to comport with Charter values. In the years since, litigants have pressed the Court to use this power to meet their normative demands, and the Court has done so on many occasions. At the same time, the Court has showed solicitude for legislative initiatives, often using the Charter to shape private-party obligations to one other only after the legislature has taken some rights-protective action in that area, in a strategy that might be called caboose constitutionalism.


1994 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 484
Author(s):  
M. Anne Stalker

The author examines the interaction between the Criminal Code and the common law in relation to two areas of law recently handled by both the Alberta Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada


2012 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 205
Author(s):  
Iris Fischer ◽  
Adam Lazier

After paying little attention to defamation law for decades, in the last few years the Supreme Court of Canada has begun to reshape the field. In what has been described as the “constitutionalization” of defamation law, the Court has recently recognized that the common law was out of step with the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This process began in 2008 with the Court’s decision in WIC Radio v. Simpson, which clarified and expanded the scope of the fair comment defence. The Court went further the following year with Grant v. Torstar Corp, which recognized an entirely new defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest.


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