Howard M. Hensel (dir.), Legitimate Use of Military Force. The Just War Tradition and the Customary Law of Armed Conflict, 2008, Aldershot, Ashgate, viii+300 p.

2009 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 136
Author(s):  
Stanislav J. Kirschbaum
ICR Journal ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-303
Author(s):  
Joel Hayward

The Quran is among the most widely read books on earth, yet it is also commonly misunderstood and misquoted. Islams critics say that it contains exhortations of violence against non-Muslims and a concept of war that is far more unbridled and indiscriminate than the western Just War theory. This study is not a general overview or critique of the Islamic laws of war, which are the varied and sometimes contradictory opinions of medieval Islamic jurists, mainly from the ninth to thirteenth centuries CE. Instead, this study analyses only the Quranic text itself and, by putting its verses into historical context, attempts to explain its codes of conduct in order to determine what it actually requires or permits Muslims to do in terms of the use of military force. It concludes that the Quran is clear: Muslims must not undertake offensive violence and are instructed, if defensive warfare should become unavoidable, always to act within a code of ethical behaviour that is closely similar to the western Just War tradition. This study attempts to dispel any misperceptions that Islams holy book advocates the subjugation or killing of non-Muslims and reveals that, on the contrary, its key and unequivocal concepts governing warfare are based on justice and a profound belief in the sanctity of human life.


2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 859-880 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER LEE

AbstractOver the past three decades Jean Bethke Elshtain has used her critique and application of just war as a means of engaging with multiple overlapping aspects of identity. Though Elshtain ostensibly writes about war and the justice, or lack of justice, therein, she also uses just war a site of analysis within which different strands of subjectivity are investigated and articulated as part of her broader political theory. This article explores the proposition that Elshtain's most important contribution to the just war tradition is not be found in her provision of codes or her analysis of ad bellum or in bello criteria, conformity to which adjudges war or military intervention to be just or otherwise. Rather, that she enriches just war debate because of the unique and sometimes provocative perspective she brings as political theorist and International Relations scholar who adopts, adapts, and deploys familiar but, for some, uncomfortable discursive artefacts from the history of the Christian West: suffused with her own Christian faith and theology. In so doing she continually reminds us that human lives, with all their attendant political, social, and religious complexities, should be the focus when military force is used, or even proposed, for political ends.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-188
Author(s):  
Eric A. Heinze ◽  
Rhiannon Neilsen

AbstractArmed reprisals are the limited use of military force in response to unlawful actions perpetrated against states. Historically, reprisals provided a military remedy for states that had been wronged (often violently) by another state without having to resort to all-out war in order to counter or deter such wrongful actions. While reprisals are broadly believed to have been outlawed by the UN Charter, states continue to routinely undertake such self-help measures. As part of the roundtable, “The Ethics of Limited Strikes,” this essay examines the doctrine of armed reprisals in light of recent instances of states using force “short of war” in this manner. We argue that the ban on reprisals has been largely ignored by states, and that recent attempts to apply the laws of armed conflict to the cyber domain (such as the Tallinn Manual) are further weakening this prohibition. We conclude that this is a potentially dangerous development that lowers the bar for resorting to military force, risking escalation and thereby further destabilizing the international system.


Author(s):  
Boothby William H

This chapter traces the evolution of the principle discrimination in the law of armed conflict. It also examines its current formulation in the law, and considers its status in customary law. The targeting law and weapons law elements of the discrimination principle are disentangled; it is noted that the weapons law element had not been specifically articulated before 1977 and the implications of this are discussed. The relevance and interpretation of the now customary prohibition of weapons that are by nature indiscriminate are explained. The language of article 51(4) of Additional Protocol 1 is discussed and the terms of the corresponding customary rule are analysed. The applicability of the rule to nuclear weapons is also set forth. Examples of the kinds of weapon that are considered to breach the rule are given.


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Drew Christiansen ◽  

Fratelli tutti expresses skepticism about the ability of the just-war tradition to provide guidance on the state use of force. It is dismissive of a whole range of rationales for going to war. In rejecting humanitarian “excuses,” Pope Francis puts to question the Church’s support even for armed enforcement of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In place of abstract moral reasoning, Francis invites contemplation of the suffering of the victims of war. He expands the horizon of analysis from particular acts to consideration of the cascading consequences of war. He invites the military to color their warrior ethic with the kindness of Christ. In practice, his teaching implies increased attention to the ius postbellum and “the responsibility to rebuild” after armed conflict.


1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Gail Gardam

Proportionality is a fundamental component of the law on the use of force and the law of armed conflict—the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. In the former, it refers to a belligerent’s response to a grievance and, in the latter, to the balance to be struck between the achievement of a military goal and the cost in terms of lives. The legitimate resort to force under the United Nations system is regarded by most commentators as restricted to the use of force in self-defense under Article 51 and collective security action under chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resort to force in both these situations is limited by the customary law requirement that it be proportionate to the unlawful aggression that gave rise to the right. In the law of armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is based on the fundamental principle that belligerents do not enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy. Since the entry into force of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, proportionality has been both a conventional and a customary principle of the law of armed conflict.


2012 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inger Österdahl

Justice after war is becoming an increasingly pressing concern. The cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and most recently Libya illustrate the importance of as well as the difficulties involved in the efforts to manage the outcome of armed conflict in a constructive way. The jus post bellum is meant to serve as the normative framework for the efforts to stabilise the post-conflict situation. The jus post bellum also has the future peaceful and arguably democratic and human rights respecting development of the post-conflict society in view. This article aims at drawing the conceptual and substantive contours of the jus post bellum and to discuss its relationship with other parts of international law, primarily the other bodies of law making up the law of armed conflict. Depending on one’s perspective the jus post bellum can be claimed not yet to exist, to exist already or irrespective of which to be superfluous as a separate category of law. The article recognises the apparent need for a comprehensive post-conflict law to serve as a bridge between war and stable peace. What way the international community should take in order to arrive at a just and useful normative framework for building peace is far from certain, however.


Author(s):  
Steven Haines

This chapter discusses seven key issues. First, it discusses and defines the term ‘weapon’. Secondly, it explores the weapons law element of the law of armed conflict (LOAC), including how it relates to other existing bodies of law dealing with weapons. Thirdly, it gives an account of the development of the conventional law of weapons, because the bulk of current weapons law is contained in treaties that contain important principles underpinning weapons law and define its nature. Fourthly, it identifies these principles and comments on their importance. Fifthly, since conventional law has a vital relationship with customary law, the chapter offers some comment on the current state of the customary law of weapons. Sixthly, it returns to the issue of technology, in particular new technologies that represent significant challenges to existing law. Finally, some attempt is made to assess where the law might go in the future and what issues are likely to be on the agenda in the immediate term.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document