Human—Technology—World

2008 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 110-119
Author(s):  
Dennis M. Weiss ◽  

This essay examines Don Ihde’s postphenomological philosophy of technology through the lens of philosophical anthropology, that sub-discipline of philosophy concerned with the nature and place of the human being. While Ihde’s philosophical corpus and its reception in Postphenomenology: A Critical Companion to Ihde indicate rich resources for thinking about human nature, several themes receive too little attention in both, including the nature of the human being, the emergence of the posthuman, and the place of the human being in our contemporary pluriculture.

Author(s):  
Guzel K. Saikina ◽  
◽  
Zulfiya Z. Ibragimova ◽  

In the philosophy of the 20th century, the idea of the absence of nature in man was established, due to which the concept of «human nature» became a rudiment in anthropological knowledge, and man himself began to be comprehended as «unsupported». In the era of the «biotechnological revolution», this concept turns out to be inconvenient for the transgressive game of man with his own limits. However, the problematization of a person in modern anthropological discourse can occur in many respects precisely through questioning the human nature. In the era of developed biotechnologies, for the purposes of human ecology, modern anthropology should not so much deny as assert the nature of man, since the concept of «human nature» indicates an ontological framework that preserves the authenticity of man, ensuring the continuity of all his historical forms. In contrast to the interpretation of the concept of human nature as opposed to the social essence (as a base physical, material, biological, vital part of human being), it is heuristically significant to elevate it to a socially significant axiological principle, filling it with value content by raising the status of the human nature. This is especially important due to the fact that this concept is substantively included in ethical, social and humanitarian expertise of biotechnological projects. Without the axiological development of this concept, bioethical and ecological discourses will lose strength and persuasiveness. A person is always incomplete, multidimensional, multifaceted, therefore there cannot be a single essential idea of a person capable of becoming the cementing foundation of anthropological knowledge, as the first generation of «philosophical anthropology» representatives hoped for. Still, man is one anthropological type with a single nature. As a result of the study, a hypothesis has been put forward that it is the reanimation of the concept of «human nature» that will give unity to anthropological knowledge and become its «ideological core».


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-110
Author(s):  
Antoni Płoszczyniec

The aim of this article is the reconstruction, analysis and presentation of Henryk Elzenberg’s philosophy of the human being, with particular emphasis on his concept of asceticism. Elzenberg’s philosophical anthropology is based on the pessimistic evaluation of reality, which itself is founded on the negative evaluation of human nature. Human nature is corrupt because of the primary will of humanity, which is selfish and self-seeking and which strives only for utilitarian values. The overcoming of pessimism is possible by the transformation of self-seeking will, and asceticism is a remedy which enables human beings to see and realise true, perfectionist values. Asceticism can overcome basic instincts, which pull human nature down to the animal-like state of being. In Elzenberg’s philosophical anthropology, asceticism creates culture and culture grants humanity to humans, which is a trope similar to the ancient conception of paideia.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 523-534
Author(s):  
Jean Rhéaume

At least two important consequences follow from the fact that human rights are based on human nature. First, they exist according to natural law even in cases where positive law does not recognize them. Secondly, they cannot evolve because the nature and purpose of the human being does not change: only their formulation and level of protection in positive law can vary according to the socio-historical context.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-91
Author(s):  
Hans Martin Dober

Abstract In this article, I test out Hans Blumenberg’s understanding of consolation as a pattern to interpret Rosenzweig’s “new thinking.” Drawing on Blumenberg’s philosophical anthropology, I explore the connection between the concept of redemption as consolation and the image of the human being that it presupposes. I further examine the function of consolation in concepts and non-conceptual images through a comparison of redemptive consolation in the respective thought of Luther and Rosenzweig.


