scholarly journals L'arbitre de griefs, instrument efficace de contrôle des abus de pouvoirs de l'employeur ?

2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-115
Author(s):  
Jean-Louis Dubé
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Collective Agreement ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Collective Agreements ◽  
Grievance Arbitration ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
Arbitration Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The One

In theory, recourse to the grievance arbitration would appear to be an efficient means of controlling the abuse of powers (i.e. violations of the collective agreement) by the employer. Indeed, experience has borne out the truth of this affirmation. Mainly due to the management rights principle however, there still remain several important lacunae in this regard. On the one hand, by invoking the so-called management rights principle as a favorite means for circumscribing the arbitrator's jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Canada has greatly diminished the efficacy of the arbitration process. This has occured primarily through the quashing of arbitration decisions either on the basis of error of law or else by limiting the arbitrator's discretion in disciplinary cases. On the other hand, it would be just as harmful to the efficiency of the arbitration process if arbitrators themselves were to abuse the management rights principle in interpreting and applying collective agreements. In general, arbitrators have proved to be highly conscious of this problem. By the same token, arbitrators have been faced with the problem of whether or not to discipline acts of insubordination even though employees may have been provoked by an abuse of authority on the part of the employer. All in all, arbitrators, by their attitude, appear to manifest a desire of ensuring the efficient functioning of the arbitration process, without acting to the detriment of management rights. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Canada, with the notable exception of Chief Justice Laskin, would seem to be fighting a rear-guard action by continually emphasizing management rights.

scholarly journals Consultation with Aboriginal Peoples: Impacts on the Petroleum Industry

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Fogarassy ◽  
KayLynn Litton
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Petroleum Industry ◽  
The Other ◽  
Aboriginal Peoples ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Company Limited ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The One ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The duties of consultation and accommodation with Aboriginal peoples affected by resource development were, until 2002, primarily the responsibility of the Crown. The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in two related decisions involving the Haida Nation on the one hand and the Crown and Weyerhaeuser Company Limited on the other, has placed these duties squarely on to the shoulders of industry. Where the Crown fails to discharge its duties of consultation and accommodation, resource tenures such as permits, licenses or leases may be invalid and activity conducted pursuant to the tenures may result in damages awarded against industry in favour of affected Aboriginal peoples. Appeals from both decisions will be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada. In the meantime, the law on industry’s duty to consult and to accommodate Aboriginal peoples continues to lack certainty.

Democracy and the Freedom of Speech: Rethinking the Conflict between Liberty and Equality

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasmin Dawood
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Competing Values ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Normative Claim ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The U.S

This article re-examines the distinction between the libertarian approach and the egalitarian approach to the regulation of campaign finance. The conventional approach (as exemplified by the work of Owen Fiss and Ronald Dworkin) is to reconcile the competing values of liberty and equality. By contrast, this article advances the normative claim that democracies should seek to incorporate both the libertarian and the egalitarian approaches within constitutional law. I argue that instead of emphasizing one value over the other, the ideal position is one that simultaneously recognizes the values of liberty and equality despite the irreconcilable tension between them. Rather than choosing one value over the other, or reconciling these values by redefining them, I claim that it is vital to maintain the tension between liberty and equality by instantiating the conflict in law. Democracy is better served when the law contains an explicit tension between these foundational values.After setting forth this normative framework, I then apply it to the campaign finance decisions of the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada, respectively. I make two main claims. First, I argue that although the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is usually presented as a binary choice, the laws of a given jurisdiction often simultaneously display both libertarian and egalitarian characteristics. For this reason, I claim that the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is better conceived of as a “libertarian-egalitarian spectrum.” Second, I argue that in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, respectively, have privileged one value—liberty or equality—at the expense of the other. The U.S. Supreme Court has over-emphasized the value of liberty (most notably in its Citizens United decision), with the result that political equality is markedly undermined. By the same token, the Supreme Court of Canada’s commitment to equality has become too one-sided in recent cases (Harper and Bryan), with the result that there are significant impairments to free speech liberties. I argue that both of these approaches are detrimental to democratic participation and governance. Finally, this article offers a preliminary proposal for how courts and legislatures can allow for the conflict between liberty and equality to be instantiated in law.

