scholarly journals Edad sexual y exclusión de la responsabilidad penal. Fundamentos del Derecho anglosajón

Author(s):  
Amparo Martinez Guerra

En los últimos años, la protección de menores frente comportamientos de abuso y explotación sexual ha sido una de las preocupaciones principales en los sistemas legales de Derecho continental y anglosajón. La respuesta de los Legisladores penales ha sido la elevación de la edad de consentimiento sexual de los menores de edad. Sin embargo, la medida provoca problemas interpretativos de índole constitucional que no pueden ser obviados. Por un lado, la posible afectación del derecho fundamental a la privacidad de los propios menores (desarrollo de su sexualidad). Por otro, la proporcionalidad de la sanción penal prevista para ese tipo de delitos, así como los efectos de la inscripción en los Registros de Delincuentes sexuales. En España, la modificación de la LO 1/2015, de 30 de marzo, elevó la edad de consentimiento sexual a los 16 años. La reforma también incluyó el nuevo art. 183 quáter, que permite al Tribunal eximir de responsabilidad penal cuando autor y víctima sean “próximos por edad y grado de desarrollo o madurez”. En los sistemas penales anglosajones esta cláusula, denominada “cláusula de escape” o “cláusula Romeo y Julieta”, es una de las piezas centrales del delito del statutory rape o delito de violación definido por estatuto. Este artículo examina los orígenes, configuración y el fundamento de la exclusión de la responsabilidad penal por “cercanía en edad o desarrollo” en los Estados Unidos de América (sistemas federal y estatal), Reino Unido e Irlanda del Norte, República de Irlanda y Canadá. El artículo analiza también la jurisprudencia más importante al respecto y los problemas constitucionales derivados de las nuevas las edades de consentimiento.In recent years the protection of minors against sexual abuse and exploitation has been one of the main concerns in the Civil and Common Law legal systems. The response of the Criminal Legislators has been the raise of the age of sexual consent of minors. However, this measure causes constitutional problems that cannot be ignored. On the one hand, the conflict with the minor fundamental right of privacy (development of the sexuality). On the other hand, the proportionality of the criminal sanction provided for such crimes, as well as the effects of the registration in the Sex Offenders Registry. In Spain, the amendment introduced by the Organic Law 1/2015, of March 30, raised the age of sexual consent to 16 years. The Law created the new article 183 quater in the Criminal Code to allow the Court to exempt from criminal responsibility when the defendant and the victim are «close in age and development or maturity». In Common Law criminal systems that clause, called «escape clause» or «Romeo and Juliet clause» is one of the central pieces of the statutory rape. This article examines the origins, the elements and the rationale of the exclusion of criminal responsibility for «close in age and development» in the United States of America (federal and state law), the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, Ireland and Canada. The article analyses the most important case-law regarding the constitutional problems arising from the new ages of consent. 

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-33
Author(s):  
Jacob Barrett

“The Experiment” presents scholars of religion with an opportunity to draw upon their training to reflect upon a contemporary issue. Editorial assistant Jacob Barrett engages with a recent edited volume from Routledge titled Leading Works in Law and Religion that, while focusing on the identity of the subfield of law and religion within the discipline of legal studies in the United Kingdom and Ireland, provides many sites for comparison with the religion and law subfield of religious studies in the United States context. Drawing upon the model set by the volume, Barrett imagines what a volume titled Leading Works in Religion and Law could look like and what the subfield of religion and law stands to gain from engaging in a project like the one done by its law and religion counterpart.


