scholarly journals Unemployment Insurance, Unemployment Duration, and Excess Supply of Labour

2005 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 368-378
Author(s):  
Dennis R. Maki
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Unemployment Duration ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
Excess Supply ◽  
Duration Of Unemployment ◽  
Unemployment Spells

This paper examines the effect of the unemployment insurance scheme on the duration of unemployment spells in Canada in the period 1953-1973.

Macroeconomic Stabilisation Properties of a Euro Area Unemployment Insurance Scheme

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Kaufmann ◽  
Maria Grazia Attinasi ◽  
Sebastian Hauptmeier
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Insurance Scheme

scholarly journals What Have We Learned from Empirical Studies of Unemployment Insurance?

ILR Review ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-95
Keyword(s):  
Uniform Distribution ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Total Population ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Policy Research ◽  
Review Article ◽  
Coverage Rate ◽  
Unemployment Duration ◽  
Waiting Period ◽  
The Mean

TIMOTHY J. CARR of Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. has brought to our attention an error in an example provided by Finis Welch in his July 1977 Review article, “What Have We Learned from Empirical Studies of Unemployment Insurance?” On page 459 Welch stated that under his assumptions (of a uniform distribution of unemployment duration from zero to twenty weeks and a two-week waiting period), the mean duration among those not receiving benefits, given an 80 percent coverage rate, would be six weeks. Actually, with an 80 percent coverage rate, the mean duration would be 7.43 weeks. According to Welch, this can be verified by the following calculations: With fraction, C, of the population covered and with 10 percent of covered employees not receiving benefits, the fraction of the total population not receiving benefits is [Formula: see text] and expected or mean duration is [Formula: see text] So, with C = 0.8, expected duration is (10.0 − 7.92) / (1 − .72) = 2.08/.28 = 7.43. EDITOR

scholarly journals The US Unemployment Insurance Scheme: A Model for the EU?

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 314-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christiaan Luigjes ◽  
Georg Fischer ◽  
Frank Vandenbroucke
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Great Recession ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
American Model ◽  
The Us ◽  
Minimum Requirements ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The system of unemployment insurance (UI) used in the United States has often been cited as a model for Europe. The American model illustrates that it is possible to create and maintain a UI system based on federal-state co-financing that intensifies during economic crises and thus reinforces protection and stabilisation. Central requirements and conditional funding can improve the aggregate protection and stabilisation capacity of the system. However, the architecture of the US system financially incentivises states to organise retrenchment of their own efforts for UI, which in turn leads to a divergence of benefit generosity and coverage levels. During the Great Recession, the federal government mitigated these incentives for retrenchment through minimum requirements attached to federal financial intervention. With regards to the European unemployment re-insurance system debate, the US experience implies both positive and encourageing conclusions and cautionary lessons.

scholarly journals Designing a European unemployment insurance scheme

2014 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 184-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
László Andor ◽  
Sebastian Dullien ◽  
H. Xavier Jara ◽  
Holly Sutherland ◽  
Daniel Gros
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Insurance Scheme

How do Unemployment Insurance and Recall Expectations Affect on-the-job Search among Workers Who Receive Advance Notice of Layoff?

ILR Review ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul L. Burgess ◽  
Stuart A. Low
Keyword(s):  
Random Sample ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Job Search ◽  
Experience Rating ◽  
Advance Notice ◽  
Unemployment Spells

This paper explores how advance notice of layoffs, recall (rehiring) expectations, and unemployment insurance (UI) benefits affected on-the-job search among a random sample of Arizona UI recipients in 1975–76. The analysis, which includes extensive controls for the characteristics of workers and their jobs, indicates that pre-unemployment search increased with length of notice and decreased with expected recall. Also, among workers not expecting recall, pre-unemployment search decreased with the level of UI benefits available after layoff. The authors argue that improved experience rating would encourage firms to give employees advance notice when layoffs are imminent, and re-employment bonuses for workers with zero or short unemployment spells would encourage early search.

scholarly journals The EITC, Tax Refunds, and Unemployment Spells

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara LaLumia
Keyword(s):  
Low Income ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Time Frame ◽  
Earned Income Tax Credit ◽  
Unemployment Duration ◽  
Tax Credit ◽  
Earned Income ◽  
Tax Refunds ◽  
Unemployment Spells ◽  
Exogenous Source

The earned income tax credit generates large average tax refunds for low-income parents, and these refunds are distributed in a narrow time frame. I rely on this plausibly exogenous source of variation in liquidity to investigate the effect of cash on hand on unemployment duration. Among EITC-eligible women, unemployment spells beginning just after tax refund receipt last longer than unemployment spells beginning at other times of year. There is no evidence that tax refund receipt is associated with longer unemployment duration for men, or that the longer durations for women are associated with higher-quality subsequent job matches. (JEL H24, J64)

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