Advancing the Aristotelian Project in Contemporary Metaphysics: A Review Essay

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 435-442
Author(s):  
Robert C. Koons ◽  

In a recent book, Substance and the Fundamentality of the Familiar, Ross Inman demonstrates the contemporary relevance of an Aristotelian approach to metaphysics and the philosophy of nature. Inman successfully applies the Aristotelian framework to a number of outstanding problems in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of physics. Inman tackles some intriguing questions about the ontological status of proper parts, questions which constitute a central focus of ongoing debate and investigation.

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-195
Author(s):  
Giuliano Andrea Vivaldi

This review-essay explores approaches to the thought of the creative Soviet Marxist thinker Evald Ilyenkov as discussed in a recent book edited by Alex Levant and Vesa Oittinen, Dialectics of the Ideal: Evald Ilyenkov and Creative Soviet Marxism. The book consists of a series of commentaries and contextual essays which centre on the translated text of Ilyenkov’s Dialectics of the Ideal. The approach the authors take to Ilyenkov’s work differs from previous ones of exploring the totality of Ilyenkov’s thought or eclectic aspects of it. By commenting on and contextualising Ilyenkov’s major text on the Ideal they locate the contribution of Ilyenkov in dialogue with traditions of classical European philosophy, and Western and Soviet Marxism, and in his importance to contemporary issues in philosophy and other disciplines. A deep analysis of Ilyenkov’s dense and often complex text is also given. By doing so the authors highlight the immense contribution of Ilyenkov to contemporary thought.


Dialogue ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-46
Author(s):  
Murray Lewis Miles

The problem of the person may be described as the crux of Descartes' philosophy in the fairly obvious literal sense that it is the point of intersection of the two chief axes of the system, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind. The actual, if not professed aim of the former is the ousting of the occult powers and faculties of Scholastic-Aristotelian physics by the mechanical concept of force or action-by-contact. The chief tenet of the latter is that mind, whose essence is thinking, is clearly and distinctly conceivable apart from matter, the essence of which is extension. From this, by an illicit inference which need not concern us further, Descartes concludes that the mind is “really distinct” from matter, that is, a substance capable of existing apart from body in its own right. Where these two lines of thought meet, the problem of the person constitutes itself in the following manner.


2013 ◽  
Vol 38 (04) ◽  
pp. 1041-1057
Author(s):  
Boğaç A. Ergene

This review essay engages Kristen Stilt's recent book, Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion, and Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt (2011), in a fashion that highlights its contributions to the study of Islamic law. In particular, it underlines the methodological arguments made in the book that might help us think about Islamic legal practice in sophisticated and historically grounded ways. As elaborated in the article, these arguments have important implications for modern as well historical settings. Specifically, Stilt's discussion of “Islamic law in action” reveals the inherent flexibility of Islamic legal practice to accommodate political change. The article also discusses how further research on the topic could benefit from specific approaches and orientations.


2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Pratt

This essay reviews a recent book on a New Zealand child abuse case which has become well-known in that country. It uses the review to explore broader issues associated with the differing and controversial forms of child sexual abuse that have come into focus in some English speaking societies over the last 20 years and the social context which has made their emergence possible.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-142
Author(s):  
L. David Ritchie

Abstract After a brief flurry of attention following its introduction by Dawkins (1976), the concept of memes has largely disappeared from mainstream social and cognitive science discourse. A significant exception is Dennett’s (1995; 2017) writings on the philosophy of mind. In his most recent book, Dennett (2017) develops what he presents as a comprehensive account of cultural evolution, based on the claims that memes, defined as a “way of behaving (roughly) that can be copied, transmitted, remembered, taught…,” develop through evolutionary processes more or less identical to the processes through which biological organisms and their genes evolve, and that both memes and genes are active agents in their own evolution. Although Dennett presents some very interesting ideas about the co-evolution of culture and human brains, he couches his argument in a system of personification, organism, war, and object metaphors that implicitly assign mental activities including intending, competing, and planning to memes. In this paper I analyze Dennett’s metaphors and argue that they effectively distract attention from the psychological and cultural processes that actually determine whether a behavior pattern (i.e. a meme) is learned, remembered, and reproduced (none of which Dennett acknowledges). I then show how the substance of Dennett’s argument can be rephrased in language that avoids the obfuscating effect of his metaphors. In addition to countering a common metaphor-based misconception in evolution theory, this analysis illustrates the importance of close attention to the entailments of conceptual metaphors used as theoretical arguments.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 169-191
Author(s):  
Sarah E. Rollens

This essay reviews Alan Kirk’s recent book Q in Matthew: Ancient Media, Memory, and Early Scribal Transmissions of the Jesus Tbrradition, which analyzes the techniques of ancient scribal composition alongside memory theory to better understand how the author of the Gospel of Matthew used his sources.


2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
pp. 18-26
Author(s):  
Daniel Luporini de Faria

No presente artigo, pretende-se expor e analisar as críticas que Noam Chomsky (2000) dirige contra o materialismo em filosofia da mente. Para o referido autor, a rigor, não faria sentido questionar o estatuto ontológico da mente, na medida em que os próprios físicos e filósofos materialistas desconhecem 90% da matéria que constitui o universo (a matéria e energia escuras). Deste modo, Chomsky dirá que no tempo de Descartes, da filosofia mecânica, o que se fazia era ciência normal, ao passo que após o advento das ideias de Newton, o universo passa a ser antimaterialista. O presente trabalho pode ser útil/valioso à filosofia e história das ciências naturais, à física e à filosofia da mente. Palavras-chave: Materialismo; Matéria Escura; Filosofia Mecânica.   Abstract The aim of this paper is to expose and analyze Noam Chomsky’s criticisms against materialism in philosophy of mind. For this author, strictly speaking, questioning the ontological status of the mind would not make sense, considering that the materialistic physicists and philosophers themselves are unaware of 90% of the matter that constitutes the universe (dark matter and energy). Accordingly, Chomsky will say that in Descartes’ time, or in times of mechanical philosophy, what was done was normal science, while after the advent of Newton's ideas the universe becomes anti-materialist. This paper can be useful/valuable to philosophy and history of natural sciences, physics and philosophy of mind. Keywords: Materialism; Dark Matter; Mechanical Philosophy.


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