Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 216-218
Author(s):  
Travis Dickinson ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Externalism

scholarly journals Does Justification Aim at Truth?

2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Graham
Keyword(s):  
Crucial Role ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
General Interest ◽  
Common View ◽  
Interesting Part ◽  
Interesting Connection ◽  
Epistemic Externalism

Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer ‘Yes’; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. In ‘The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism’ they argue that justification bears no interesting connection to truth; justification does not even aim at truth. ‘Truth is not a very interesting part of our best understanding’ of justification (C&P 2004, 137); it has no ‘connection to the truth.’ A ‘truth-aimed … epistemology is not entitled to carry the day’ (C&P 2004, 138, emphasis added).Pollock and Cruz's argument for this surprising conclusion is of general interest for it is ‘out of step with a very common view on the part of epistemologists, both internalist and externalist alike’ (C&P 2004, 136), as nearly all ‘epistemologists have claimed that truth and falsity play a crucial role in distinguishing between justified and unjustified beliefs [for] believing truths is the ultimate aim of human rational cognition’ (C&P 2004, 125; cf. Audi 1988).

scholarly journals A METAPHILOSOPHICAL DILEMMA FOR EPISTEMIC EXTERNALISM

2005 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 688-707
Author(s):  
Pierre Le Morvan
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Externalism

The ‘Conditional Position Problem’ for epistemic externalism

Synthese ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 197 (12) ◽  
pp. 5203-5224
Author(s):  
Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas
Keyword(s):  
Position Problem ◽  
Epistemic Externalism

Review: Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism

Mind ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 116 (464) ◽  
pp. 1088-1092
Author(s):  
Stephen Hetherington
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Externalism

Religious disagreement, externalism, and the epistemology of disagreement: listening to our grandmothers

2007 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 417-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES KRAFT
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Peer Conflict ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Key Points ◽  
Religious Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Externalism

AbstractA new emphasis in epistemology is burgeoning, known by the phrase ‘the epistemology of disagreement’. The object of investigation is the situation where the two combatants of a disagreement are equally well situated epistemologically. Central questions include whether peer epistemic conflict reduces the support one has for one's belief, whether the reduction should be understood on internalist or externalist lines, and how often such peer conflict happens. The main objective in the first two sections will be to provide background by bringing key points of contention to the surface in the recent epistemologies of disagreement both in mainstream epistemology and in religious epistemology. A final section asserts that epistemic externalism in religious epistemology doesn't easily escape the challenge of epistemic, peer, religious disagreement.

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