scholarly journals L'étanchéité de l'A.A.N.B. est-elle menacée?

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 383-396
Author(s):  
Jean-Charles Bonenfant
Keyword(s):  
North America ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
German Federal Republic ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Stare Decisis ◽  
British North America ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Distribution Of Powers ◽  
Canada Limited

In his opinion in John A. MacDonald, Railquip Enterprises Ltd and Vapor Canada Limited, Chief Justice Laskin commented that in the future it might be necessary to reconsider the 1937 Labour Conventions Decision which established the « watertight compartments » doctrine applicable to the implementation of treaties concluded by Canada. According to this doctrine as it was set forth by the Privy Council, the fact that Canada can enter into treaties with other countries does not mean that the Federal Parliament of Canada can legislate contrary to the distribution of powers provided for by sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act. In his article, Professor Bonenfant recalls the criticism which the Privy Council evoked, particularly that which appeared in the June, 1937, issue of The Canadian Bar Review. If the Supreme Court of Canada wishes to revise the decision of the Privy Council, it will not be hampered by the rule of stare decisis. But, Professor Bonenfant writes, whatever the judicial solution may be, it would probably be better to follow the example of other countries, particularly the example provided by article 32 of the Constitution of the German Federal Republic, and seek a political solution. In this domain as in others, if federalism has failed in Canada, he writes that it is perhaps because the interpretation of Canada's Constitution has been left to the intellectual virtuosity of the members of the Privy Council and of the Supreme Court.

Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme Court

2021 ◽  
pp. 183-228
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Direct Result ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Canadian History ◽  
British North America ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court

This chapter assesses the emergence of judicial review in Canada. Canadian judicial review emerged as a direct result of federalism and separation of powers umpiring by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), which was Canada’s highest court from the adoption of the British North America Act in 1867 until Canada ended appeals to the JCPC in 1949. There was also, as Ran Hirschl would argue, an element of elite hegemonic entrenchment by imperial British colonial elites in the retention of the JCPC as the highest court of appeals in Canada from the creation of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1875 until Canada abolished appeals to the JCPC in 1949. Some Canadian elites tried and failed to end JCPC judicial review in Canadian cases in 1875. Canadian judicial review from 1867 to 1982 was exclusively concerned with federalism and separation of powers judicial umpiring because Canada had no constitutional Bill of Rights until 1982. There are thus two founding moments in the judicial review of legislation in Canadian history: firstly, the period from 1867 to 1982 when Canadian federalism and separation of powers law took shape as a result of federalism and separation of powers umpiring; and, secondly, the period from 1982 to the present, when the Supreme Court of Canada began vigorously enforcing the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The emergence of judicial review from 1982 down to the present day is partly a rights from wrongs phenomenon, and it is partly the result of constitutional borrowing from the United States’s Warren Court.

scholarly journals La Cour suprême et le rapatriement de la constitution : la victoire du compromis sur la rigueur

2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 619-648
Author(s):  
Nicole Duplé
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Distribution Of Powers

On September the 28th 1981, the Supreme Court of Canada made public its opinion as to the constitutionaly of the Federal government's plan to repatriate and amend the B.N.A. Act. Modifications affecting provincial powers require, according to convention, the existance of which is recognized by six of the Judges, a certain degree of provincial consensus. The federal projet, contested by eight of the ten provinces, was therefore considered unconstitutional by a majority of the Judges. The Court mentioned furthermore that the federal plan, should it become law, would impinge upon the distribution of powers set forth in the B.N.A. Act. Seven of the nine Judges so deciding declared, on the other hand, that the Senat and House of Commons' resolution pertaining to the plan of repatriation and amendement was perfectly legal and that the British Parliament was, in law, the only authorized body to bring about the changes sought by said plan.

scholarly journals Commentary on Papers Delivered on the Supreme Court of Canada and the Law of Obligations

1969 ◽  
pp. 160
Author(s):  
D. C. McDonald
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Cost