scholarly journals La Cour suprême et le rapatriement de la constitution : la victoire du compromis sur la rigueur

2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 619-648
Author(s):  
Nicole Duplé
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Distribution Of Powers

On September the 28th 1981, the Supreme Court of Canada made public its opinion as to the constitutionaly of the Federal government's plan to repatriate and amend the B.N.A. Act. Modifications affecting provincial powers require, according to convention, the existance of which is recognized by six of the Judges, a certain degree of provincial consensus. The federal projet, contested by eight of the ten provinces, was therefore considered unconstitutional by a majority of the Judges. The Court mentioned furthermore that the federal plan, should it become law, would impinge upon the distribution of powers set forth in the B.N.A. Act. Seven of the nine Judges so deciding declared, on the other hand, that the Senat and House of Commons' resolution pertaining to the plan of repatriation and amendement was perfectly legal and that the British Parliament was, in law, the only authorized body to bring about the changes sought by said plan.

scholarly journals An Inquiry into the Limits of Judicial Intervention in the Impeachment Process of Governors in Kenya

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-156
Author(s):  
Andrea Munyao
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Other ◽  
County Government ◽  
Judicial Intervention ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Problematic Issue ◽  
Duty To Protect ◽  
The One

Article 181(2) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya instructs Parliament to enact a law highlighting the process of impeachment of a county governor. This has been realised through the County Government Act, Section 33. Section 33 recognises the County Assembly and the Senate as the bodies responsible for this process. However, the County Government Act fails to address at what point the courts can intervene in the impeachment process of governors. This is often a problematic issue as the doctrine of separation of powers requires each arm of government to perform their functions independently. Nonetheless, Kenyan courts have the duty to protect aggrieved parties whenever their rights are threatened. However, the point at which they can intervene is not stated under any law and this creates confusion between the role of courts of law in the impeachment process, on the one hand, and that of the County Assembly and the Senate, on the other. It is not clear which role should be discharged first. This paper, therefore, seeks to address this confusion through a critique of the Wambora case, a case that was appealed up to the Supreme Court. The paper also suggests a complimentary system whereby the Senate, County Assembly and the courts can work in harmony, and, do away with the confusion.

The Confessions Rule and the Charter

2010 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 517-546 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamish Stewart
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Constitutional Principle ◽  
Trial Judges ◽  
Right To Silence ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

Abstract The confessions rule—the requirement that the Crown prove the voluntariness of the accused’s statements to persons in authority—is a well-established rule of criminal evidence and is closely connected with the constitutional principle against self-incrimination that it structures. The confessions rule is thus a natural candidate for recognition as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, there are two distinct routes by which the confessions rule might be constitutionalized. Under the “rule of evidence” approach, the confessions rule would be recognized as an aspect of the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial. Under the “rights violation” approach, the conduct of the state in obtaining an involuntary statement would be treated as a violation of the accused’s constitutional rights. In R. v. Singh, despite having previously adopted the “rule of evidence” approach, the Supreme Court of Canada applied the “rights violation” approach and linked the confessions rule very closely to the constitutional right to silence. In so doing, the Court conflated the distinct protections offered by the right to silence on the one hand and the confessions rule on the other, particularly when Singh is read in light of other recent cases that appear to weaken the confessions rule. Fortunately, the Court’s recent decisions concerning the confessions rule may also be read as instances of appellate deference to trial judges’ factual findings on voir dires. Thus, they leave room for the recognition that neither the right to silence nor the confessions rule is reducible to the other, and that each has a distinct role to play: the right to silence protects the accused’s decision to speak at all, while the confessions rule concerns the accused’s motivations for speaking as he or she did.

scholarly journals Explaining the Selection and Rejection of Harriet Miers: George W. Bush, Political Symbolism, and the Highpoint of Conservatism

2008 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 253-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin J. McMahon
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
White House ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Political Symbolism ◽  
The Right ◽  
President Bush ◽  
Selection Of

Following the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist in the summer of 2005, President George W. Bush appeared to be in alliance with conservatives in his desire to fill the two vacancies with strong ideologues who would push the Supreme Court to the right. However, after pleasing conservatives with his selection of John Roberts for one of the vacancies, President Bush angered many of his ideological brethren by choosing White House counsel Harriet Miers for the other. This article considers why the president decided on Miers and why her selection upset so many conservatives. It concludes by suggesting that Miers’s forced withdrawal represented a highpoint in the conservative effort to transform the Court.

