scholarly journals Introduction. Raillerie, satire, ironie et sens plus profond*

2008 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-12
Author(s):  
Pascal Engel
Keyword(s):  
Gregory Currie

Résumé Peut-on avoir une théorie unifiée de l’ironie ? La théorie de la feintise défendue par Gregory Currie est sans doute l’une des meilleures candidates à ce titre. Mais elle n’est pas sans difficultés, comme on peut le voir sur quelques exemples empruntés à Swift. Je soutiens que Swift illustre parfaitement les différentes non seulement dimensions de la théorie de l’ironie comme feintise, mais aussi d’une conception anti-post-moderniste des valeurs de l’ironiste.

Intentionalist Strategies of Interpretation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Stock
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Authorial Intention ◽  
Gregory Currie ◽  
Ordinary Case ◽  
Unreliable Narration ◽  
Fictional Truth

This chapter addresses the complaint that extreme intentionalism standardly forces the reader who engages in interpretation to posit private, or hidden, authorial intentions, for which she has little or no evidence. It is first argued that there are no automatic strategies of interpretation of fictional content: at every stage, whether or not a given interpretative strategy is to be appropriately applied depends on the presence of relevant authorial intention as a sanction. (This section includes a discussion, and rejection, of the views of David Lewis and Gregory Currie about fictional truth; a discussion of the relevance of genre to fictional content; and a consideration of the issue of unreliable narration for an intentionalist view.) The foregoing material on strategies of interpretation is then used to show that it is false to think of the extreme intentionalist as being committed to ‘hidden’ or ‘secret’ meanings in the ordinary case.

Rethinking Role Realism

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Glavaničová
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
General Idea ◽  
Fictional Characters ◽  
Realist Theory ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Individual Concepts ◽  
Gregory Currie ◽  
Fictional Names

Abstract Role realism is a promising realist theory of fictional names. Different versions of this theory have been suggested by Gregory Currie, Peter Lamarque, Stein Haugom Olsen, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. The general idea behind the approach is that fictional characters are to be analysed in terms of roles, which in turn can be understood as sets of properties (or alternatively as kinds or functions from possible worlds to individuals). I will discuss several advantages and disadvantages of this approach. I will then propose a novel hyperintensional version of role realism (which I will call impossibilism), according to which fictional names are analysed in terms of individual concepts that cannot be matched by a reference (a full-blooded individual). I will argue that this account avoids the main disadvantages of standard role realism.

Arts and Minds. ? Gregory Currie

2007 ◽  
Vol 57 (228) ◽  
pp. 508-510
Author(s):  
Justine Kingsbury
Keyword(s):  
Gregory Currie

scholarly journals Revisiting the problem of satisfaction conditions and the indispensability of i-desire

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-259
Author(s):  
Yuchen Guo
Keyword(s):  
Emotional Responses ◽  
Gregory Currie

Gregory Currie has argued for the indispensability of i-desires – a kind of imaginative counterpart of desires – by drawing a distinction between the satisfaction conditions of the desire-like states involved in our emotional responses to tragedies and those of genuine desires. Nevertheless, Fiora Salis has recently shown that the same sort of distinction can also be found in nonfictional cases and has proposed a solution to the issue of satisfaction conditions that dispenses with i-desires. In this paper, I refute Salis’s stance and argue for the indispensability of i-desires. For this aim to be achieved, I first argue that the distinction between the satisfaction conditions of i-desires and those of desires can be given a different explanation, and that in this case, the same sort of distinction cannot arise in nonfictional cases; Secondly, I argue that we cannot make sense of the conflict between our desire-like states triggered by fictions and our background desires, and therefore i-desires should be introduced to avoid this conflict.Keywords: i-desires, desire-like imaginings, tragedy, imaginative desires,

Philosophical Papers. Imre Lakatos , John Worrall , Gregory Currie

Isis ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. 484-486
Author(s):  
Peter D. Asquith
Keyword(s):  
Imre Lakatos ◽  
Gregory Currie

Imre Lakatos

Philosophy ◽  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan Larvor ◽  
Colin Jakob Rittberg
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽  
London School ◽  
Mathematical Concepts ◽  
Imre Lakatos ◽  
Gregory Currie ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
London School Of Economics ◽  
Modern Mathematics ◽  
Mathematics And Science

Imre Lakatos (b. 1922–d. 1974) was a philosopher of mathematics and science. Having left Hungary in 1956, he made his first appearance on the international stage with a series of four papers during 1963 and 1964 in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, later published together posthumously in Proofs and Refutations (1976), in which he discusses the formation of mathematical concepts by proof-analysis. This radical break with classical approaches to the philosophy of mathematics attracted sufficient interest that Kitcher and Aspray deem Lakatos to have started a new and “maverick” tradition in the field (“An Opinionated Introduction,” in History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, 1988). By 1959, Lakatos had become an assistant lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics and Political Science. This department was still under the direction of its founder, Karl Popper, and Lakatos’s evolving and ultimately antagonistic relations with Popper and the Popperians conditioned much of his work. The chief part of this work was a series of influential papers on the philosophy of science. These are included in the two books of his work that two of his former students, John Worrall and Gregory Currie, published after his death (Lakatos 1978a and Lakatos 1978b, cited under Posthumously Published). In 1974, Lakatos died of a heart attack, leaving his projects in philosophy of science and mathematics incomplete.

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