The speaker noted that the Hon. Emmett Hall, for whom he was substituting, had had experience as trial judge, quality he considers desirable in the appellate courts. He then commented on some of the very early cases of the S.C.C., before proceeding to discussion of Dean Friaman's paper. The speaker discussed aspects in the development of the law relating to trespassers and occupier's liability. He was of the opinion that the S.C.C. was not as mechanistic in its approach to the law of tort as Dean Fridman thought it to be. In commenting on Dr. Beaudoin's presentation, Mr. Justice McDonald noted that the blame for the lack of weight given to French decisions in matters concerning the Quebec Civil Code droit de delits should not be attributed to the S.C.C. but to the Privy Council. In concluding, His Lordship observed that the process of applying for have to appeal to the S.C.C. deserves further study, since the present requirement that the Court dispose of applications for leave which are not accompanied by an oral submis sion increases the cost of appeal particularly for Western cases.

scholarly journals De facto and de jure Crown Sovereignty: Reconciliation and Legitimation at the Supreme Court of Canada Ryan

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Beaton
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Nations ◽  
Short Story ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Shed Light

This paper offers a short story of Crown sovereignty at the Supreme Court Canada in order to shed light on questions the Court has raised about the legitimacy of Crown sovereignty over territory claimed by First Nations. In skeletal form, the story is simple. The Crown — first Imperial British and later Canadian federal and provincial — asserted sovereignty over what is now Canadian territory, and Canadian courts (and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) accepted those assertions without question. Yet the Supreme Court of Canada has lately qualified Crown sovereignty in striking ways, perhaps most notably in speaking of “de facto Crown sovereignty” in reasons released in 2004.

“The Other Woman: Lizzie Cyr and the Origins of the ‘Persons Case’”

1998 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Bright
Keyword(s):  
North America ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Turning Point ◽  
The Other ◽  
Women’S Rights ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Public Office ◽  
British North America ◽  
Other Woman ◽  
The Right

AbstractIn 1929, the British Privy Council reversed an earlier ruling by Canada's Supreme Court that Canadian women did not, under the British North America Act, qualify as persons. Historians have long heralded this so-called ‘Persons Case’ as a turning point in the recognition of Canadian women's rights. However, little attention has been paid to the case's origins, which date back to the trial of an alleged prostitute in Calgary in 1917. That case successfully tested the right of women to hold high public office in Alberta – in this case, Calgary Police Magistrate Alice Jamieson – and began the subsequent twelve-year battle. However, this victory was achieved only at the expense of the rights of another woman: the alleged prostitute Lizzie Cyr. At best, then, the ‘Persons Case’ should be regarded as a tainted victory.

scholarly journals The Supreme Court of Canada, the House of Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and Administrative Law

1969 ◽  
pp. 5
Author(s):  
D. H. Clark
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Mumbo Jumbo ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Individual

The Supreme Court of Canada's contribution to the jurisprudence of administra tive law has been weak and fitful, erratic and lacking in attention to the principles of its own previous decisions. Failure to articulate points of distinction between its decisions has led to uncertainty in the law. The speaker suggested that the insufficiency of the Court's reasoning and the inadequacy of its citation might be reduced if judgments were more often delivered by more members of the Court thus increasing the individual research and writing of the Court so that its earlier fcmons would be kept in view and the case law developed more coherently. Furthermore, the Court should foUow the House of Lords in not considering itself bound by ds own decisions. The speaker regretted the Court's tendency to take mechanically conceptualise approach to substantive administrative law issues- if Canadian courts are to keep pace with those of other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Canada cannot continue to use outworn mumbo-jumbo as substitute for identifyltZtJ «»*"*»* societal interests that are the stuff of /hefPe?kfr aho discussed and compared the contributions of the House of Lords and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Although it has fewer members the House of Lords has more dissenters in administrative law decisions than the Supreme Court of Canada, (whereas the Privy Council until 1966 could not have dissent). While the S.C.C. has been inconsistent and weak, the Privy Council has been consistent and weak. Although there have been occasional achievements, between 1951 and 1971 the Privy Council rendered series of regressive decisions that impaired coherent development of the administrative law in England and in the Commonwealth. ReidZhh^ i*' f" H0USe °f Lof* under the influenc* of the late Lord h^'^nuJf has enjoyed as most creative °n TegreSSiVe period inPrivy relation Council to public decisions> law si™ However *• earlyhaknZd 1960's mnnt rxiicc ft ££Icrt has*eenperfo

scholarly journals Watertight Compartments: Getting Back to the Constitutional Division of Powers

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asher Honickman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Modern Trend ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Mutual Exclusivity ◽  
Stare Decisis ◽  
Division Of Powers ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Degree Of Overlap

This article offers a fresh examination of the constitutional division of powers. The author argues that sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 establish exclusive jurisdictional spheres — what the Privy Council once termed “watertight compartments.” This mutual exclusivity is emphasized and reinforced throughout these sections and leaves very little room for legitimate overlap. While some degree of overlap is permissible under this scheme — particularly incidental effects, genuine double aspects, and limited ancillary powers — overlap must be constrained in a principled fashion to comply with the exclusivity principle. The modern trend toward flexibility and freer overlap is contrary to the constitutional text. The author argues that while some deviation from the text is inevitable due to the presumption of constitutionality and stare decisis, the Supreme Court should return to a more exclusivist footing in accordance with the text.

