scholarly journals A atividade “Magia ou Ciência?” do evento Portas Abertas 2018: uma análise das perguntas produzidas pelos visitantes

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. e98
Author(s):  
Alessandro Da Silva Ramos ◽  
Maurícius Selvero Pazinato ◽  
Tania Denise Miskinis Salgado ◽  
Camila Greff Passos

This article aims to perform a qualitative analysis on the questions produced by the visitors of the activity "Magic or Science?" of event Portas Abertas offered by a Brazilian public university. In event Portas Abertas of 2018, six experiments were presented to more than 100 visitors who interacted with the moderators through questions about practices. Therefore, the objective of this article is to analyze the character and the demand of the questions asked by the visitors of the activity and to classify them according to the components of the scientific explanation proposed in the literature. The questions produced were recorded with a voice recorder and in the researchers' field diaries. In general, there was a predominance of informative questions belonging to the subcategories of description and causal explanation, however it is highlighted that there was a satisfactory number of investigative questions of prediction. The questions classified with the investigative character and demand of the prediction type need a future action to be answered, that is, they favor the investigation on the scientific knowledge involved in the studied phenomenon.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Adamek ◽  
Yu Luo ◽  
Joshua Ewen

The chapters in this Handbook reveal the breadth of brilliant imaging and analysis techniques designed to fulfill the mandate of cognitive neuroscience: to understand how anatomical structures and physiological processes in the brain cause typical and atypical behavior. Yet merely producing data from the latest imaging method is insufficient to truly achieve this goal. We also need a mental toolbox that contains methods of inference that allow us to derive true scientific explanation from these data. Causal inference is not easy in the human brain, where we are limited primarily to observational data and our methods of experimental perturbation in the service of causal explanation are limited. As a case study, we reverse engineer one of the most influential accounts of a neuropsychiatric disorder that is derived from observational imaging data: the connectivity theories of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). We take readers through an approach of first considering all possible causal paths that are allowed by preliminary imaging-behavioral correlations. By progressively sharpening the specificity of the measures and brain/behavioral constructs, we iteratively chip away at this space of allowable causal paths, like the sculptor chipping away the excess marble to reveal the statue. To assist in this process, we consider how current imaging methods that are lumped together under the rubric of “connectivity” may actually offer a differentiated set of connectivity constructs that can more specifically relate notions of information transmission in the mind to the physiology of the brain.


Author(s):  
Bernhard Rieder ◽  
Ariadna Matamoros-Fernández ◽  
Òscar Coromina

Algorithms, as constitutive elements of online platforms, are increasingly shaping everyday sociability. Developing suitable empirical approaches to render them accountable and to study their social power has become a prominent scholarly concern. This article proposes an approach to examine what an algorithm does, not only to move closer to understanding how it works, but also to investigate broader forms of agency involved. To do this, we examine YouTube’s search results ranking over time in the context of seven sociocultural issues. Through a combination of rank visualizations, computational change metrics and qualitative analysis, we study search ranking as the distributed accomplishment of ‘ranking cultures’. First, we identify three forms of ordering over time – stable, ‘newsy’ and mixed rank morphologies. Second, we observe that rankings cannot be easily linked back to popularity metrics, which highlights the role of platform features such as channel subscriptions in processes of visibility distribution. Third, we find that the contents appearing in the top 20 results are heavily influenced by both issue and platform vernaculars. YouTube-native content, which often thrives on controversy and dissent, systematically beats out mainstream actors in terms of exposure. We close by arguing that ranking cultures are embedded in the meshes of mutually constitutive agencies that frustrate our attempts at causal explanation and are better served by strategies of ‘descriptive assemblage’.


