scholarly journals “Sexualized Online Bullying” Through an Equality Lens: Missed Opportunity in AB v. Bragg?

2014 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-737 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Bailey

In AB v. Bragg, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that fifteen-year-old AB should be allowed to use a pseudonym in seeking an order to disclose the identity of her online attacker. By framing the case as one pitting the privacy interests of a youthful victim of sexualized online bullying against principles protecting the free press and open courts, the SCC approached but ultimately skirted the central issue of equality. Without undermining the important precedent that AB achieved for youthful targets of online sexualized bullying, the author explores the case as a missed opportunity to examine the discriminatory tropes and structural inequalities that undergird the power of this kind of bullying. Viewed through an equality lens, enhanced access to pseudonymity for targets is not necessarily about privacy per se, but rather an interim measure to respond to the equality-undermining effects of sexualized online bullying—a privacy mechanism in service of equality.

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Margaret Unsworth

This paper outlines the decisions of the Courts in the cases of Gilles Caron and Pierre Boutet [Caron] as well as the basic arguments advanced by the parties at the Supreme Court of Canada. The central issue in the case is whether there is a constitutional obligation on the Province of Alberta to publish its laws in French.This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the myriad of issues that were argued by Mr. Caron and Mr. Boutet in defence of their traffi c tickets. Rather, the objective is to give an overview of the essentials of each of the decisions and the basic arguments advanced. This paper will also not address the matter of funding at trial, an issue in this case which also went to the Supreme Court of Canada.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-82
Author(s):  
Nathan Dawthorne

In December 2014, despite the Supreme Court of Canada finding Canada's prostitution laws unconstitutional, the Conservative government passed a bill criminalizing the buying of sex and the advertisement of sex for sale. Sex work has a long history as a hot-button topic, and it continues to remain newsworthy throughout the country. This public discussion in some contexts has privileged certain lobbyists and so-called advocates, disregarding or distorting the voices of sex workers themselves. This territory is starkly heteronormative, reinforcing gendered stereotypes and naturalizing certain types of heterosexual behaviour while ignoring a spectrum of other realities. By analysizing depictions of sex work published for 2013 in the London Free Press, a politically centre-right newspaper printed in a midsized Canadian city, this paper provides analysis of articles about sex work in the local-regional context of London, Ontario (Canada). Exposing a Foucauldian rarefaction of discourse, the analysis works to unveil ideological underpinnings, fleshing out a distorted gendered discourse. 


2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Jennifer Koshan ◽  
Jonnette Watson Hamilton

The Supreme Court of Canada has to date delivered eight Charter equality decisions in an Aboriginal context. In the most recent case, Kahkewistahaw First Nation v Taypotat, the Court unanimously dismissed Louis Taypotat’s challenge to his community’s election code requirement that members of the First Nation running for election as Chief or Band Councillor have a Grade 12 education or its equivalent.We contend that the absence of a section 25 analysis in Taypotat was a missed opportunity, particularly because Taypotat is the only section 15(1) decision of the Supreme Court with an Aboriginal government as respondent. In the following part, we review the Court’s approach to section 25 and the potential application of section 25 in Taypotat. We conclude with a plea to litigators and the courts to move section 25 jurisprudence forward.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.


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