De facto and de jure Crown Sovereignty: Reconciliation and Legitimation at the Supreme Court of Canada

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Ryan Beaton
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Nations ◽  
Short Story ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Shed Light

This paper offers a short story of Crown sovereignty at the Supreme Court Canada in order to shed light on questions the Court has raised about the legitimacy of Crown sovereignty over territory claimed by First Nations. In skeletal form, the story is simple. The Crown — first Imperial British and later Canadian federal and provincial — asserted sovereignty over what is now Canadian territory, and Canadian courts (and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) accepted those assertions without question. Yet the Supreme Court of Canada has lately qualified Crown sovereignty in striking ways, perhaps most notably in speaking of “de facto Crown sovereignty” in reasons released in 2004.The purpose behind this qualification, in line with the Court’s Aboriginal rights and title cases since Calder v British Columbia (Attorney General), seems to be to encourage the Crown to negotiate modern treaties and settle outstandingAboriginal rights and title claims in order to perfect or legitimate Crown sovereignty. As Crown negotiations with First Nations stalled, however, the Court proceeded to develop its own framework for the procedural legitimation of Crown sovereignty, i.e. a framework of procedural safeguards designed to weed out “bad” exercises of Crown sovereignty from legitimate ones.

2 Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme Court

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hogg Peter W
Keyword(s):  
North America ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Legislative History ◽  
British North America ◽  
American Colonies ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
British North American

Canada has no single document that is customarily described as ‘the constitution’. The closest approximation of such a document is the Constitution Act 1867, which was originally named the British North America Act 1867. This is a statute of the United Kingdom Parliament that created the new Dominion of Canada by uniting three of the colonies of British North America and by providing the for the admission of all the other British North American colonies and territories. This chapter presents an overview of Canada's constitution and discusses its interpretation, the Supreme Court of Canada, separation of powers, problems of constitutional interpretation, interpretation of the residuary clause, interpretation of the Charter of Rights, interpretation of Aboriginal rights, interpretation of judicial independence, sources of interpretation, constitution as statute, legislative history, modes of interpretation, originalism, unwritten constitutional principles, influences on interpretation, dialogue between the Court and legislatures, presumption of constitutionality, and formalism and creativity.

scholarly journals Fiduciary Relationship as Contemporary Colonialism

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-115
Author(s):  
Christina Yui Iwase
Keyword(s):  
North America ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Aboriginal Peoples ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
Constitutional Protection ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Recent Tendency

Aboriginal rights as inherent rights deriving from Aboriginal peoples’ historical occupation of North America (i.e. sovereignty) are recognized and affirmed in Section 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982. Despite the fact that this constitutional protection recognizes the sui generis nature of the Crown-Aboriginal relationship, there is a recent tendency in the Supreme Court of Canada to comprehend Aboriginal rights by characterizing the Crown-Aboriginal relationship as fiduciary. This paper discusses the danger of recognizing Aboriginal rights through the lens of a Crown-Aboriginal fiduciary relationship. This type of recognition entails: (1) authorizing excessive fiduciary discretion by the Crown, as opposed to focusing on its obligations; (2) failing to reflect the Aboriginal perspective on Aboriginal rights, which are derived from Aboriginal sovereignty; (3) fundamentally distorting the nature of Aboriginal rights by creating a myth that Aboriginal rights were created by the Canadian constitution; and (4) as a result, creating vulnerability on the Aboriginal side by making Aboriginal peoples tacitly consent to the Crown’s de facto sovereignty. If the Court’s characterization of the Crown-Aboriginal fiduciary relationship remains as it is now, the gap between the Crown’s understanding of Aboriginal rights and that of Aboriginal peoples may constitute a form of contemporary colonialism.

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