Problems of Framing
2020 ◽
Vol 13
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pp. 118-129
Keyword(s):
In “Fatalism and Time,” Mark Bernstein argues against the notion that the B-theory of time is fatalistic. However, when he frames the differences between the A-theory of time and the B-theory of time, I argue that Bernstein imports some troublesome conceptual baggage in the form of what he calls “atemporal truths,” which, in the end, dooms the B-theory to fatalism, the consequence he sought to avoid. From my examination of Bernstein’s framing of the B-theory of time, I suggest that, given the proper framing of that theory, it is not doomed to fatalism.
Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
1962 ◽
Vol EC-11
(4)
◽
pp. 571-572
Keyword(s):
2010 ◽
Vol 57
(2)
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pp. 708-714
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):