Michael J. Dodds, OP: The One Creator God in Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Theology

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 162-163
Author(s):  
Fabio Schilereff ◽  
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
Terezinha Oliveira

The considerations on the book “VirtuosaBenfeitoria” aim atevaluating the relevance of a social project to guide the actions of the ruler and theindividuals, with a view to practical actions that converge to the common good. The infant D. Pedro, also known as the Duke of Coimbra, wrote the work. The central focus of the book is to address the sense of improvement and how the prince should practice and bestow it and how the subjects would receive and practice it. The arguments of D. Pedro to deal with the good and the society are strongly influenced by classical authorities and authors of scholasticism, especially Thomas Aquinas. In this sense, on the one hand our study seeks to show that such knowledge was essential for him to understand the plots that build human relationships, whose premises, to him, should be the ones leading society towards the common good;on the other hand, the goal is to analyze the work we regard as essential theoretical and methodological principles of history that allow us to recover, through memory, historical events that potentially guide us through paths that show the relevance of the Master of the University, as a vector in the organization of a given society. 


Author(s):  
Andrea Possamai

The present essay aims, on the one hand, to recall the reasons of anti-naturalism, intended in a metaphysical perspective, of a large part of medieval philosophical and theological reflection and, on the other hand, to show how the same type of problems, specifically those concerning the possible mutability or immutability of the past, can be employed in favour of various conflicting positions on the matter. To demonstrate this, reference was made to some thinkers who could represent emblematic positions on the theme, in particular: Pliny the Elder for the ancient world, Augustine of Hippo, Peter Damian, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas for the medieval era.


1971 ◽  
Vol 118 (546) ◽  
pp. 549-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Basil Douglas-Smith

Religions mysticism (hereinafter referred to as R.M.) is defined as (alleged) direct experience of ultimate reality seen as personal or hyper-personal. It may take any one of three forms: nature mysticism, theistic mysticism, and monist mysticism. In nature mysticism, the percipient feels the whole of Nature, including man, to be pervaded and directed by Mind (the capital letters are used deliberately). Wordsworth's Prelude and Tintern Abbey provide classical examples. In theistic mysticism, the percipient feels himself to be aware of the God of religion in a purely spiritual manner, which in respect of its immediacy is felt to be analogous to sensory perception. Thomas Aquinas, in fact, defines this kind of experience as ‘direct awareness of God, analogous to sensory perception.’ In monist mysticism, the percipient feels himself to be the One-and-Only Mind. The Yogi mystic, Swami Vivekananda, provides the classical example of this latter type of experience, proclaiming ‘I am the Blissful One’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 739-749 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Roszak ◽  
Tomasz Huzarek

Abstract: How to recognize the presence of God in the world? Thomas Aquinas' proposition, based on the efficient, exemplary and intentional causality, including both the natural level and grace, avoids several simplifications, the consequence of which is transcendent blindness. On the one hand, it does not allow to fall into a panentheistic reductionism involving God into the game of His variability in relation to the changing world. The sensitivity of Thomas in interpreting a real existing world makes it impossible to close the subject in the ''house without windows'', from where God can only be presumed. On the other hand, the proposal of Aquinas avoids the radical transcendence of God, according to which He has nothing to do with the world.


Numen ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 245-270
Author(s):  
Willemien Otten

The development of medieval Christian thought reveals from its inception in foundational authors like Augustine and Boethius an inherent engagement with Neoplatonism. To their influence that of Pseudo-Dionysius was soon added, as the first speculative medieval author, the Carolingian thinker Johannes Scottus Eriugena (810–877ce), used all three seminal authors in his magisterial demonstration of the workings of procession and return. Rather than a stable ongoing trajectory, however, the development of medieval Christian (Neo)Platonism saw moments of flourishing alternate with moments of philosophical stagnation. The revival of theTimaeusand Platonic cosmogony in the twelfth century marks the achievement of the so-called Chartrian authors, even as theTimaeusnever acquired the authority of the biblical book of Genesis. Despite the dominance of scholastic and Aristotelian discourse in the thirteenth century, (Neo)Platonism continued to play an enduring role. The Franciscan Bonaventure follows the Victorine tradition in combining Augustinian and Dionysian themes, but Platonic influence underlies the pattern of procession and return — reflective of the Christian arc of creation and salvation — that frames the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Echoing the interrelation of macro- and microcosmos, the major themes of medieval Christian Platonic thought are, on the one hand, cosmos and creation and, on the other, soul and self. The Dominican friar Meister Eckhart and the beguine Marguerite Porete, finally, both Platonically inspired late-medieval Christian authors keen on accomplishing the return, whether the aim is to bring out its deep, abyss-like “ground” (Eckhart) or to give up reason altogether and surrender to the free state of “living without a why” (Marguerite), reveal the intellectual audacity involved in upending traditional theological modes of discourse.