Canons of Evasion in Constitutional Criminal Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharon Dolovich
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
State Action ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

In this chapter, Sharon Dolovich argues that the Supreme Court deploys three “canons of evasion” that undermine core constitutional principles: deference, presumption, and question substitution. The chapter shows how the Court on the one hand affirms basic constitutional principles—such as the right to counsel or the right against cruel and unusual punishment—that courts are to enforce against the state for the protection of individual penal subjects. Yet on the other hand, the doctrinal maneuvers of deference, presumption, and substitute question encourage judges in individual cases to affirm the constitutionality of state action even in the face of seemingly egregious facts. As a result, judicial review delivers almost automatic and uncritical validation of whatever state action produced the challenged conviction, sentence, or punishment. Dolovich identifies troubling questions raised by pervasive use of these canons for the legitimacy of the state’s penal power.

Divorce in the Canadian Conflict of Laws: Two Recent Developments

1974 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 193-219
Author(s):  
Joost Blom
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Conflict Of Laws ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Court Of First Instance ◽  
First Time

Two recent cases have added substantially to the Canadian jurisprudence on divorce in the conflict of laws. In one, discussed in Part I of this article, a court of first instance in Alberta initiated what is likely to be a far-reaching change in the rules for the recognition of foreign decrees. In the other, discussed in Part II, the Supreme Court of Canada gave its imprimatur for the first time to the controversial doctrine whereby someone who has obtained an invalid foreign decree may be precluded from denying its validity in a Canadian court. Although the two questions that these cases deal with are quite separate, their treatment by the Alberta Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada shows a common tendency to resolve conflicts problems by rules that are general and flexible rather than precise and arbitrary.

scholarly journals AUCTION SALES “SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION” AND FORMATION OF CONTRACTS Withok Small Farms (Pty) Ltd v Amber Sunrise Properties 5 (Pty) Ltd 2009 2 SA 504 (SCA)

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Henk Delport
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Standard Form ◽  
The Other ◽  
Small Farms ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The One

The Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in Withok Small Farms (Pty) Ltd v Amber Sunrise Properties 5 (Pty) Ltd (2009 2 SA 504 (SCA) (“Withok”)) raises two important issues for property practitioners, the one relating to auction sales and the other to the formation of contracts. The dispute arose largely because of a badly drafted agreement of sale document, but the import of the judgment is such that it may be prudent for practitioners to revisit even their well-drafted standard form sale and lease documents. The facts were straightforward. Certain properties owned by the first and second appellants (“the sellers”) were put up for sale at a public auction on 13 June 2006. The respondent, represented by one A, put in the highest bid, which the auctioneer accepted. Both A and the auctioneer signed a document entitled “Agreement and Conditions of Sale” (“the conditions of sale”), which set out the conditions relating to the auction. On 20 June 2006 the sellers’ representative confirmed the sale in writing by adding his signature in the allotted space on the final page of the document. However, the confirmation of the sale was not communicated to the respondent within the time contemplated in clause 1. In fact, the respondent did not receive notice of the confirmation until some time early in July 2006.The respondent did not wish to be bound by the sale and in due course applied for an order declaring the agreement to be of no force and effect. Its case was that the confirmation of the sale had not been communicated to it within the seven-day period contemplated in clause 1 of the conditions of sale, with the result that no agreement came into existence. The sellers, in turn, contended that the conditions of sale signed by the respondent and the auctioneer at the time of the auction constituted an agreement of salesubject to a suspensive condition, namely the confirmation of the sale by the sellers; the condition was fulfilled immediately upon the confirmation of the sale and without any need for it to be communicated to the respondent. The only issue in dispute was whether or not the confirmation of the sale had to be communicated to the respondent within the seven-day period.

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