scholarly journals Classification of Property and Conceptions of Ownership in Civil and Common Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Pierre
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Conceptual Background ◽  
The Law

This paper examines the classification of property in common law and civil law, by contrasting the conceptions of ownership in each tradition. The author aims to provide a comparative analysis of the fundamental concepts and institutions of the law of property in each tradition. This is deemed useful, not only for promoting a better understanding of the law of property by jurists in both traditions, but also for enabling the jurist of one tradition, to find his way in the unfamiliar territory of the other tradition. The author demonstrates that ownership in common law—insofar as it exists—is constructed on the ruins of the feudal system. Having been developed in an ad hoc manner from such origins, the law of property is seen to be an amalgam of technical and complex principles, built around institutions which sometimes have archaic features that serve no useful purpose in the present day. The theory of "estates", which is espoused, is however acclaimed for its flexibility, its most celebrated attribute being that invaluable institution, the Trust. Ownership in civil law in contrast, is shown to have developed from the romanisation of the feudal system. The law of property, its principles and institutions, are more systematically and rationally organised. They are therefore more easily assimilated and applied. The theory of absolute ownership which is at its core, is however criticised for being, to some extent, inflexible. Using this historical and conceptual background, the author shows that underneath the façade of similar powers over land in the two traditions, lies fundamental juridical differences in the nature and characteristics of the institutions—even those bearing the sames names.

The doctrine of Res Judicata in International Criminal Law

2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Theofanis
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Res Judicata ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of

AbstractRes judicata is well-settled as a general principle of international law. But the rules of res judicata in international criminal procedure are undeveloped. Recent cases from the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have added to the understanding of res judicata in international law - demonstrating the risk that new rules of res judicata will implicitly incorporate either a common-law or civil-law definition of what the "law" is. Analysis of issues considered in recent Tribunal jurisprudence - particularly the questions of review and reconsideration - locates potential hazards in the development of the law and provides guidance for the application of the ICC statute.

Negligence and Ignorance

Philosophy ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 53 (205) ◽  
pp. 293-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. D. Woozley
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Strict Liability ◽  
The Other ◽  
Working Paper ◽  
Positive Sense ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Criminal Charges ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Commission

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and to relate to each other two topics: (a) the admissibility of ignorance and mistake of fact as defences against negligence in crime; and (b) the inadmissibility of ignorance and mistake of law as defences against criminal charges. I am in (a) not concerned at all with torts negligence, only with criminal offences (whether common law or statutory) which can be committed negligently, where negligence suffices for liability, as in the law of homicide. This produces an untidy classification of elements, one or other of which is needed to provide the required mens rea (the exception of strict liability offences is here ignored): intention ( = purpose or aim), knowledge (or belief), recklessness and negligence. It is untidy, because the last does not belong on the same list as the other three, each of which can appropriately be called a state of mind in what we might say to be a positive sense, for each of them includes some degree of awareness of and/or attitude to relevant facts. If negligence is to be called (partly) a state of mind, it is so in a very stretched and negative way: to be told that a person was not attending to, thinking of or noticing something that he should have been is to be given some information, of a negative sort, about his state of mind, but it tells us very little, for it eliminates only one of an unlimited range of states of mind (in the positive sense). His not attending, noticing, etc., is equally compatible with his daydreaming (not attending to or noticing anything) and with his concentrating hard on something else. If negligence requires inadvertence, as is commonly maintained, then there was a state of mind which the agent should have been in but was not; if, as I would argue, it does not require inadvertence, then there was a state of mind which the agent should have been in, and maybe he was not in it, maybe he was in it. (In the present state of English law most offences of criminal negligence do require inadvertence, the notable exceptions being traffic offences such as careless driving. On the other hand, the proposal in the Law Commission Working Paper, No. 31 (1970) would not require it; the definition runs, ‘a person is negligent if he fails to exercise such care, skill or foresight as a reasonable man in his situation would exercise’. However, that is only a proposal; at present advertent negligence is rare in criminal law, although common in torts.) On this view, the questions are (1) whether his performance fell below scratch, (2) what are to be the excusing conditions for such a performance, and (3) if the answer to (1) is yes, whether his performance was covered by the excusing conditions.

