Power competition in East Asia: from the old Chinese world order to post-Cold War regional multipolarity

1997 ◽  
Vol 35 (02) ◽  
pp. 35-1178-35-1178
Author(s):  
Petrus Liu

This chapter argues that the conventional understanding that we live in a post-Cold War world order is part of an imperialist aesthetic logic for two important reasons. On the one hand, traditional history creates a teleological narrative that conflates the intellectual history of Marxism—which continues to thrive in China and other locations today—with the political structure of the USSR that collapsed in 1991. According to this narrative, Marxism is merely an "ideology" that is inimical to free thinking and free speech, and, since humanity has entered a distinctly new phase called the "end of history" or the "end of ideologies" in 1991, any current effort to rebuild Marxist or socialist programs must be anachronistic, utopian, or naive. On the other hand, the conventional definition of the Cold War as the period from the Truman Doctrine of 1941 to the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 naturalizes a Western-centered explanatory framework that completely overlooks the experience and agency of East Asia. The presumption that Cold War studies must begin (and end) with the United States and its Western rival(s) is therefore part of the imperialist aesthetics that organizes our temporal-spatial life worlds into the rise and fall of Western empires.


2012 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-99
Author(s):  
Gaurav Kumar Jha ◽  
Amrita Banerjee

Despite long historical ties, post-colonial relations between India and Myanmar have fluctuated between magnanimity and mistrust. While India often stood for high moral grounds and promotion of democracy, it did so at the cost of losing Myanmar to China. This affected both India and Myanmar adversely: while New Delhi’s economic, energy and security interests were hurt, isolated Yangon became more China-dependent. However, since the early 1990s, domestic developments in Myanmar and post-Cold War structural changes in the world order necessitated conditions for cooperation and mutual gains. It appears that blatant domestic suppression in, and international seclusion of, Myanmar is not desirable. Having witnessed two eras of magnanimity and mistrust, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Myanmar in 2012 heralds a prospective era of market interdependence while opening Pandora’s box: can India get a better share of Myanmar’s commercial possibilities without compromising its core interests in promoting democracy, development and diaspora protection?


2018 ◽  
Vol 236 ◽  
pp. 1197-1205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcin Kaczmarski

A decade ago, Beijing's relations with Moscow were of marginal interest to China scholars. Topics such as growing Sino-American interdependence-cum-rivalry, engagement with East Asia or relations with the developing world overshadowed China's relationship with its northern neighbour. Scholars preoccupied with Russia's foreign policy did not pay much attention either, regarding the Kremlin's policy towards China as part and parcel of Russia's grand strategy directed towards the West. The main dividing line among those few who took a closer look ran between sceptics and alarmists. The former interpreted the post-Cold War rapprochement as superficial and envisioned an imminent clash of interests between the two states. The latter, a minority, saw the prospect of an anti-Western alliance.


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