scholarly journals How the Charter Has Failed Non-citizens in Canada: Reviewing Thirty Years of Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence

2013 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 663-728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Dauvergne

This article reviews the Supreme Court of Canada’s treatment of claims by non-citizens since the introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While the early decisions in Singh and Andrews were strongly supportive of rights for non-citizens, the subsequent jurisprudence has been strikingly disappointing. This study shows that the decline in rights protections for non-citizens is a predictable consequence of some of the Court’s early interpretative positions about the Charter. This study considers all Supreme Court of Canada decisions in the thirty-year time frame. The analysis is rounded out by a consideration of cases that were not granted leave and cases that engage directly with an issue of non-citizens’ rights even where a non-citizen was not a party. The concluding section shows that non-citizens in Canada now have less access to rights protections than do non-citizens in some key comparator countries.

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leonid Sirota

In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada held, by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagreement of the concurrence, that criminal prosecutions in which a trial does not conclude by a set deadline will be presumed to breach the right to be tried within a reasonable time, protected by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The acceptable length of proceedings set out in the decision is of 18 months from the day charges are laid for cases that proceed without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months otherwise. The Crown can still show that exceptional circumstances outside of its control have arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a stay of proceedings will be the automatic consequence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will be able to show that delay below these ceilings is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by demonstrating not only that the delay is “markedly” greater than reasonable, but also that he or she diligently sought to have the case heard sooner.


1993 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 523-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter McCormick

AbstractNow that the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has made the fact of judicial power so obvious, it is important to develop the conceptual vocabulary for describing and assessing this power. One such concept that has been applied to the study of United States and British appeal courts is the notion of “party capability theory,” which suggests that different types of litigant will enjoy different levels of success, as both appellant and respondent. Using a data base derived from all reported decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada between 1949 and 1992, this article applies party capability theory to the performance of Canada's highest court, and compares the findings with similar studies of American and British courts.


Refuge ◽  
2002 ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
Audrey Macklin

In Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Ahani v. MCI, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that removing a refugee accused of terrorism to a country where he or she would face a substantial risk of torture or similar abuse would virtually always violate the individual’s rights under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While the Court deserves praise for vindicating fundamental human rights over competing claims of national security, coming so close on the heels of September 11, the victory is in certain respects more apparent than real. Given the strong endorsement of judicial deference to the exercise of Ministerial discretion in national security matters, the Court leaves the state wide scope to circumvent the spirit of the judgment while adhering to its letter.


2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 995-1003
Author(s):  
Louis-Philippe Pigeon

In practice, no question ever arises respecting the effectiveness of judicial decisions in matters of public law. Whether or not a judgment is technically executory is of no importance. There is such a high degree of respect for the decisions of the courts, specially those of the Supreme Court of Canada, that public authorities practically never feel free to seek a way out of compliance with a judicial pronouncement. Remedial powers of the courts are entrenched under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Constitution is declared to be the supreme law of Canada. There is thus very limited scope for governmental action in defiance of court orders. The only specific provision for such action appears to be a section of the Extradition Act authorizing the Minister of Justice to refuse to surrender a fugitive if he determines that the latter's offence is of a political character.


Author(s):  
Lawrence Sonia

This chapter considers the effect of section 1, the “justification” section of the Canadian Charter, on the doctrinal development of section 15, the equality section. It begins by describing the development of the section 15 substantive equality analysis, including the claim of a conceptually complete separation from the section 1 analysis of state justification. The chapter then identifies some features of section 15 which suggest that this separation is less than complete, including the existence of section 15(2), and anxieties over constraining government action. The chapter then turns to three post-2001 cases in which the Supreme Court of Canada found discrimination under the Charter but then held that discrimination was “justified” through section 1, and asks what these cases might reveal about the symbolic significance of a finding of discrimination and the Court’s struggle with institutional competence concerns in equality claims.


Federalism-E ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-65
Author(s):  
Joshua Nahmias

This article explores the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its role in altering two core concepts of Canadian democracy: parliamentary sovereignty and federalism. The author argues that the Charter has undermined these concepts through the empowerment of Canada's judiciary, namely the Supreme Court of Canada. The article explores ways in which the powers of parliament have been superseded by the courts, specifically through the establishment of "charter proofing," parliament's loss of power over the "public purse," and the erosion of the provinces' policy autonomy. Ultimately, the article seeks to demonstrate that the Charter has "legalized" Canadian politics to the extent that the judiciary unwieldy an unacceptable amount of power in Canada's political environment. Cases explored in the essay include Morgentaler v. the Queen (1988), Schachter v. Canada (1992), and Attorney-General of Québec v. Association of Québec Protestant School Boards (1984).


2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janine Benedet

In its recent decision in R. v. Sharpe, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Criminal Code provisions prohibiting the possession and making of child pornography, subject to two exceptions. Despite a narrow construction of the definition of child pornography and a broad reading of the statutory defences, the majority found that prohibiting individuals from making and possessing some kinds of child pornography was an unjustifiable limit on the freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The dissent would have upheld the legislation in its entirety. This article argues that the majority of the Court erred in considering the value of freedom of expression in a detached and abstract manner. Operating in this abstract plane led the Court to approve two significant exceptions on the basis of hypothetical examples of overbreadth, without considering the reality of the exceptions as they relate to documented child pornography cases. As a result, the Court extended constitutional protection to some categories of material that are clearly harmful to children. This result should make us sceptical of the use in Charter cases of broad reading in remedies that create complex judicial amendments with unexamined consequences.


Author(s):  
Louise Langevin

AbstractThe Supreme Court of Canada has recognized the right to reproductive autonomy for women based on the right to liberty protected by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Thus, it is a woman's choice whether to have children. It follows, therefore, that in the case of a violation of her reproductive autonomy, a woman has a right to compensation. It is in light of these principles that I analyze the wrongful pregnancy cases in Québec civil law. From a feminist analytical framework, I posit that Québec courts have effectively denied women the right to reproductive autonomy by awarding compensation for the cost of child-rearing only in cases where a difficult economic situation is evidenced by the parents. In so doing, the courts have not only refused to fully compensate women for the injuries caused to them, but they continue to reproduce the dominant pronatalist ideology in reproductive matters. This judicial reaction to cases of wrongful pregnancy is another example of the gendered dimension of law.


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