scholarly journals Compulsory Arbitration : Panacea or Millstone? By Harold S. Roberts, University of Hawaii, Industrial Relations Center, December 1965, 162 pages.

1967 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 142
Author(s):  
Paul Guy
1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Roper

On 10 March 1988, three :months to the day after the introduction of the State Sector Bill, the Government announced a nun1ber of changes to the Bill, arnongst which was the following: A provision will be included in the law that will allow the negotiating parties to a particular document to agree to a compulsory arbitration arrange1nent in return for a "no-strike" commitment from the union. The type of arbitration available will be "final offer" arbitration where the Arbitration Commission must choose between the whole position put forward by one party or the other and cannot go "down the middle" (Goverrunent Press Statement, March 10, 1988). Final offer arbitration (FOA) is a new concept for the New Zealand industrial relations system. It was not canvassed in the Buff Paper. Its potential application in this country has certainly not been the subject of debate amongst industrial relations practitioners. This is typical of the way in which this Bill was processed from its introduction. It bodes ill for the future of such an alien elernent in state sector bargaining.


1979 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 214
Author(s):  
D.H. Young

The unique Australian system of controlling industrial relations matters was created in the early 1900's against a background of disastrous national strikes in the 1890's and during the formation of the Commonwealth of Australia.The Australian Constitution was framed to include specific powers to protect the country and the general public from the consequences of industrial disputes between employers and employees by requiring conciliation processes to be followed and, if they failed, for compulsory arbitration of the dispute.The division of powers between the Commonwealth and State Governments causes complications and inconsistencies and has highlighted the intrusion of political considerations into industrial relations problems.The Commonwealth and most State Governments have created systems based on registered organisations of employers and employees. Registration is intended to create rights and obligations and to result in responsible bodies being subject to the enforcement procedures of the arbitration tribunals. Registration also delineates the scope of membership coverage and the industries in which the registered bodies may operate. In theory, there should be no overlapping of registered constitutions and therefore no demarcation or "jurisdictional" type disputes. A major problem has been created by registration based on crafts or occupations instead of on an industry basis. This has resulted in up to 15 or more unions having members in, even, medium sized establishments.The recent trend has been towards amalgamations of employer and employee organisations and the formation of "peak" employer and employee councils-the CAI and the ACTU. The activities of these Councils is leading to a centralised system of wage fixation and towards common standards of conditions of employment with deviations only to meet special circumstances. This tends to cause any change in wage rates or conditions of employment in any one area to "flow" into other areas and industries on a "comparative wage justice" basis.The expansion of onshore exploration and development of the hydrocarbons industry into offshore areas has resulted in more unions becoming involved in the industry, with inconsistencies between land based and maritime unions in approaches to construction and production work.Much work will be required by employers and their organisations within the hydrocarbons industry to overcome the industrial relations difficulties that will arise at interfaces between them and other well established industries.


1993 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Sheldon

The introduction of compulsory arbitration in New South Wales in 1901 did not lead to increased union membership levels among building and construction industry workers. The administration of the Act proved largely unworkable and delivered positive results to building employers rather than unionists. Instead, the recovery of unionism in this sector after the 1890s depression was due to a range of economic and other institutional factors, including the positive stimulus provided by the Public Works administration of E. W. O'Sullivan. The introduction of a revamped arbitration framework in 1908 probably did contribute to the strong growth in union membership in succeeding years, given the greater accessibility to awards it provided. Still, much of this encouragement was at best indirect. Here again, though, other factors— economic, industrial relations and political—were probably at least as important. Among these were a sustained building boom, the changed structure of the industry's workforce, the increasing scale of projects and a growing worker dissatisfaction with arbitration's meagre fruits.


Author(s):  
Ray Fells ◽  
Charles Mulvey

Western Australia was the first jurisdiction in Australia to legislate for compulsory arbitration. The original legislation, which was modelled on the New Zealand Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1894, was enacted in 1900, replaced by another Act in 1912, another in 1979, and amended on a number of occasions subsequently.


1970 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Hicks

The industrial relations systems of Australia and New Zealand are unique in using conciliation and arbitration as the main form of conflict regulation. Although the concept of compulsory arbitration was devised in Australia it was first introduced in New Zealand and only later adopted by the Australians. Because this common origin exists it is interesting for New Zealanders to examine the divergent development of the two systems. One advantage of this is that it exposes possible strengths and weaknesses of the New Zealand system.


1998 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 663-689 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Alexander ◽  
Roy Green ◽  
Andrew Wilson

This article examines the pattern of union membership decline in Australia using the 1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey data set (AWIRS 95), including the panel of surviving workplaces drawn from the 1990 survey. It confirms recent studies that suggest that the decline is more or less comprehensive, but points to some diversity in the longitudinal findings. In particular, the article tracks the growth of delegate structures in the previous five years in unionised workplaces, employee attitudes to unions, and the much slower rate of derline associated with 'active unionism', While it has been argued, not least by Joe Isaac (1958), that workplace organisation tended to 'atrophy' under compulsory arbitration, there is no automatic process by which it will correspondingly flourish under more decentralised bargaining arrangements. The AWIRS 95 findings suggest that the future of unions will be determined by a range of factors, which include their ability to build and co-ordinate delegate networks and hence the role of the state in providing legislative support for workplace organisation and fair wages. We argue that this, not a return to centralised wage restraint, sbould be the focus of strategic unionism.


1970 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Grills

The Employment Contracts Act 1991 (the ECA or the Act) completes the legal evolution in New Zealand industrial relations from to compulsory arbitration to direct bargaining. It also represents one of the concluding steps in the of the New Zealand economy. Under the compulsory arbitration system, the Arbitration Court was the central institution and provided arbitration as a dispute resolution process for a wide of range of issues. The Arbibation Court represented an arm of administrative law where the instituion, on behalf of Parlianent, instituted its wishes to regulate aspects of the labour market.


1988 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 248-257
Author(s):  
Greg Hundley

State and local government workers in the United States are covered by a wide variety of collective bargaining laws, thus providing a rare opportunity to analyse the effects of the law on union membership. Analysis of a large micro-data sample shows that several aspects of bargaining laws, particularly provisions relating to exclusive jurisdiction and union security, have a pronounced effect on the probability that a worker will be a union member. An individual covered by the right to strike is less likely to be a union member than an individual covered by a compulsory arbitration law. Estimates indicate that deregulation of an industrial relations system that provides incentivesfor unionism similar to those that exist in Australian policy would produce a dramatic decline in membership.


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