scholarly journals Documentary Letter of Credit: A Pivotal Case for the Inefficiency of the Law of Contract

2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-532
Author(s):  
Malgorzata Karolina Chmielewska
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Guinea Pig ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Letter Of Credit ◽  
Distinct Mechanism ◽  
The Law ◽  
Commercial Device

This study compares the methods used both in common law and civil law jurisdictions to deal with the basic problems relating to the documentary letter of credit. A unique commercial device was thus developed in international trade as a means of ensuring safe and swift payment for goods. Even though this distinct mechanism works efficiently in practice, the numerous attempts made to classify it legally have been unsuccessful. A comparative analysis of the legal conceptualizations traditionally used to explain the nature of credit reveals apparent shortcomings in contractual theories. Because the basis of the documentary credit appears to be an abstract promise to pay, this phenomenon seems to break through the conceptual framework of traditional contract law theory. This is due to the fact that the process of forming the credit does not fit into the ordinary offer-acceptance formula. Yet, the easiest solution—the credit as a "mercantile specialty" or a "sui generis contract"—avoids facing the true challenge of our era, which is re-thinking the concept of "contracts" under modern laws. Legal debates should be directed in a more functional direction in order to provide satisfactory theoretical grounds for providing solutions to obvious, but still unanswered questions such as why people ought to keep their promises and why only some of those promises are likely to be legally enforced. It seems that, in this regard, documentary credit would be a convenient "guinea pig" for most contemporary concepts relating to the law of contracts.

Mistake

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hein Kötz
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
European Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
To Receive

This chapter examines how the law deals with contracts that a party entered into by mistake. After a brief discussion of the historical background of the rules in the civil law and the common law, the question is raised whether there is a relevant mistake if a party’s ‘motive’ for entering into the contract turns out to be incorrect, if the party’s mistake refers to the value of what it promised or was to receive under the contract, or if the party’s mistake is due to its carelessness. Should the relevance of a mistake not depend on whether it was caused or shared by the other party? Finally, the chapter outlines some common threads in the development of a European law on mistake.

scholarly journals THE COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY OF LIMITATION AND PRESCRIPTION

Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eltjo Schrage
Keyword(s):  
Legal History ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Oliver Wendell Holmes ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The One

Within both the civil law and the common law (as well as in mixed legal systems), there are means of acquiring and losing rights, or of freeing ourselves from obligations with the passage of time. The reason for this is at least twofold: on the one hand, for a claimant, a dispossessed owner or a creditor, limitation and prescription provide stimuli for bringing the action; on the other, this sanction upon the negligence of the claimant implies in many cases a windfall for the defendant. If a creditor is negligent in protecting his assets, the law at a certain stage no longer protects him or her. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said aptly some 100 years ago: “Sometimes it is said that, if a man neglects to enforce his rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the law follows his example”.

Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems

2006 ◽  
pp. 476-512 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacques Du Plessis
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Legal Development ◽  
European Context ◽  
The Common

Legal systems generally are ‘mixed’ in the sense that they have been influenced by a variety of other systems. However, this label traditionally is only attached to those systems which represent a mix between the common law and the civilian tradition. This article focuses on what studies of mixed legal systems reveal about the broader comparative themes of the classification of legal systems, whether and how borrowing can take place, the quality of the law to which borrowing gives rise, the connection between civil law and the common law in the European context, and the role which language can play in comparative analysis and legal development.

Compelling Medical Examinations of Litigants: A Comparative Analysis

1986 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-164
Author(s):  
Stephen Goldstein
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Bodily Integrity ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Medical Examinations

Compelling litigants to undergo medical examinations or tests raises a very clear problem of conflicting values. On the one hand, compelling any person to undergo a physical examination or test against his will is a clear impingement on his rights of liberty, privacy and bodily integrity. On the other hand, there are situations in which without such examinations or tests of a civil litigant the right of his adversary to fair and properly conducted litigation would be frustrated.In this article, we will discuss how four different legal systems have attempted to balance these conflicting rights in their development of rules concerning such medical examinations. We will discuss rather fully three systems that are viewed as following common law procedure – namely, those of England, the United States and Israel – and compare them with that of Italy, as an example of the Romanist civil law countries.