Author(s):  
Joseph Pitt ◽  
Steven Mischler

The modern search for an adequate general theory of explanation is an outgrowth of the logical positivist’s agenda: to lay the groundwork for a general unified theory of science. Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, cited under the Deductive-Nomological Model of Explanation) was the first major attempt to put forth an account that met the positivist’s criteria. It initiated a lively debate that has continued up to the present. But as the attention of the philosophers of science became increasingly focused on the individual sciences, it quickly became clear that one general theory of explanation would not do since the particulars of the various sciences called for different accounts of what constituted an adequate explanation in physics and biology as well as chemistry, etc. This article attempts to capture the flavor of the debates and the nature of the shifting targets over the years. It does not profess to be complete, being largely restricted to work published in English, but it is a start. While the modern debates surrounding explanation can be said to begin with Hempel and Oppenheim, the history of philosophical accounts of explanation can be traced at least to Aristotle, whose metaphysics set the logical framework for explanations until Galileo urged that appeals to metaphysical categories be replaced by mathematics and measurement. For the most part, Galileo was not interested in appealing to causes or occult forces. The account of how things behaved was to be expressed in the language of mathematics. Descartes tried to capitalize on that insight with his resurrection of medieval discussions of causation relying on Aristotle’s framework framed in a mathematical physics, only to be countered by Newton, who introduced non-Aristotelian causal explanation grounded in mathematical physics. Finally John Stuart Mill begins the long march to contemporary accounts of causal explanation in both the physical and the social sciences, again relying on certain key assumptions about human nature. So the history of explanation is long and intertwined with a variety of metaphysical frameworks. The Positivists of the 20th century unsuccessfully eschewed metaphysics and sought to create an account of causal explanation that somehow aimed to stick strictly to the dictates of science, only to be thwarted by the metaphysical assumptions in the sciences themselves.


Author(s):  
Joyce A. Cameron

Traditionally, human factors/ergonomics professionals, especially in the United States, use concepts and methods derived from engineering and experimental psychology, both of which are rooted in the conceptual framework of classical, seventeenth-century, Newtonian physics. As a result, our conceptual foundations emphasize reductionism and determinism. However, we need to update these conceptual foundations to reflect the reality of the science of today. Concepts such as holism demand re-thinking the structure of scientific knowledge; principles such as uncertainty have profound implications concerning observation and measurement; and principles such as complementarity require re-examination of the nature of scientific explanation. Many variables of interest to Test and Evaluation (T&E) professionals can be investigated using concepts and methods derived from the physical sciences, the life sciences, and/or the human sciences. However, the science used will profoundly influence the available explanatory concepts and the resulting explanations. Thus, in addition to defining the questions to be asked, T&E professionals need also to consider the kind of science to be used in each investigation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 183-191
Author(s):  
Nilüfer Didiş Körhasan ◽  
◽  
Ali Eryılmaz ◽  
Şakir Erkoç ◽  
◽  
...  

As part of a multiphase study (Didiş et al., 2014; Didiş et al., 2016), this research focused on the effective issues on cognition, and it examined the role of metacognition in the construction of mental models. With the identification of students’ mental models of quantization of physical observables in the previous parts of the project, we considered metacognition theory to identify how knowledge about cognition influenced the construction of their mental models. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with students by considering their knowledge and experiences about learning quantum theory during the semester. Based on the determined metacognitive behaviors, students’ mental models were reinterpreted by considering the metacognitive theory. The qualitative analysis results indicated that (1) students presenting more metacognitive behaviors constructed more coherent and scientific knowledge structures than the others and (2)satisfaction with knowledge was a breaking point for students’ reorganization of their knowledge. These findings are important to indicate the influence of metacognition on the construction and revision of mental models about physics concepts. In teaching of science at university level, students’ metacognitive evaluations should be taken into consideration together with their conceptions forscientific understanding.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 58-64
Author(s):  
Aulia Fuji Yanti ◽  
Riandi Riandi ◽  
Bambang Supriatno

The purpose of this research was to analyze students’ scientific explanation on the human digestive systems topic using explanation-oriented lesson-design model. This research was conducted with a descriptive research design, a total of 29 eighth grade students from a junior high school in Tasikmalaya were involved in this research. Samples were taken using a convenience sampling technique. The scientific explanation observed was written causal explanation. This research data was collected using test, observation and interview method. The result of this research indicates that the number of students who have scientific explanation ability in intermediate category was 66% (n = 19), basic category was 31% (n = 9), and the advanced category was 3% (n = 1). Therefore, it can be concluded that most of the abilitiy of eighth grade students’ scientific explanation were intermediate category. Overall, students could make the components of scientific explanataion referred to this research. However, the components explaining a phenomenon, most students can only explain a phenomenon using patterns that are commonly observed. In addition, the components explain the patterns in the data and processes that support the occurence of a phenomenon, most students explain the patterns and processes that support the occurence of the phenomenon with spesific, but not detailed. In addition, the components connect data patterns and processes using principles, theories, or disciplinary core ideas, most student connect data patterns and processes using principles by including relevant concepts that are logically, specific, but not detailed.


