From Radical Enactivism to Folk Philosophy

2020 ◽  
pp. 75-82
Author(s):  
Daniel D. Hutto ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Radical Enactivism

Lessons from a virtual slime: marginal mechanisms, minimal cognition and radical enactivism

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 453-464
Author(s):  
Lachlan Douglas Walmsley
Keyword(s):  
Physarum Polycephalum ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Radical Enactivism ◽  
Slime Mould ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
The Mind

Radical enactivism (REC) and similar embodied and enactive approaches to the mind deny that cognition is fundamentally representational, skull-bound and mechanistic in its organisation. In this article, I argue that modellers may still adopt a mechanistic strategy to produce explanations that are compatible with REC. This argument is scaffolded by a multi-agent model of the true slime mould Physarum polycephalum.

scholarly journals Enactivism, Radical Enactivism and Predictive Processing: What is Radical in Cognitive Science?

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Gärtner ◽  
Robert W. Clowes
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Dynamic Interaction ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Radical Enactivism ◽  
Problem Section ◽  
The World ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Basic Cognition

AbstractAccording to Enactivism, cognition should be understood in terms of a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. Further, this view holds that organisms do not passively receive information from this environment, they rather selectively create this environment by engaging in interaction with the world. Radical Enactivism adds that basic cognition does so without entertaining representations and hence that representations are not an essential constituent of cognition. Some proponents think that getting rid of representations amounts to a revolutionary alternative to standard views about cognition. To emphasize the impact, they claim that this ‘radicalization’ should be applied to all enactivist friendly views, including, another current and potentially revolutionary approach to cognition: predictive processing. In this paper, we will show that this is not the case. After introducing the problem (section 2), we will argue (section 3) that ‘radicalizing’ predictive processing does not add any value to this approach. After this (section 4), we will analyze whether or not radical Enactivism can count as a revolution within cognitive science at all and conclude that it cannot. Finally, in section 5 we will claim that cognitive science is better off when embracing heterogeneity.

scholarly journals RADICAL ENACTIVISM AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE

2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (141) ◽  
pp. 723-743
Author(s):  
Giovanni Rolla
Keyword(s):  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Radical Enactivism ◽  
Perceptual Model ◽  
Self Knowledge

ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness (one's beliefs, desires, intentions and so on) are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated with self-knowledge without entailing an insurmountable gap between self- knowledge and knowledge of other minds.

scholarly journals Radical enactivism, Wittgenstein and the cognitive gap

2014 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 350-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Loughlin
Keyword(s):  
Radical Enactivism

scholarly journals Enactivism and Normativity The Case of Aesthetic Gestures

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Boncompagni
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Psychology ◽  
Dynamic Interaction ◽  
Sense Making ◽  
Radical Enactivism ◽  
The Aesthetic

Enactivist approaches claim that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. An ongoing challenge for these approaches is the problem of accounting for normativity while avoiding overly reductionist outcomes. This article examines a few proposed solutions, including agent-environment dynamics, participatory sense-making, radical enactivism, the skilful intentionality framework, and enactivist cultural psychology. It argues that good examples of enacted normativity are gestures of appreciation/disapproval performed in the aesthetic domain. Both Wittgenstein and Dewey explore this issue and their ideas could be productively worked upon in an enactive account.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document