scholarly journals Auditors perceptions on impact of mandatory audit firm rotation on auditor independence Evidence from Bahrain

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Said Kousay ◽  
Khasharmeh Hussein
Keyword(s):  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph V. Carcello ◽  
Albert L. Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Fraudulent Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Client Relationship ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
The U.S

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) required the U.S. Comptroller General to study the potential effects of requiring mandatory audit firm rotation. The General Accounting Office (GAO) concludes in its recently released study of mandatory audit firm rotation that “mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the most efficient way to strengthen auditor independence” (GAO 2003, Highlights). However, the GAO also suggests that mandatory audit firm rotation could be necessary if the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's requirements do not lead to improved audit quality (GAO 2003, 5). We examine the relation between audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Comparing firms cited for fraudulent reporting from 1990 through 2001 with both a matched set of non-fraud firms and with the available population of non-fraud firms, we find that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur in the first three years of the auditor-client relationship. We fail to find any evidence that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely given long auditor tenure. Our results are consistent with the argument that mandatory audit firm rotation could have adverse effects on audit quality.

Auditor Rotation: The PCAOB Considers a New Direction

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. C15-C20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela B. Roush ◽  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
J. Gregory Jenkins ◽  
Susan A. McCracken ◽  
Jonathan D. Stanley
Keyword(s):  
Active Participation ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) recently undertook an exploration of the need for mandatory audit firm rotation with its issuance of the Concept Release on Auditor Independence and Auditor Rotation (PCAOB 2011a). The accumulation of evidence from PCAOB inspections of audit engagements over the last eight years has led the Board to consider additional steps to protect auditors' independence. We provide a brief synopsis of these matters based primarily on remarks by the PCAOB's chairman, James R. Doty (PCAOB 2011b, 2011c). In addition, we include relevant observations from prior academic studies and end with a call for the active participation of stakeholders in this important debate.

Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 1089 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakwoon Kim ◽  
Hyoik Lee ◽  
Jong Eun Lee
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Financial Statement Audit ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
First Time

Recently, regulators and policy makers who witnessed the global financial crisis during 20072009 began considering a variety of ways to enhance auditor independence and financial reporting quality, ultimately aiming at investor protection. Since the enactment of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR) requirement has once again received significant attention from regulators and policy makers around the world, including the European Union (EU) and the U.S. Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). In this paper, we investigate whether MAFR enhances audit quality in Korea. We find that under MAFR, newly rotated auditors are more likely to issue first-time going-concern audit opinions to financially distressed firms during their initial (first-year) financial statement audit compared with under the Voluntary Audit Firm Change (VAFC). Moreover, firms audited by mandatorily rotated new auditors have less discretionary accruals and higher accrual quality than those audited by voluntarily switched new auditors during the initial audit engagement. These results of earnings quality are more pronounced for firms that received a first-time going-concern audit opinion during the initial financial statement audit under MAFR. Taken together, the findings suggest that MAFR produces better audit quality than the VAFC. Further, our study provides implications for regulators and policy makers of countries considering the adoption of MAFR.

Does Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Enhance Auditor Independence? Evidence from Spain

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emiliano Ruiz-Barbadillo ◽  
Nieves Go´mez-Aguilar ◽  
Nieves Carrera
Keyword(s):  
Positive Impact ◽  
Rotation Period ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY: In this study, we document evidence on the impact of mandatory rotation of audit firms on auditor independence using Spanish archival data. Rotation of audit firms every nine years was mandatory in Spain from 1988–1995. Although the rule was never enforced, the Spanish context provides a unique setting to examine the effects that mandatory audit firm rotation has on auditor behavior. We examine audit reports for a sample of financially stressed companies from 1991–2000 to compare audit reporting behavior in a regime with rotation (mandatory rotation period: 1991–1994) and one without rotation (post-mandatory rotation period: 1995–2000). We test two competing hypotheses concerning the impact of mandatory rotation on the likelihood of auditors' issuing going-concern modified audit opinions. We find no evidence to suggest that a mandatory rotation requirement is associated with a higher likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions. Our results suggest that auditors' incentives to protect their reputation have a positive impact on the likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions, while auditors' incentives to retain existing clients did not impact on their decisions in both the mandatory rotation and post-mandatory rotation periods. Overall, our results provide empirical support for the arguments put forward by opponents of mandatory rotation.

scholarly journals Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 37: PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, Concept Release on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. C15-C27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith L. Jones ◽  
Jagadison K. Aier ◽  
Duane M. Brandon ◽  
Tina D. Carpenter ◽  
Lisa M. Gaynor ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Exposure Period ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Professional Skepticism ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Comment ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