Author(s):  
Raquel Flores

ABSTRACTThis essay is part of a reflection whose purpose is to discuss and clarify some points and tensions around gender issues from the perspective of embodied consciousness, corporeality and temporality. The texts to be discussed for this purpose are the authors Edgar Morin: Introduction to Complex Thought (1994) and The Mind Sorted Bien (2001); Jacques Luc Nancy, Community DOA (2000) and Merleau-Ponty (1975) Phenomenology of Perception, authors who have allowed a glimpse of new theoretical contributions to gender. The challenge arises from the Philosophical Anthropology is trying to understand the “human phenomenon”, from a metaphysical perspective, according to this conception, the human being is the result of what he does to himself in his relationship with nature. To start this reflection, it is necessary to recognize that it arises from the Phenomenology, which is also considered a philosophy for which the world is always “already there” before reflection as an inalienable presence and allows to account for the space, time and "lived" world. Hurssel the theorist who founded this movement says: I'm not the result or crosslinking of the many coincidences that determine my body or my “psyche” but rather, all I know the world, I know from a prospect or mine experience the world without which the symbols of science would not want to say anything. (Husserl, 1913, p. 369-370)RESUMENEl presente ensayo es parte de una reflexión cuyo propósito es discutir y dilucidar algunos puntos de encuentro y tensiones en torno a la temática de género desde la perspectiva de la conciencia encarnada, la corporalidad y la temporalidad. Los textos que serán abordados para este objetivo son de los autores Edgar Morin: Introducción al Pensamiento Complejo (1994) y La Mente Bien Ordenada (2001); Jacques Luc Nancy, Comunidad Inoperante (2000) y Merlau-Ponty (1975) Fenomenología de la Percepción, autores que han permitido vislumbrar nuevos aportes teóricos al tema de género. El desafío que surge desde la Antropología Filosófica es tratar de entender el “fenómeno humano”, desde una perspectiva metafísica, según esta concepción el ser humano es el resultado de lo que hace consigo mismo en su relación con la naturaleza. Para iniciar esta reflexión, se hace necesario reconocer que ésta surge desde la Fenomenología, la que también es considerada una filosofía, para la cual el mundo está siempre “ya ahí”, antes de la reflexión como una presencia inalienable y que permite dar cuenta del espacio, del tiempo y del mundo “vividos”. Hurssel el teórico que funda este movimiento afirma que: no soy el resultado o entrecruzamiento de las múltiples casualidades que determinan mi cuerpo o mi “psiquismo” sino más bien, todo lo que sé del mundo, lo sé a partir de una perspectiva mía o de una experiencia del mundo sin la cual los símbolos de la ciencia no querrían decir nada. (Husserl, 1913. p. 369-370).


2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-157
Author(s):  
Roman Darowski

Roman Darowski. Philosophical Anthropology: Outline of Fundamental Problems. Translated from Polish by Łukasz Darowski SDS. Wydawnictwo Ignatianum [Editions of Ignatianum, The Jesuit University of Cracow, Wydawnictwo WAM: Cracow, 2014.—Author’s summary The translation of this book into English we are dealing with here is a somewhat changed and revised version of the 4th edition of Filozofia człowieka in Polish. The last section (“Human Being—an Absolute?”) has been expanded, while the “History of Philosophical Anthropology” chapter and the Anthology of Texts section have both been omitted.  


Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 238-260
Author(s):  
Franco Manni ◽  

From the ideas of Aristotle, De Saussure and Wittgenstein, philosopher Herbert McCabe elaborated an original anthropology. 'Meaning' means: the role played by a part towards the whole. Senses are bodily organs and sensations allow an animal to get fragments of the external world which become 'meaningful' for the behaviour of the whole animal Besides sensations, humans are ‘linguistic animals’ because through words they are able to 'communicate', that is, to share a peculiar kind of meanings: concepts. Whereas, sense-images are stored physically in our brain and cannot be shared, even though we can relate to sense-images by words (speech coincides with thought). However, concepts do not belong to the individual human being qua individual, but to an interpersonal entity: the language system. Therefore, on the one hand, to store images is a sense-power and an operation of the brain, whereas the brain (quite paradoxically!) is not in itself the organ of thought. On the other hand, concepts do not exist on their own.


Author(s):  
Douglas J. Den Uyl ◽  
Douglas B. Rasmussen

This chapter argues against the claim advanced by Daniel Haybron, Daniel C. Russell, and Mark LeBar that human self-perfection is ultimately based on notions of well-being and human flourishing that we bring to our understanding of human nature and in favor of the idea that it is human nature itself that ultimately grounds our understanding of human well-being or human flourishing. In doing so, the question of whether there is some gap between (a) what it is to be a good human being and (b) what is good for a human being is addressed. It is shown that the arguments on behalf of a such a gap fail and that the version of perfectionism that is advanced—that is, individualistic perfectionism—is ideally suited to not only avoid such a gap but also to display their unity, especially when perfection is understood as a process of living things and not as some cosmic or metaphysical process.


Author(s):  
Sara Brill

This chapter offers an account of the bios of the human animal in light of Aristotle’s treatment of the lives of non-human animal collectives. This discussion is anchored in Aristotle’s claim that the regime (the politeia) is the way of life of the city, and it is argued that proper attention to the zoological lens informing Aristotle’s Politics requires us to view the relation between human being and polis as an intensified form of the relation between any animal and its proper habitat. Its intensity is due precisely to the forms of intimacy and estrangement made possible by the possession of language. The Politics’s sustained meditation on how to ensure the longevity of a city’s bios—its political ecology—must, then, be read as a necessary complement to its account of human nature, its anthropology.


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