Conscious Matter and Matters of Conscience

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-156
Author(s):  
Matthew Owen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Scientific Study ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Philosophical Basis ◽  
Consciousness Studies ◽  
Life Itself ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

In recent decades consciousness science has become a prominent field of research. This essay analyzes the most recent book by a leading pioneer in the scientific study of consciousness. In the The Feeling of Life Itself Christof Koch presents the integrated information theory and applies it to multiple pressing topics in consciousness studies. This essay considers the philosophical basis of the theory and Koch’s application of it from neurobiology to animal ethics.

scholarly journals Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Ellia ◽  
Jeremiah Hendren ◽  
Matteo Grasso ◽  
Csaba Kozma ◽  
Garrett Mindt ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Scientific Study ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
The Way ◽  
Integrated Information

Abstract Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically—its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do.

Phenomenology and mechanisms of consciousness: Considering the theoretical integration of phenomenology with a mechanistic framework

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 601-619 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Pokropski
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Mechanistic Model ◽  
Axiomatic Method ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Theoretical Integration ◽  
Consciousness Studies ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

In this article, I consider the possibility of a theoretical integration of phenomenology and a mechanistic framework. First, I discuss the mechanistic model of explanation and the idea of theoretical integration in science as opposed to unification. I argue that the mechanistic model of explanation is preferable for integrating the cognitive sciences, although it is limited and in the case of consciousness studies should be complemented with phenomenology. Second, I examine three possible approaches to the integration of phenomenology and the mechanistic model of explanation. First, I discuss Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness and propose a new argument against IIT’s axiomatic method—namely, I argue that IIT misuses the notion of axiom. Next, I discuss two different proposals for the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences: front-loaded phenomenology and neurophenomenology. I argue that these proposals cannot be integrated with a mechanistic framework unless requisite modifications are made.

scholarly journals Awareness and integrated information theory identify plant meristems as sites of conscious activity

PROTOPLASMA ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Trewavas
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Complex Networks ◽  
Environmental Changes ◽  
Biological Function ◽  
Human Consciousness ◽  
Extrinsic Information ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Conscious Activity ◽  
Integrated Information

AbstractLacking an anatomical brain/nervous system, it is assumed plants are not conscious. The biological function of consciousness is an input to behaviour; it is adaptive (subject to selection) and based on information. Complex language makes human consciousness unique. Consciousness is equated to awareness. All organisms are aware of their surroundings, modifying their behaviour to improve survival. Awareness requires assessment too. The mechanisms of animal assessment are neural while molecular and electrical in plants. Awareness of plants being also consciousness may resolve controversy. The integrated information theory (IIT), a leading theory of consciousness, is also blind to brains, nerves and synapses. The integrated information theory indicates plant awareness involves information of two kinds: (1) communicative, extrinsic information as a result of the perception of environmental changes and (2) integrated intrinsic information located in the shoot and root meristems and possibly cambium. The combination of information constructs an information nexus in the meristems leading to assessment and behaviour. The interpretation of integrated information in meristems probably involves the complex networks built around [Ca2+]i that also enable plant learning, memory and intelligent activities. A mature plant contains a large number of conjoined, conscious or aware, meristems possibly unique in the living kingdom.

How to Catch an AI Zombie

2020 ◽  
pp. 439-458
Author(s):  
Susan Schneider
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Real World ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Artificial Consciousness ◽  
High Level ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

How can we determine if AI is conscious? The chapter begins by illustrating that there are potentially very serious real-world costs to getting facts about AI consciousness wrong. It then proposes a provisional framework for investigating artificial consciousness that involves several tests or markers. One test is the AI Consciousness Test, which challenges an AI with a series of increasingly demanding natural-language interactions. Another test is based on the Integrated Information Theory, developed by Giulio Tononi and others, and considers whether a machine has a high level of “integrated information.” A third test is a Chip Test, where speculatively an individual’s brain is gradually replaced with durable microchips. If this individual being tested continues to report having phenomenal consciousness, the chapter argues that this could be a reason to believe that some machines could have consciousness.

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