scholarly journals Engagement of the undercover agent, with emphasis on the responsibility of the undercover agent for the unlawful conduct during his engagement

2016 ◽  
Vol 88 (6) ◽  
pp. 147-166
Author(s):  
Tatjana Petrović
Keyword(s):  
Undercover Agent ◽  
Unlawful Conduct

scholarly journals Thoughts on the principle of ne bis in idem in the light of administrative and criminal sanctions for the legal protection of animals

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (31) ◽  
pp. 7-22
Author(s):  
Krisztina Bányai
Keyword(s):  
Animal Welfare ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Criminal Sanctions ◽  
European Court ◽  
Ne Bis In Idem ◽  
Unlawful Conduct ◽  
Administrative Sanctions ◽  
Cruelty To Animals

According to the well-developed interpretation of the principle of the ne bis in idem in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights, the same conduct cannot be the subject of two proceedings or santions with similar functions and purposes. In Hungary the Constitutional Court has interpreted the rules of the ne bis in idem in administrative and criminal procedure for animal welfare fine and sanctions for cruelty to animals in Decision 8/2017. (IV.18) AB and the legislator settled its rules in Act on administrative sanctions which came into effect from the 1st of January, 2021. The recent study through practical issues approaches how principle prevails, its problems and possible solutions in the field of unlawful conduct in animal welfare, in particular regarding the role of the prosecutor.

6. Manslaughter

2019 ◽  
pp. 163-217
Author(s):  
John Child ◽  
David Ormerod
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Reform ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Loss Of Self ◽  
Actus Reus ◽  
Corporate Manslaughter ◽  
Unlawful Conduct ◽  
Partial Defences ◽  
Diminished Responsibility

This chapter focuses on manslaughter, a common law homicide offence with an actus reus of unlawful conduct causing death. The chapter considers two categories of manslaughter: voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter arises where D commits murder, but meets the criteria for one of the partial defences: loss of self-control, diminished responsibility, or suicide pact. Involuntary manslaughter arises where D does not commit murder, but commits a relevant manslaughter offence: unlawful act manslaughter, gross negligence manslaughter, or reckless manslaughter. The chapter explains statutory offences of unlawful killing (corporate manslaughter, driving causing death, infanticide, killing of a foetus) and concludes by outlining options for legal reform concerning voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and the structure of manslaughter offences. Relevant cases are highlighted with a summary of the main facts and judgment.

scholarly journals The diary of an undercover agent in Mexico’s war on drugs

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 290-293
Author(s):  
Carlos Barrera ◽  
R. Gerald Hughes
Keyword(s):  
War On Drugs ◽  
Undercover Agent

scholarly journals Histamine: an undercover agent in multiple rare diseases?

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (9) ◽  
pp. 1947-1960 ◽  
Author(s):  
Almudena Pino-Ángeles ◽  
Armando Reyes-Palomares ◽  
Esther Melgarejo ◽  
Francisca Sánchez-Jiménez
Keyword(s):  
Rare Diseases ◽  
Undercover Agent

The In Pari Delicto Defense for Auditors in Professional Negligence Cases: Imputation of Managers’ Unlawful Acts to the Client Firm

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-226
Author(s):  
Stephen E. Blythe
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Financial Accounting Standards Board ◽  
Auditor Liability ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Client Firm ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Unlawful Conduct ◽  
Term Benefit