scholarly journals CODIFICATION, CONSOLIDATION, RESTATEMENT? HOW BEST TO SYSTEMISE THE MODERN LAW OF TORT

2021 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-305
Author(s):  
Paula Giliker
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Scholarship ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
The Law ◽  
Codal Provisions ◽  
Code Civil

AbstractThe law of tort (or extra or non-contractual liability) has been criticised for being imprecise and lacking coherence. Legal systems have sought to systemise its rules in a number of ways. While civil law systems generally place tort law in a civil code, common law systems have favoured case-law development supported by limited statutory intervention consolidating existing legal rules. In both systems, case law plays a significant role in maintaining the flexibility and adaptability of the law. This article will examine, comparatively, different means of systemising the law of tort, contrasting civil law codification (taking the example of recent French proposals to update the tort provisions of the Code civil) with common law statutory consolidation and case-law intervention (using examples taken from English and Australian law). In examining the degree to which these formal means of systemisation are capable of improving the accessibility, intelligibility, clarity and predictability of the law of tort, it will also address the role played by informal sources, be they ambitious restatements of law or other means. It will be argued that given the nature of tort law, at best, any form of systemisation (be it formal or informal) can only seek to minimise any lack of precision and coherence. However, as this comparative study shows, further steps are needed, both in updating outdated codal provisions and rethinking the type of legal scholarship that might best assist the courts.

Classifying precontractual liability: a comparative analysis

Legal Studies ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Dietrich
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Common Elements ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
The Common ◽  
Initial Focus

The common law has solved questions of liability arising in the context of precontractual negotiations by resort to a range of different doctrines and approaches, adopting in effect ‘piecemeal’ solutions to questions of precontractual liability. Consequently, debate has arisen as to how best to classify or categorise claims for precontractual work and as to which doctrines are best suited to solving problems arising from anticipated contracts. The purpose of this article is to consider this question of how best to classify (cases of) precontractual liability. The initial focus will be on the ongoing debate as to whether principles of contract law or principles of unjust enrichment can better solve problems of precontractual liability. I will be suggesting that unjust enrichment theory offers little by way of explanation of cases of precontractual liability and, indeed, draws on principles of contract law in determining questions of liability for precontractual services rendered, though it does so by formulating those principles under different guises. Irrespective, however, of the doctrines utilised by the common law to impose liability, it is possible to identify a number of common elements unifying all cases of precontractual liability. In identifying such common elements of liability, it is necessary to draw on principles of both contract and tort law. How, then, should cases of precontractual liability best be classified? A consideration of the issue of classification of precontractual liability from a perspective of German civil law will demonstrate that a better understanding of cases of precontractual liability will be gained by classifying such cases as lying between the existing categories of contract and tort.

Professional secrecy and legal professional privilege

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorg Sladič
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Family Life ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Other ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Legal Professional ◽  
The Right

Legal privilege and professional secrecy of attorneys relate to the right to a fair trial (Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) as well as to the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR). The reason for protecting the lawyer via fundamental rights is the protection of fundamental rights of the lawyer’s clients. All legal orders apply legal privileges and professional secrecy; however, the contents of such are not identical. Traditionally there is an important difference between common and civil law. The professional secrecy of an attorney in civil law jurisdictions is his right and at the same time his obligation based on his membership of the Bar (that is his legal profession). In common law legal privilege comprises the contents of documents issued by an attorney to the client. Professional secrecy of attorneys in civil law jurisdictions applies solely to independent lawyers; in-house lawyers are usually not allowed to benefit from rules on professional secrecy (exceptions in the Netherlands and Belgium). On the other hand, common law jurisdictions apply legal professional privilege, recognized also to in-house lawyers. Slovenian law follows the traditional civil law concept of professional secrecy and sets a limited privilege to in-house lawyers. The article then discusses Slovenian law of civil procedure and compares the position of professional secrecy in lawsuits before State’s courts and in arbitration.

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