2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-38
Author(s):  
Predrag Milidrag

In the first part of the Summa theologiae St. Thomas Aquinas analyzes the cognition in God, angels and human beings; he does that by comparing and juxtaposing them. On the one side, the questions concerning divine cognition, such as the identity of the divine cognition and the divine substance, its nondiscursivity, its scope or future contingents are considered in the articles dedicated to the angels. On the other side, the proper characteristics of the human cognition in the part of the Summa on human soul, such as the active intellect, lack of inborn intelligible species, the inductive procedure in the abstracting from sense cognition, the cognition of the particulars, those problems are analyzed in the part on angelic cognition too. So, there is a structural symmetry of corresponding questions in the Summa on divine, angelic and human cognition.


Lumen et Vita ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Bigelow Reynolds

Contemporary debates on divine impassibility generally offer two options: either affirm a suffering God who loves and cares, or uphold an impassible God who turns a blind eye to the cries of his people. For Thomas Aquinas, divine impassibility (along with the other divine attributes: simplicity, infinity, immutability, etc.) is not inconsonant with divine compassion. God’s unchangeable nature affirms, not undermines, God’s ability to love. This paper, acknowledging the inadequacy of these two incomplete and dichotomous categorizations, will argue that Thomas’ understanding of the divine names in the Summa Theologiae, 1a, q. 13 illuminates the way in which he reconciles impassibility and compassion in God.It is not the goal of this paper to defend either the idea that God does or does not suffer, nor to affirm or deny the doctrine of divine impassibility on a scale any larger than the work of Thomas and selected contemporary scholars who assist in the project of unpacking and analyzing his thought. It is the goal of this paper to examine in as close a way as possible how Thomas’ defense of divine impassibility can be placed in dialogue with his understanding of the way that humans know and name God, ultimately revealing the inadequacy in the polarizing assumption that an immutable God cannot love.I will begin by analyzing the structure and implications of Thomas’ defense of divine impassibility in Question 9. This will be followed by an analysis of how, in Thomas’ understanding, human knowledge of God, including God’s attribute of impassibility, affects human capacity to name God, here drawing heavily on the insights David Burrell. I will then explore the theological and scriptural implications of Thomas’ assertion that “The One Who Is” is the most appropriate name for God, ultimately arguing that an understanding of the Hebrew scripture from which this name is drawn reveals that God’s love and compassion on behalf of his suffering people is not opposed to but rather relies upon his unchanging nature.


2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-129
Author(s):  
Andrija Soc

The main goal of this paper is to explore the continuity and discontinuity in how different philosophical systems understand the concept of substance. At the beginning of the paper, I draw a distinction between formal criteria for what it means to be a substance and the question of what satisfies those criteria. I then analyze Aristotle?s, medieval and modern views on substance in order to show that, in spite of other considerable differences among them, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Descartes, Locke and Hume all identify the same criteria for being the substenc. The differences between them, I then claim, lie in the way they answer the question of what satisfies the criteria. The most radical conclusion, as will be clear, is drawn by Hume, who famously believes that there is nothing that really satisfies traditional formal criteria for substantiality. In the last part of the paper, I analyze Kant?s idealist view and show that it is his only within his philosophical system that we can find a complete break with the philosophical tradition and quite differing criteria for substantiality. It will be shown that, for Kant, substance is no longer something that should be the basis for the properties of objects that exist independently of us, but the way in which human cognitive powers understand some key aspects of the phenomenological domain of the knowable. The upshot of this discussion is that the history of the idea of substance can be divided on the period before and after Kant, where it is Kant, rather than Descartes, the one who truly diverges from the traditional philosophical pardigms about substance.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document