scholarly journals Public Philosophy of Technology

2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-200
Author(s):  
D. E. Wittkower ◽  
Evan Selinger ◽  
Lucinda Rush ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Public Philosophy

scholarly journals Public Philosophy of Technology

2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. E. Wittkower ◽  
Evan Selinger ◽  
Lucinda Rush ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Open Access ◽  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Public Philosophy ◽  
The Public ◽  
Open Access Publication ◽  
Public Role ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives

Philosophers of technology are not playing the public role that our own theoretical perspectives motivate us to take. A great variety of theories and perspectives within philosophy of technology, including those of Marcuse, Feenberg, Borgmann, Ihde, Michelfelder, Bush, Winner, Latour, and Verbeek, either support or directly call for various sorts of intervention—a call that we have failed to heed adequately. Barriers to such intervention are discussed, and three proposals for reform are advanced: (1) post-publication peer-reviewed reprinting of public philosophy, (2) increased emphasis on true open access publication, and (3) increased efforts to publicize and adapt traditional academic research.

Das Konzert der Maschinen

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Henning Schmidgen
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Contemporary Society ◽  
Transitional Space ◽  
Political Program ◽  
The Status ◽  
Mode Of Being

Gilbert Simondons Abhandlung Du mode d'existence des objets techniques (1958) operiert im Übergangsraum zwischen Heideggers Technikphilosophie und zeitgenössischer Kybernetik. Darüber hinaus skizziert Simondon ein explizit politisches Programm, das in der Forderung kulminiert, die technischen Objekte durch menschliche Repräsentanten in der Kultur der heutigen Gesellschaft besser zur Geltung zu bringen. Grundlage für dieses Programm ist seine Auffassung des technischen »Dings« als Medium. </br></br>Gilbert Simondon's essay (1958 [On the mode of being of technical objects]) operates in the transitional space between Heidegger's philosophy of technology and contemporary cybernetics. Furthermore, Simondon outlines an explicitly political program that culminates in the demand to emphasize the status of technical objects in the culture of contemporary society by way of human representatives. The basis for this program is his conception of the technical »thing« as a medium.

scholarly journals Technologizing the Transcendental, not Discarding it

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter Lemmens
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Primary Concern ◽  
Social Language ◽  
The Social ◽  
Technical Artifacts

AbstractIn this reply I further defend my claim that the transcendental should always remain a primary concern for philosophy of technology as a philosophical enterprise, contra the empirical turn’s rejection of it. Yet, instead of emphasizing the non-technological conditions of technology, as ‘classic’ thinkers of technology such as Heidegger did, it should recognize technology itself as the transcendental operator par excellence. Starting from Heidegger’s ontological understanding of transcendence I show that while technical artifacts may indeed always conform to a certain horizon of understanding, they also constitute this horizon in specific ways. Following Stiegler I show that concrete technologies (technology with a small ‘t’) are not just empirical effects of an overarching movement of transcendence (Technology with a capital ‘T’) but are originally constitutive of it. In response to Romele’s critique that the social, language, images, imaginaries, symbols, etc. are also transcendentals, I argue that all these phenomena are always already conditioned by technical milieus. As for Besmer’s contention that I offer a reductive interpretation of postphenomenology’s notion of multistability, I argue that there are decisive systemic and organological limits to multistability offered by technical artefacts and that all variation in use and implementation is always constrained by inherent technical tendencies and processes of concretization. Agreeing with Besmer that the transcendental and the empirical should be understood not oppositional but compositional I argue that technology may be that which constantly ‘mediates’ between the two.

scholarly journals Wearable robotic exoskeletons: A socio-philosophical perspective on Duchenne muscular dystrophy research

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 404-413
Author(s):  
Alexandra Kapeller ◽  
Michael H. Nagenborg ◽  
Kostas Nizamis
Keyword(s):  
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy ◽  
Muscular Dystrophy ◽  
Disability Studies ◽  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Research Projects ◽  
Philosophical Perspective ◽  
Individual Model ◽  
Engineering Sciences ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Individual

AbstractRecently, several research projects in the Netherlands have focused on the development of wearable robotic exoskeletons (WREs) for individuals with Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD). Such research on WREs is often treated solely within the disciplines of biomedical and mechanical engineering, overlooking insights from disability studies and philosophy of technology. We argue that mainly two such insights should receive attention: the problematization of the ableism connected to the individual model of disability and the stigmatization by assistive technology. While disability studies have largely rejected the individual model of disability, the engineering sciences seem to still locate disability in an individual’s body, not questioning their own problematization of disability. Additionally, philosophy of technology has argued that technologies are not neutral instruments but shape users’ actions and perceptions. The design of WREs may convey a message about the understanding of disability, which can be comprehended as a challenge and an opportunity: stigmatization needs to be avoided and positive views on disability can be evoked. This article aims to highlight the benefits of considering these socio-philosophical perspectives by examining the case of WREs for people with DMD and proposing design principles for WREs. These principles may enhance acceptability of WREs, not only by individuals with DMD but also by other users, and help engineers to better place their work in the social context.

scholarly journals Agency, Responsibility, Selves, and the Mechanical Mind

Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Fiorella Battaglia
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Human Machine Interaction ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Legal Perspective ◽  
Area Of Concern ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Brain

Moral issues arise not only when neural technology directly influences and affects people’s lives, but also when the impact of its interventions indirectly conceptualizes the mind in new, and unexpected ways. It is the case that theories of consciousness, theories of subjectivity, and third person perspective on the brain provide rival perspectives addressing the mind. Through a review of these three main approaches to the mind, and particularly as applied to an “extended mind”, the paper identifies a major area of transformation in philosophy of action, which is understood in terms of additional epistemic devices—including a legal perspective of regulating the human–machine interaction and a personality theory of the symbiotic connection between human and machine. I argue this is a new area of concern within philosophy, which will be characterized in terms of self-objectification, which becomes “alienation” following Ernst Kapp’s philosophy of technology. The paper argues that intervening in the brain can affect how we conceptualize the mind and modify its predicaments.

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