SUMMARY In August 2011, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board) issued a concept release to solicit public comment on the potential direction of a proposed standard-setting project on means to enhance auditor independence, objectivity, and professional skepticism. The Concept Release sought comments on and explores in detail the possibility of mandatory audit firm rotation. The PCAOB provided for a 121-day exposure period (from August 16 to December 14, 2011) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the concept release. The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below (dated December 13, 2011) to the PCAOB on PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 37: PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, Concept Release on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation. Data Availability: Information about and access to the release are available at: http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/Release_2011-006.pdf

scholarly journals Mandatory audit firm rotation: A student perspective An assessment of the perceived impact on auditor independence

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Msizi Gwala ◽  
Bomi Cyril Nomlala
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
The United States ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Student Perspective ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Perceived Impact ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
The Impact

Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR), set to be implemented in South African from 1 April 2023, is poised by its propellers the world over as an essential reform in the efforts to improve auditor independence. Available literature suggests that there is no consensus regarding the impact of the implementation of MAFR. The divergent views on MAFR were demonstrated in recent time, with the European Union (EU) choosing to adopt it, while regulators in the United States decided to reject it. This paper examines the perspective of university auditing students on MAFR by examining the perceived impact it could have on auditor independence. The study finds that the majority (from 413 participants) of students surveyed are of the view that MAFR would yield positive outcomes on independence. The majority, however, agree on the MAFR Independence Benefit but warn about the possible negative consequences. MAFR will strengthen the independence of auditors.

scholarly journals How Investors Perceive Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation in Korea

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1089 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sook Kim ◽  
Seon Kim ◽  
Dong Lee ◽  
Seung Yoo
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Indirect Evidence ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
The Impact

Credible audit quality is a precondition for a firm’s sustainability. External auditors offer assurance with regard to the uncertain factors that can jeopardize a firm’s sustainability and provide audit opinions that help investors assess risk. After the global crisis and accounting scandals, mandatory audit firm rotation has been implemented globally. However, few studies have investigated either the cost or the benefit of mandatory audit firm rotation. Prior studies provide only indirect evidence on the effects of audit firm tenure on audit quality/perceived audit quality. By discussing prior arguments, we examine how investors perceive the implementation of mandatory audit firm rotation in Korea. Using a unique and direct setting to examine our research question, we analyze the relationship between firms with mandatorily switched audit firms and the cost of equity capital from 2006 to 2008. We find that the mandatory change in the auditors has a negative association with the cost of equity capital. The results are robust to using the arithmetic mean of the cost of equity capital, lagged control variables, and the manufacturing industry effect. The results indicate that investors perceive that mandatory audit firm rotation provides an environment for qualified audits by enhancing auditor independence and skepticism, and thus decreases the cost of equity capital. This study helps to improve our understanding of the impact of mandatory audit firm rotation the information risk evaluations and provides political implications for policy makers by showing the benefit of mandatory audit firm rotation.

scholarly journals Impact of auditor and audit firm rotation on accounting and audit quality: A critical analysis of the EC regulation draft

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Velte ◽  
Markus Stiglbauer
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Rotation Period ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
A Current

In a current regulation draft of 2011, the European Commission (EC) plans the mandatory audit firm rotation principally after six years and with regard to a cooling off period of four years to increase auditor independence. This could complement the internal mandatory rotation (auditor rotation) by the 8th EC directive. The present paper gives a state of the art analysis of the empirical research results with regard to auditor and audit firm rotation. In contrast to the perception of the EC, the majority of the empirical results doesn’t find evidence for increased financial accounting and audit quality by audit firm rotation. Furthermore, the positive effects of the internal rotation period of seven years and the cooling off period of two years by the 8th EC directive are not empirically proved yet.

Why Audit Committees Oppose Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation: Interview Evidence from Canada

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. P11-P15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Fontaine ◽  
Hanen Khemakhem ◽  
David N. Herda
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Effective Means ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Professional Judgment ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
Audit Partner Rotation

SUMMARY This article summarizes our recent study (Fontaine, Khemakhem, and Herda 2016), which investigates audit committee (AC) members' perspectives on mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR), mandatory audit partner rotation, ways in which AC members monitor auditor independence, and the costs associated with changing audit firms. We conduct in-person interviews with AC members in Canada to explore our research questions. Our findings reveal that AC members view MAFR as an unnecessary threat to their shareholder-granted authority to make audit firm appointment decisions, and believe their professional judgment and observations are the most effective means of ensuring auditor independence. We explain our findings using self-determination theory. Deep insight into the perspectives of AC members, attained by face-to-face interviews and guaranteed anonymity, should interest audit firms and regulators.

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