A Case for How Eschatological and Soteriological Considerations Strengthen the Plausibility of a Good God

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-272
Author(s):  
Zachary Breitenbach ◽  

This article contends that considerations of continued human existence beyond this earthly life are advantageous both for defending against a key challenge to the existence of a good God (the evidential problem of evil) and for making a positive moral case for theism. On the defensive side, I address the charge that the amount and alleged gratuitousness of evil render God’s existence unlikely. On the offensive side, I leverage postmortem considerations to bolster a positive case for a good God by offering new arguments that God and an afterlife are key to making sense of moral rationality and morality’s overridingness.

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 154
Author(s):  
Toby Betenson

Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil assume that “logical” formulations of the problem are untenable, and that we should operate with “evidential” formulations instead. I argue that this consensus is founded on a mistake and that there is no legitimate reason to abandon logically binding formulations of the problem of evil. I conclude by arguing that, though it is possible to formulate a genuinely “evidential” problem of evil, logical formulations of the problem of evil are preferable in all cases.


Author(s):  
William Hasker

In Chapter 3 of this volume, Klaas Kraay presented a critique of William Hasker’s necessity-of-gratuitous-evil defense against the evidential problem of evil (the NGE defense). Hasker’s response here in Chapter 4 contends that the defense survives all of Kraay’s objections. Most important of these objections is the contention that there is far too much gratuitous evil to be accounted for by Hasker’s defense.


Author(s):  
Giovanni Stanghellini

This chapter reformulates the concept of ‘conflict’, arguing that conflicts do not inevitably involve an unconscious desire—they involve plurality. Conflicts go with being human because we are intrinsically plural, as we are inhabited by alterity. Plurality implies disunion. This does not amount merely to internal conflicts in a strict psychoanalytical sense; rather, it is the ubiquitous presence of non-coincidence and eccentricity. Human existence constantly escapes any coinciding with an essence. Disunion means that I am called to take a position in front of myself, and more specifically in front of the otherness I experience in my existence. One does not coincide with his experience. To be human is to deal with this reflective duplicity by taking upon myself the responsibility for articulating, making sense of, coping with, and appropriating. All this is explained through a clinical example: post partum depression.


2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-272
Author(s):  
László Bernáth ◽  
Daniel Kodaj

Abstract The evidential problem of evil involves a rarely discussed challenge, namely the challenge of defending theism against the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator. Our argument uses a Bayesian framework and it starts by showing that if the only alternative to classical theism is naturalistic atheism, then fine-tuning can render theism virtually certain, even in the face of evil. But if the alternatives include the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator, theism is defeated even if the fine-tuning premise is accepted. The resulting version of the evidential problem is unsolvable using the tools that are currently deployed by theists against evil.


2006 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
CARLO FILICE

I attempt to show that a cosmic theistic scheme that includes multiple lives as part of a benign plan for the world is likely to be the most moral scheme. It has the best chance of dealing with key aspects of the problem of evil, or of apparent cosmic injustice – particularly when compared to a single-life scheme. Its advantages have to do with the initial disparate condition of children, and with the massive nature of undeserved harm. A multiple-lives scheme is also promising for handling broader meaning of life questions. I end by replying to some common objections to multiple-lives schemes.


BMJ ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 2 (5547) ◽  
pp. 298-298
Author(s):  
E. Stengel
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 55-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Law

AbstractSkeptical theism is a popular - if not universally theistically endorsed - response to the evidential problem of evil. Skeptical theists question how we can be in a position to know God lacks God-justifying reason to allow the evils we observe. In this paper I examine a criticism of skeptical theism: that the skeptical theists skepticism re divine reasons entails that, similarly, we cannot know God lacks God-justifying reason to deceive us about the external world and the past. This in turn seems to supply us with a defeater for all our beliefs regarding the external world and past? Critics argue that either the skeptical theist abandon their skeptical theism, thereby resurrecting the evidential argument from evil, or else they must embrace seemingly absurd skeptical consequences, including skepticism about the external world and past. I look at various skeptical theist responses to this critique and find them all wanting.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jannai Shields

I argue that Stephen Wykstra’s much discussed Parent Analogy is helpful in responding to the evidential problem of evil when it is expanded upon from a positive skeptical theist framework. This framework, defended by John Depoe, says that although we often remain in the dark about the first-order reasons that God allows particular instances of suffering, we can have positive second-order reasons that God would create a world with seemingly gratuitous evils. I respond to recent challenges to the Parent Analogy by arguing that God, like a good parent, wants a rightly ordered relationship of mutual love with created beings.


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