AbstractThe Enron scandal, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 2008 financial crisis have resulted in new laws and regulations regarding auditor liability and an evolution of some of the old ones. One of the older laws is the in pari delicto defense: in a lawsuit brought by a corporation alleging that its auditor was negligent in failing to detect a manager’s fraud, the auditor may be able to use that defense if the manager’s fraud is imputable to the company. Since a bankruptcy trustee or a receiver steps into the shoes of the bankrupt company it represents, a similar defense (the Wagoner Rule) may also be applicable if a trustee or a receiver files a negligence lawsuit against the company’s auditor. However, in pari delicto is inapplicable when: (1) the wrongful acts of the manager are so adverse to the corporate client that the manager is deemed to have totally abandoned the corporation for its, or a third party’s, sole benefit (unless the manager is also the sole shareholder, or the company has incurred a short-term benefit because of the fraud); (2) the corporate client had at least one innocent manager or shareholder who could have prevented or stopped the fraud if he had known about it; (3) the auditor does not deal with the corporate client in good faith and engages in unlawful conduct; or (4) the plaintiffs are totally innocent shareholders (but in this case, the in pari delicto defense is still applicable with respect to culpable shareholders). The State of New York has been on the cutting edge in the evolution of the in pari delicto defense, and this defense is strongest there. Other states recognizing the defense include New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and (in dicta) Delaware (only if the company has engaged in actual wrongdoing). Finally, these are examples of recent evolution of in pari delicto: (a) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s prohibition of management from interfering with or deceiving the auditor; such statutory violations of management could be used by the auditor at trial in proving the applicability of the in pari delicto defense and (b) the new constraints on off-balance sheet leases, expected to be released shortly by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, may decrease management’s ability to deceive the auditor in the first place.

‘Pretaliatory’ Enforcement Action for Chilling Whistleblowing through Corporate Agreements: Lessons from North America

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivia Dixon
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Change ◽  
Codes Of Conduct ◽  
The United States ◽  
Regulatory Function ◽  
Speaking Up ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Legitimate Interests ◽  
The Government ◽  
Right To Communicate ◽  
Unlawful Conduct

Studies have shown that potential whistleblowers are reluctant to report misconduct because they fear retaliation. In Australia, fear of retaliation is exacerbated for private-sector employees where the lack of prescriptive legislation aggravates vulnerability in all but exceptional circumstances. Through examining the codes of conduct of Australia's 100 largest listed companies (‘Codes’) this article argues that while Codes have the potential to provide an important regulatory function through facilitating whistleblowing, the breadth of confidentiality undertakings contained therein may instead be chilling potential whistleblowers from speaking up. While companies have legitimate interests in protecting confidential information, it is well-established that employees may disclose their employer's unlawful conduct to the government, even if such disclosure is in violation of the company's confidentiality policy. To affirm this right, in the United States (US), federal regulators have recently taken ‘pretaliatory’ enforcement action against companies for requiring employees to execute confidentiality agreements that stifle the reporting of possible violations of federal laws. Such regulation by enforcement has successfully effected cultural change through facilitating widespread amendments to US corporate confidentiality agreements. Accordingly, this article argues that any future Australian legislation should include an ‘anti-confidentiality provision’ similar to the US and Canadian frameworks to affirm an employee's right to communicate with a regulator directly, despite any purported agreement or corporate policy to the contrary.

UN peacekeeping operations: when can unlawful acts committed by peacekeeping forces be attributed to the UN?

Legal Studies ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Buchan
Keyword(s):  
Legal Framework ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
The Icj ◽  
Peacekeeping Forces ◽  
Peacekeeping Missions ◽  
Unlawful Conduct ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Military

UN peacekeeping missions operate under the authority of the UN. However, the military personnel that constitute a UN peacekeeping mission remain organs of the states from which they are contributed. Thus, whether unlawful acts committed by peacekeepers can be attributed to the UN is dependent upon whether the peacekeeping force can be regarded as being under the direction and control of the UN. This is a question of fact. According to the ICJ and the International Law Commission, unlawful acts committed by peacekeeping forces will be attributed to the UN only where the UN exercised ‘effective control’ over the commission of the unlawful act. In contrast, the ECtHR has consistently propounded a very different test, asserting that unlawful acts will be attributed to the UN only where the UN retained ‘ultimate authority and control’ over the peacekeeping mission. I argue, however, that neither of these tests provides a suitable legal framework for determining attribution of unlawful conduct in the context of UN peacekeeping missions. After outlining the deficiencies of these tests, I submit that a more suitable approach to determining attribution would be based upon the overall control test as outlined by the ICTY in Tadić.

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