Author(s):  
Alisa Bokulich

In the spirit of explanatory pluralism, this chapter argues that causal and non-causal explanations of a phenomenon are compatible, each being useful for bringing out different sorts of insights. First the chapter reviews the author’s model-based account of scientific explanation, which can accommodate causal and non-causal explanations alike. Then it distills from the literature an important core conception of non-causal explanation. This non-causal form of model-based explanation is illustrated using the example of how Earth scientists in a subfield known as aeolian geomorphology are explaining the formation of regularly-spaced sand ripples. The chapter concludes that even when it comes to everyday “medium-sized dry goods” such as sand ripples, where there is a complete causal story to be told, one can find examples of non-causal scientific explanations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 273 ◽  
pp. 11029
Author(s):  
Yana Kosyakova

The purpose of this work is to: 1) identify, study and analyze speech methods of updating scientific knowledge as a tool for influencing the reader's consciousness; 2) identify potential criteria for increasing the audience's interest in the presented scientific knowledge in the aspect of popular science discourse on the example of popular science articles from selected journals for analysis; 3) describe the influencing potential of these speech methods of presenting knowledge to the addressee. Methodology. The influencing potential of media sources that increase the interest of the readership is revealed through a series of studies describing the factors and methods of popularizing scientific knowledge in modern media on the basis of intersecting discourses (social-political, pedagogical, medical, etc.). The research is also based on the method of continuous sampling in the selection of practical material, the method of quantitative and qualitative analysis. The article substantiates the most effective and frequent speech patterns.


Author(s):  
Fábio Gabriel Nascibem

Resumo: Verificamos que as discussões na sociedade têm tendido a extremos: há visões em que negam totalmente a primazia da explicação científica e, por outro lado, visões que centram toda validade na ciência. Defendemos uma que se estabeleça diálogo entre saberes. Levantamos algumas questões: Como pode ser abordado o tema do diálogo entre saberes? Quais potencialidades? Quais contribuições para o ensino e para a sociedade tais discussões podem trazer? Nosso objetivo neste artigo é esclarecer temas relacionados ao diálogo entre saber científico e saber popular à luz de teorias da filosofia da ciência a partir de duas obras cinematográficas. As obras que analisamos foram: o “Escolarizando o Mundo - O último fardo do homem branco” e o filme “1984”. Ambos fornecem subsídios para uma discussão madura do tema, com potencialidades para a sociedade, por meio de uma postura que privilegie diálogos, bem como para o Ensino de Ciências.Palavras-chave: Saber Científico. Saberes Populares. Obras Cinematográficas. The dialogue between knowledges from films: contribu-tions for science, society and educationAbstract: We note that discussions in society have tended to extremes: there are views that totally deny the prima-cy of scientific explanation and, on the other hand, views that focus all validity in science. We support a dialogue to be established between knowledge. We raise some questions: How can be addressed the issue of dialogue between knowledge? What potential? What contributions to education and society can such discussions bring? Our objective in this article is to clarify themes related to the dialogue between scien-tific knowledge and popular knowledge in the light of theories of the philosophy of science from two cinematographic works. The works we analyzed were: the “Schooling the World - The White Man’s Last Burden” and the film “1984”. Both provide subsidies for a mature discussion of the theme, with potential for society, through a posture that favors dialogues, as well as for Science Teaching.Keywords: Cinematographic Works. Scientific Knowledge. Popular Knowledge. 


2020 ◽  
Vol 178 (2) ◽  
pp. 533-557 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Townsen Hicks

AbstractHumeans are often accused of positing laws which fail to explain or are involved in explanatory circularity. Here, I will argue that these arguments are confused, but not because of anything to do with Humeanism: rather, they rest on false assumptions about causal explanation. I’ll show how these arguments can be neatly sidestepped if one takes on two plausible commitments which are motivated independently of Humeanism: first, that laws don’t directly feature in scientific explanation (a view defended recently by Ruben in R Inst Philos Suppl 27:95–117, 1990, 10.1017/S1358246100005063 and Skow in Reasons why, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) and second, the view that explanation is contrastive. After outlining and motivating these views, I show how they bear on explanation-based arguments against Humeanism.


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