2018 ◽  
pp. 933
Author(s):  
Lucinda Vandervort

This article examines the operation of “reasonable steps” as a statutory standard for analysis of the availability of the defence of belief in consent in sexual assault cases and concludes that application of section 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code, as presently worded, often undermines the legal validity and correctness of decisions about whether the accused acted with mens rea, a guilty, blameworthy state of mind. When the conduct of an accused who is alleged to have made a mistake about whether a complainant communicated consent is assessed by the hybrid subjective-objective reasonableness standard prescribed by section 273.2, many decision-makers rely on extra-legal criteria and assumptions grounded in their personal experience and opinion about what is reasonable. In the midst of debate over what the accused knew and what steps were “reasonable,” given what the accused knew, the legal definition of consent in section 273.1 is easily overlooked and decision-makers focus on facts that are legally irrelevant and prejudice rational deliberation. The result is failure to enforce the law. The author proposes: (1) that section 273.2 be amended to reflect the significant developments achieved in sexual consent jurisprudence since enactment of the provision in 1992; and (2) that, in the interim, the judiciary act with resolve to make full and proper use of the statutory and common law tools that are presently available to determine whether the accused acted with mens rea in relation to the absence of sexual consent.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This concluding chapter identifies the four major causes of the growth and origin of judicial review in the G-20 common law countries and in Israel. First, the need for a federalism umpire, and occasionally a separation of powers umpire, played a major role in the development of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation in the United States, in Canada, in Australia, in India, and most recently in the United Kingdom. Second, there is a rights from wrongs phenomenon at work in the growth of judicial review in the United States, after the Civil War; in Canada, with the 1982 adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; in India, after the Indira Gandhi State of Emergency led to a massive trampling on human rights; in Israel, after the Holocaust; in South Africa, after racist apartheid misrule; and in the United Kingdom, after that country accumulated an embarrassing record before the European Court of Human Rights prior to 1998. This proves that judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation often occurs in response to a deprivation of human rights. Third, the seven common law countries all borrowed a lot from one another, and from civil law countries, in writing their constitutions. Fourth, and finally, the common law countries all create multiple democratic institutions or political parties, which renders any political attempt to strike back at the Supreme Court impossible to maintain.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter examines the two models of judicial review that exist in the common law countries: the Diffuse Model and the Second Look Model. The Diffuse Model of judicial review originated in the United States and has spread to India, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, most of the countries of Latin America, the Scandinavian countries (except for the Netherlands), and Japan. It is premised on the idea that a country’s written constitution is its supreme law and that courts, when deciding cases or controversies that are properly before them, are thus duty-bound to follow the constitution, which is supreme law, and not a contrary statute whenever those two items conflict. Meanwhile, the essence of the Second Look Model of judicial review is that a Supreme or Constitutional Court ought to have the power of judicial review, subject to some kind of legislative power of override. This, it is said, best harmonizes the advantages of a written constitution and a bill of rights enforced by courts with the imperatives of democratic self-government. The underlying goal is to obtain the advantages of both constitutional government and also of democratic government.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This book is about the stunning birth and growth of judicial review in the civil law world, since 1945. In Volume I of this two-volume series, I showed that judicial review was born and grew in common law G-20 constitutional democracies and in Israel primarily: (1) when there is a need for a federalism or a separation of powers umpire, (2) when there is a rights from wrongs dynamic, (3) when there is borrowing, and (4) when the political structure of a country’s institutions leaves space within which the judiciary can operate. The countries discussed in Volume I were the following: (1) the United States, (2) Canada, (3) Australia, (4) India, (5) Israel, (6) South Africa, and (7) the United Kingdom....


Author(s):  
Armando Saponaro

This chapter outlines the “conflict” and “peace-keeping” victim-oriented justice paradigms. The latter empowers the victims of crime, putting them at the center of an encounter and using interindividual mediation or collective circles to address conflict resolution. Two models are critically discussed in the conflict victim-oriented justice paradigm. The European continental “visible victim” model structures the role of the victim as a full-fledged processual party together with the public prosecutor and offender. In this model, the victim has the same rights and powers of the defendant. The “invisible victim” common law model views the victim as a trial witness, participating, for example, through a victim impact statement (in the United States) or victim personal statement (in the United Kingdom) at the sentencing stage. The visible victim conflict paradigm model enhances a victim's role and involvement in the criminal justice system, offering a solution to existing controversial and critical common law system issues.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 261-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Whitting ◽  
Andrew Day ◽  
Martine Powell

Community notification statutes, popularly known as ‘Megan’s Law’, were passed in rapid succession throughout the United States following the enactment of landmark legislation in the state of Washington in 1990. Calls for the adoption of similar legislation in Australia gained momentum following the introduction of ‘limited disclosure’ schemes in the United Kingdom and, in 2012, one Australian state introduced a limited form of community notification. This study presents an analysis of in-depth interviews with specialist police officers ( N=21) who are responsible for coordinating the ongoing management, registration and monitoring of sex offenders who live in the community in this jurisdiction to understand their perspectives on the scheme’s implementation. Systematic thematic analysis revealed that the officers were particularly interested in understanding the impact that notification has on offenders, victims and the broader community, and the police agency. The practice-based wisdom distilled from these interviews is used to inform a discussion about the more widespread implementation of this type of public policy both in Australia and in other countries that may be giving this consideration.


Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eesa A Fredericks

This series of two articles provides a comparative overview of the position in the common-law conflict of laws in respect of the contractual capacity of natural persons. The comparative study is undertaken in order to provide guidelines for the future development of South African private international law. Reference is primarily made to case law and the opinions of academic authors. The legal position in the law of the United Kingdom, as the mother jurisdiction in Europe, is investigated in part I. Although Scotland is a mixed civil/common-law jurisdiction, the situation in that part of the United Kingdom is also discussed.Part II will deal with the rules and principles of private international law in respect of contractual capacity in Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), North America (the common-law provinces of Canada and the United States of America), Asia (India, Malaysia and Singapore) and Africa (Ghana and Nigeria). Part II also contains a comprehensive summary of the legal position in the common-law countries, followed by ideas for the reform of South African private international law in this regard.


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