scholarly journals Invisible Trade Barriers Between Canada and the United States, par FRANCIS MASSON et H.-EDWARD ENGLISH. Une brochure, 6 po. X 9, 73 pages. — CANADIAN AMERICAN COMMITTEE, 1963

1964 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 448
Author(s):  
B. B.
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Trade Barriers

Retaliation, Bargaining, and the Pursuit of “Free and Fair” Trade

1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kishore Gawande ◽  
Wendy L. Hansen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Foreign Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Fair Trade ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Factors ◽  
Trade Barriers ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Political Economic

That domestic political economic factors are important determinants of a nation's trade barriers has been empirically well established. However, the question of how effective strategically retaliatory trade barriers are in deterring foreign protectionism has received far less systematic empirical attention. In this article we use bilateral nontariff barrier (NTB) data between the United States and five developed partner countries (Japan, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) to systematically examine the effectiveness of strategic retaliation. We employ a simultaneous Tobit model where the home and foreign NTB levels are determined endogenously in a bilateral game. The model provides estimates of deterrence coefficients, that is, the reduction in foreign trade barriers as a result of U.S. retaliation, which we use to characterize the nature of bilateral NTB games. Our hope is that the empirical results presented here, which have realistic though controversial implications, will inform U.S. trade policy.

Protect or Compensate?

1953 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-329
Author(s):  
John Hulley
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Trade Barriers ◽  
International Division ◽  
European Economic ◽  
Variety Of Groups ◽  
Factors Of Production ◽  
International Division Of Labor

The postwar drive to liberalize trade, increase competition, and thereby improve productivity within Western Europe has met with determined opposition, as have similar attempts at reducing trade barriers in the United States. This resistance has come from a variety of groups which fear that their interests will be jeopardized as a result of keener competition, and its magnitude can hardly be overestimated. Indeed, it probably constitutes the major single barrier to European economic unification. Certainly, it can no longer be passed off with lectures on the virtues of competition, mobility of the factors of production, and international division of labor.

Fishing Downstream Revisited: A Multi-country Analysis of Antidumping Patterns

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 20170096 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell T. Andersen ◽  
Robert M. Feinberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Statistical Estimation ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
The United States ◽  
Trade Barriers ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Country Analysis

A long-held view in international trade policy analysis is that import protection flows downstream. The descriptive analysis of Feinberg and Kaplan 1993, looking at trends in upstream and downstream antidumping and countervailing-duty cases since the US Trade Agreements Act of 1979. It covers the period from 1980 to 2015 for the five leading users of temporary trade barriers (TTBs): Argentina, Brazil, the European Union, India, and the United States. We examine evidence for two broad sectors which have dominated the use of TTBs: metals and chemicals. Both via descriptive trend analysis and simple statistical estimation, we find suggestive evidence in support of cascading trade protection, though more so for the developing countries studied.

Trade Restriction and Economic Growth: A Study of Developed and Developing Countries

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 193-202
Author(s):  
Mehdi Monadjemi ◽  
John Lodewijks
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
The United States ◽  
Statistical Technique ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Trade Barriers ◽  
Trade Restrictions ◽  
The Exchange Rate

According to the World Bank, most research suggests that unilateral reduction in trade barriers can result in the greatest and the quickest gains in welfare. However, recently United States imposed tariffs on good imported from China and Chinese government retaliated by introducing trade barriers on imports from the United States. Generally, developed counties attempt to improve their trade deficits by allowing the exchange rate to depreciate, whereas developing countries rely more on trade restrictions. In this paper, five developed countries and five developing countries that experienced persistent trade deficits were selected. A VAR statistical technique was used to examine the effects of exchange rate changes of the net trade of two selected groups of countries. It is shown that in case of developed counties, the exchange rate and net trade moved in the same direction. However, the same results were not confirmed for the developing countries. 

Conflict Management: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Adjudication

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina L. Davis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Quantitative Data ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Statistical Techniques ◽  
Trade Barriers ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Influence Strategy ◽  
Trade Partners

This chapter examines the effectiveness of legal complaints to bring an end to trade disputes. Using quantitative data from the United States, it shows that when comparing similar kinds of disputes and trade partners, states gained better outcomes through the dispute mechanism. Conditioning on the fact that the most politicized cases are selected for World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudication, the legal forum is quite effective for dispute settlement. The chapter applies statistical techniques of matching to the sample of negotiated trade barriers to adjust for their propensity to be raised in adjudication, and then conducts regression analysis of dispute outcomes in terms of policy change. The results show that adjudication increases the probability of progress to resolve the complaint by one-third. Furthermore, a duration model that controls for the variables that influence strategy selection illustrates how adjudication reduces the time to removal of the barrier.

Foreign Retaliation

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas A. Irwin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World Trade ◽  
The United States ◽  
General Election ◽  
Trade Barriers ◽  
Primary Motivation ◽  
Trade Blocs ◽  
Liberal Government

This chapter examines at the international reaction to the Smoot–Hawley tariff. The popular perception is that the tariff backfired by triggering retaliation against U.S. exports and the spread of trade blocs that discriminated against the United States, inflicting long-term damage for U.S. commercial and foreign policy interests. This perception is largely accurate. While countries did not broadcast that they were retaliating against the United States for imposing the tariff, the nature and timing of the measures they took strongly suggest that was the primary motivation. A month after the Smoot–Hawley tariff was imposed, a pro-American Liberal government in Canada lost a general election to the pro-British Conservatives, who erected trade barriers designed to shift Canada's imports from the United States to Britain. Other countries discriminated against U.S. exports as well, and the nation's share of world trade fell sharply.

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