scholarly journals Value congruence of manufacturer: Distributor guanxi orientation and manufacturers relationship specific investments

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuan PAN ◽  
Shuwei ZANG
Keyword(s):  
Value Congruence ◽  
Specific Investments

Developer Centrality and the Impact of Value Congruence and Incongruence on Commitment and Code Contribution Activity in Open Source Software Communities

MIS Quarterly ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 951-976
Author(s):  
Likoebe M. Maruping ◽  
◽  
Sherae L. Daniel ◽  
Marcelo Cataldo ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Open Source ◽  
Open Source Software ◽  
Value Congruence ◽  
The Impact

Investments and Risk Transfers

2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Baldenius ◽  
Beatrice Michaeli
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Risk Premium ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Risk Premia ◽  
The Other ◽  
Investment Risk ◽  
Incomplete Contracting ◽  
Risk Transfer ◽  
Specific Investments ◽  
Division Managers

ABSTRACT We demonstrate a novel link between relationship-specific investments and risk in a setting where division managers operate under moral hazard and collaborate on joint projects. Specific investments increase efficiency at the margin. This expands the scale of operations and thereby adds to the compensation risk borne by the managers. Accounting for this investment/risk link overturns key findings from prior incomplete contracting studies. We find that if the investing manager has full bargaining power vis-à-vis the other manager, he will underinvest relative to the benchmark of contractible investments; with equal bargaining power, however, he may overinvest. The reason is that the investing manager internalizes only his own share of the investment-induced risk premium (we label this a “risk transfer”), whereas the principal internalizes both managers' incremental risk premia. We show that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) reduces the managers' incentives to invest in relationship-specific assets. The optimal PPS, thus, trades off investment and effort incentives.

The Value of Information in the Hold-Up Problem

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Pfeiffer
Keyword(s):  
Information System ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Value Of Information ◽  
The Other ◽  
Information Control ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Head Office ◽  
Specific Investments ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Central Management

Abstract In the literature, the information structure of the hold-up problem is typically assumed to be exogenous. In this paper, we introduce an additional stage at which the head office may grant individual divisions access to an information system before they undertake their specific investments. Although more information ceteris paribus enhances each divisions’ profits, more information can reduce divisions’ investments and destroy synergies for the other division that would have been generated by the investments. If this negative effect dominates, then information can be harmful for the entire company. Hence, information control can be a subtle force to deal with the hold-up problem to a certain extent. In this paper we analyze those conditions under which information is either harmful or beneficial for central management.

A seller perspective on economic and non-economic satisfaction as precursors to formalisation, specific investments and dependence in business relationships

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nils M. Høgevold ◽  
Gøran Svensson ◽  
Mercy Mpinganjira
Keyword(s):  
Structural Equation ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Specific Investment ◽  
Specific Investments ◽  
Economic Satisfaction ◽  
Business Exchange ◽  
Business To Business

PurposeSeen from the seller's point of view, this study examines economic and non-economic satisfaction as distinct conceptual variables, and tests how the constructs relate to each other and to the business transactional cost variables of formalisation, specific investments and dependence.Design/methodology/approachData was collected from 213 key informants from Norwegian companies involved in business-to-business marketing. Structural equation modelling was used to test the posited hypotheses.FindingsThe findings show that sellers' economic satisfaction exerts a positive influence on non-economic satisfaction and on formalisation, while its posited influence on specific investments was not found to be significant. Formalisation was, however, not significantly influenced by seller non-economic satisfaction. Specific investment was positively influenced by seller non-economic satisfaction. The influence of formalisation on specific investments and dependence was significant. Specific investments were also found to be positively influenced by dependence.Research limitations/implicationsThe study reveals the importance of assessing both economic and non-economic satisfaction in trying to understand sellers' behaviour in business-to-business markets.Practical implicationsThe findings show the need for managers to ensure economic satisfaction, as its affects non-economic satisfaction.Originality/valueThis study contributes to a better understanding of satisfaction in business-to-business exchange relationships and its relationship with transactional cost constructs based on a seller's perspective.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document