Study on Cost-sharing of Telecommunications Infrastructure Based on the Modified Method of Shapley Value

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (10) ◽  
pp. 38-41
Author(s):  
Zifu Fan ◽  
Jiating Hu ◽  
Ye Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Telecommunications Infrastructure ◽  
Modified Method

Research on Tax Assignment of Environmental Conservation in China Energy Industry Chain

2011 ◽  
Vol 361-363 ◽  
pp. 1651-1654
Author(s):  
Ye Ren ◽  
Hui Xia Hao ◽  
Xun Cheng Huang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Environmental Conservation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Energy Industry ◽  
Industry Chain ◽  
Modified Method ◽  
Scientific Analysis ◽  
Save Energy

In order to protect enviroment and save energy consciously. China began to levy taxes for enviromental conservation. At present, there exists two ways to levy tax, one depends on the pollution degree of each enterprise in the chain, the other mostly lies on the profit. Both ways are of one-sidedness and lack of fair because they do not make scientific analysis to the whole industry chain.For enterprises in the energy industry chain, this paper think the best way is to pay taxes cooperatively.It can ensure seamless joint of chains and obtain resonable profit assignment.Based on game theory,this article established a model of tax assignment for enviromental conservation by means of Shapley value method.Furthermore,the paper gave out an example to prove the validity of the model.Finally, the paper put forward a modified method based on venture .

scholarly journals Cost Sharing Models in Game Theory = Költségelosztási modellek a játékelméletben

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Anna Ráhel Radványi
Keyword(s):  
Water Management ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shortest Path ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Average Cost ◽  
Fair Allocation ◽  
Sharing Rule ◽  
The Shapley Value

In our thesis we examined economic situations modeled with rooted trees and directed, acyclic graphs. In the presented problems the collaboration of economic agents (players) incurred costs or created a profit, and we have sought answers to the question of \fairly" distributing this common cost or profit. We have formulated properties and axioms describing our expecta- tions of a \fair" allocation. We have utilized cooperative game theoretical methods for modeling. After the introduction, in Chapter 2 we analyzed a real-life problem and its possible solutions. These solution proposals, namely the average cost- sharing rule, the serial cost sharing rule, and the restricted average cost- sharing rule have been introduced by Aadland and Kolpin (2004). We have also presented two further water management problems that arose during the planning of the economic development of Tennessee Valley, and discussed solution proposals for them as well (Straffinn and Heaney, 1981). We analyzed if these allocations satisfied the properties we associated with the notion of \fairness". In Chapter 3 we introduced the fundamental notions and concepts of cooperative game theory. We defined the core (Shapley, 1955; Gillies, 1959) and the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), that play an important role in finding a \fair" allocation. In Chapter 4 we presented the class of fixed-tree game and relevant ap- plications from the domain of water management. In Chapter 5 we discussed the classes of airport and irrigation games, and the characterizations of these classes. We extended the results of Dubey (1982) and Moulin and Shenker (1992) on axiomatization of the Shapley value on the class of airport games to the class of irrigation games. We have \translated" the axioms used in cost allocation literature to the axioms corresponding to TU games, thereby providing two new versions of the results of Shapley (1953) and Young (1985). In Chapter 6 we introduced the upstream responsibility games and char- acterized the game class. We have shown that Shapley's and Young's char- acterizations are valid on this class as well. In Chapter 7 we discussed shortest path games and have shown that this game class is equal to the class of monotone games. We have shown that further axiomatizations of the Shapley value, namely Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s characterizations are valid on the class of shortest path games.

A Strategic Implementation of the Shapley Value for the Nested Cost-Sharing Problem

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
YOUNGSUB CHUN ◽  
CHENG-CHENG HU ◽  
CHUN-HSIEN YEH
Keyword(s):  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Strategic Implementation

The effect of cost sharing on the quality of dental care

1984 ◽  
Vol 48 (11) ◽  
pp. 597-605 ◽  
Author(s):  
HL Bailit ◽  
RH Brook ◽  
CJ Kamberg ◽  
GA Goldberg ◽  
V Spolsky ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Dental Care ◽  
Cost Sharing

Cost sharing and the demand for ambulatory mental health services.

1984 ◽  
Vol 39 (10) ◽  
pp. 1195-1197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall P. Ellis ◽  
Thomas G. McGuire
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Mental Health Services ◽  
Health Services ◽  
Cost Sharing
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